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“The gates were closed, the sun was gone down, and there was no beauty but the gray beauty of
steel that withstands all time. Even the grief he could have borne was left behind in the country
of illusion, of youth, of the richness of life, where his winter dreams had flourished.”
-F. Scott Fitzgerald, “Winter Dreams” (1922)

“We once believed... that there were things one place which did not exist in another.”
-Zelda Fitzgerald, Save Me the Waltz (1932)
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PREFACE
I started out intending to write a dissertation on confluences of manhood, economy, and
American region in F. Scott Fitzgerald‟s fiction. I was drawn both to Fitzgerald‟s dated Algeresque regional stereotypes and his deployment of these static forms in the spastic modernist
literary environment. My original project entailed mapping Fitzgerald‟s representation of the
United States through the gender and economic tropes coded in the regional types he so
frequently invoked: stock characters like his displaced Southern men (who flee home to pursue
wealth up north) and his wide-eyed Midwestern boys (who never fit in with their East Coast
peers at prep school). Yet every attempt to write that particular dissertation faltered, for
Fitzgerald‟s America proved at each step to be much broader in historical scope than the first
half of the twentieth century and much larger in space than the forty-eight states that formed the
Union when he died in 1940.
More often than not, Fitzgerald‟s sectional stereotypes are indebted to nineteenth-century
American regionalist literatures, meaning that any serious consideration of region in his Jazz Age
and Great Depression fiction must reach at least as far back as the time of Harriet Beecher
Stowe. Otherwise, it is difficult to explain why Fitzgerald‟s contemporary critics resisted his
sentimental caricatures and what political purpose he had in invoking them in the first place.
Fitzgerald‟s cosmopolitanism (and that of his peers) poses another obstacle to an exclusively
American, strictly twentieth-century reading of region in his works. When writing about
American place, interwar authors made frequent connections between domestic and foreign
spaces. H.L. Mencken, along with a number of eugenicist thinkers, blamed the South‟s
economic woes in part on the supposedly bad genes of European immigrants; Fitzgerald himself
compared the French Riviera to the American South; and many writers likened the glamor of US
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cities to the Orientalized allure of the Far East. The recent Great War had made the world a
smaller place, a phenomenon evident in the overlap of these imagined geographies.
Thus, while this dissertation retains an emphasis on American region in the era of Boom
and Bust, it incorporates a wide perspective of regionalist literary history and a transnational
approach more conducive to explicating Fitzgerald‟s politicized citations of foreign contexts. In
referring to “Fitzgerald‟s America,” the title of the present project alludes both to the places he
represented in fiction and to the American/transnational histories surrounding his works. These
strategies provide a toolset for analyzing the paradox of American place in the early twentieth
century: the country seemed to shrink as a result of syndicated media and the homogenization of
culture, but it expanded considerably in terms of global connectivity and the dissemination of US
cultural products abroad. What I hope to show is the remarkable extent to which Fitzgerald‟s
fiction capitalized on the blurring of these geographic boundaries.
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ABSTRACT
The two decades between World Wars I and II were a remarkably isolationist,
xenophobic period in the history of American politics and culture. In the era‟s literature,
however, some US authors repurposed regional writing as a medium for rethinking conservative
nationalism and for imagining their country‟s place in the emerging global community. F. Scott
Fitzgerald, whose career successes and failures mirrored the parabolic national pattern of Boom
and Bust, was one such author. Though his works have seldom been interpreted through a
regionalist lens, Fitzgerald lived in and wrote about every major American section, often
planting tropes of transregional and transnational significance in his “local color” fictions, using
US place to address sociopolitical topics. When Fitzgerald wrote about his native Midwest, he
contrasted its pastoral past with its rapidly urbanizing present; in taking up this theme, he linked
his works with a body of 1920s fiction and social scientific discourse arguing that newlybooming Midwestern cities presented evidence of a spreading cultural homogeneity. His stories
about the South ponder the role of biological determinism in inter-regional debates about
defining “progress” and “regress” in the 1920s. In his writings about the regional East, he
frequently incorporated nominal “Oriental” elements, juxtaposing the excessive privilege of
blue-blooded American “Brahmin” with the plight of Asian immigrants assailed in the era by
draconian immigration reform. Fitzgerald‟s American West came to serve in his late career
works as a representation of moribund Western Civilization, beleaguered by fascism and antidemocratic elements; like a handful of other authors in the 1930s, he drew inspiration from the
elegiac, apocalyptic tone of the Western film genre, and he combined Western tropes with the
philosophy of Oswald Spengler to express his pessimism about the “decline of the West.” Even
his writings about foreign locales contained traces of American regional and national identities,
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for he compared the multiracial French Riviera to the miscegenated American South, and he
critiqued American usurpations of French space in 1920s Paris. Fitzgerald‟s works (and those of
his literary peers) provide an invaluable index for reevaluating the significance of regionalist
prose in a transnational context.

viii

INTRODUCTION: PLACE IN FITZGERALD
Place is an essential abstraction in literary studies. In her essay “Place in Fiction” (1956),
Eudora Welty concedes that the term itself “means little” but nevertheless functions as one of the
“beacon lights of literature” (Stories, Essays, & Memoir 781, 796). Writers tie themselves and
their works to carefully selected geographic keystones, places to which they are linked by birth
or circumstance. Often, readers of such works are excited by the prospect of verisimilitude, the
accurate artistic rendering of a familiar place in such a way that a geographic section springs to
life in fiction as it cannot on a map. But critics and scholars are generally less interested in the
idea that a specific place has been represented than in the problems of how and why it has, for, in
the works of our greatest American writers, place is nearly always political. Individual regions
come to embody social and economic ideals or fantasies about the future of the larger United
States. We find authors sparring over the validity of these interpretations, each seeking to
reproduce in print a calculated vision of a region that responds to some opponent‟s prior insight.
Brad Evans observes that around the time of the Civil War regional writers began to value
“literature as a synecdoche of the nation” (Before Cultures 90). Regionally coded texts were
burdened with the paradoxical task of conveying “regionalism‟s nationalism,” the idea that a
specific geographic part expressed a representative relation to an abstract national whole (86).
Following the failed Confederate secession, writers from the Northeast, South, Midwest, and
West did not celebrate their difference from the larger nation so much as they argued for their
exclusive territorial ownership of an ever-changing, heatedly-debated set of nationalistic values.
Place is nearly as politicized in American culture today as it was almost two centuries
ago. During election years, television pundits need little encouragement to roll out their
demographic charts (neatly overlaid onto maps of the nation) and draw attention to the regional
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implications of our enduring red state-blue state divide. Southern states are, with few
exceptions, Republican red, while Northeastern states tend towards bleeding heart blue. The
West Coast is a long bar of Democratic indigo, while the Midwestern swing states are
increasingly rouge. Stereotypes and barbs ring out between inhabitants of these places.
Urbanites who associate social conservatism with rural locales might refer to any place not in the
Northeast or on the West Coast as “flyover country.” Conversely, some inhabitants of “flyover
country” may regard Eastern city dwellers and Western liberals as “un-American” or, oddly
enough, “Canadian.” Politicians themselves draw upon this inter-regional animus to secure
support via an “us versus them” mentality. Pandering to the Tea Party, conservative Southern
and Midwestern governors regularly refuse relief and stimulus funds from Washington, citing
state independence, fiscal responsibility, and regional strength as reasons for their anti-federal
stance.
Such debates about the political, ethical, and economic value of place persist in spite of—
or perhaps because of—the fact that ideas about place are both abstract and mutable. American
notions of sectional identity have changed drastically over the course of history, both as the
nation expanded westward and as industry drew portions of the country away from its agrarian
heritage. Tennessee, for instance, was in the late 1700s the western frontier, and it was
subsequently referred to as “Midwestern” in the early 1800s. But the state‟s slave-owning past,
its status as a former Confederate state, and its initial resistance to industrial capitalism have left
Tennessee staunchly Southern in the modern American mind. There also exist regionally liminal
places that defy simple classification. What are we to make of states like Kentucky and
Missouri, regional border zones between the modern South and the Midwest? And what about
Maryland, which occupies a strange nebulous space between Northeast and South? These are
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fundamentally political questions, for regional identity (how a state‟s citizens envision
themselves as well as how the people of other states envision them) helps determine which
national leaders will earn the goodwill of the state‟s electorate. Southern voters perceive shared
values in Southern candidates—if none are available, they lean towards conservatives who have
earned the support of Southern governors. Interestingly, states in regional transition away from
traditional Southern identity—places like Maryland and Florida but also, to a lesser extent,
Virginia and North Carolina—have functioned as battleground states in recent presidential
elections. Their acknowledged regional ambivalence seems to be reflected in their persistent
political ambivalence.
If the regional identity of places proves subject to change, so too does the regional
identity of individual people (especially entertainers and politicians). In contemporary American
pop culture, Southern humor icon Larry the Cable Guy is actually the fictional creation of Dan
Whitney, a Nebraskan stand-up comedian. His ability to affect a rural Southern accent has
allowed him to reap millions from comedy tours, television shows, and movies. In politics, we
have the example of George W. Bush, who despite hailing from a long line of New England
politicians emphasized his Texas upbringing as he pursued state and national office. He
strategically downplayed his birth in Connecticut, his prep school attendance in Massachusetts,
his undergraduate studies at Yale, and his graduate degree from Harvard. He correctly intuited
that the American public would prefer a Southern good old boy to a New England blueblood, a
type he would face and trounce in his 2004 campaign against challenger John Kerry. In
selectively crafting a salable regional self, Bush was in fine political company. Theodore
Roosevelt similarly rose in politics by drawing attention away from his pampered Eastern
upbringing and toward his more appealing Western rancher identity. The writer Owen Wister,
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Roosevelt‟s friend and fellow Easterner, applied a similar process of persona formation to his
literary career. Born in Philadelphia, he later claimed the West as a second home and essentially
invented the modern Western. Wister‟s contributions to the genre have circulated back into the
realm of politics and greatly influenced American ideals of rugged independence and laissezfaire economics. Since Wister, every US president who has donned a cowboy hat for a publicity
photo has paid subtle tribute to the puissance of literary regionalism.
In addition to being abstract and mutable, then, place is meaningful. Cited within a
contextual network of cultural signifiers, imagined regional geographies convey a wealth of
information and assumption. Such citations gesture towards the unceasing discourse between
US sections about what is authentically or desirably American. Whether tied to economic
realpolitik or to mostly unreal stereotypes, demarcations of region are inherently political
divisions. Works by American writers tell us a great deal about how these part-cartographic,
part-ideological lines have been drawn at various moments in US history, but often authors work
exclusively within a slice of map they stake as their own: William Faulkner‟s Mississippi,
Sinclair Lewis‟s Midwest, John Updike‟s New England, et cetera. These are valuable depictions
of place because they capture a regional insider‟s perspective on the relation of a geographic
section to other parts of the nation and to the country as a whole. Rarer, however, are works by
displaced writers in transit from one American place to another—not one-off travel narratives
but writings by authors deprived of area insider status by frequent removals. Through a process
Evans describes as “the movement across perspectival frames” (99), such persons acquire unique
insight into the conflict between sectional identity and national character. In the nineteenth
century, Edgar Allan Poe inherited the gifts and burdens of this special perspective as he
careened from place to place: Boston, Richmond, Baltimore, Philadelphia, and New York City.
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His works sought to assess the emerging character of Jacksonian and post-Jacksonian America
from a variety of sectional perspectives, from the Southern identity he adopted to the New
England hauteur he despised but envied. In the late twentieth century, one observes the impact
of regional displacement in the novels of Cormac McCarthy, who abandoned, midcareer,
Southern Appalachia and struck out for the American Southwest. His books, which prior to the
move had contrasted a deviant South with a normative nation, subsequently began to consider
the theme of the frontier in the American present. But it is with Francis Scott Key Fitzgerald, the
great American writer who never settled in any particular American place, that this project is
ultimately concerned.

F. Scott Fitzgerald and the Post-Regionalist American Literary Scene
Few writers saw and wrote about as much of the United States as Fitzgerald. His five
novels and hundred-plus short stories feature an impressive range of American settings: the
metropolises and suburbs of the Northeast, the humbler burgs of the urban Midwest, the
mountains and prairies of the further West, the entertainment industry boom towns of the West
Coast, the South‟s dilapidated old cities, and a number of in-between places that defy regional
stereotypes. Appropriately, then, Fitzgerald wrote through a transitional moment in American
history, a time when regionalist writing was on the decline and sectional identification was
becoming vastly more complicated than it had been in the nineteenth century. Immediately
before the Civil War, place had functioned in literature as a convenient means of dividing
Americans into identifiable sectional categories with discrete political interests and disparate
beliefs, paradoxically depicting a United States of disunion. In the postbellum era, local color
writing and regionalist literatures seemed to invoke the same categories for the entirely opposite
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purpose. Readers from all around the country eagerly consumed fictions that were marketed as
regionally-specific ethnographic documents. The emphasis turned to celebrating geographic and
cultural difference as essential to the American character in abstract—romances of reunion. But
inter-regional competitiveness often informed these writings, especially as Midwestern authors
now argued that their region had inherited the rugged, artisanal aura of American-ness outgrown
by the metropolitan Northeast and squandered by the plantocratic South.
However, this literary discourse was in decline when Fitzgerald began his professional
career. Sinclair Lewis, himself a Midwesterner, had in Main Street (1920) and Babbitt (1922)
been highly skeptical of the notion that Midwestern pastoralism was the hard-working but
liberal-minded face of modern American identity. He portrayed the region as mired in
xenophobia and materialism, enamored with the urban East it supposedly opposed. His
resistance to regionalist writing was symptomatic of a general downturn; in the urbanized and
increasingly globalized 1920s, the market for regional niche fiction (which was typically
retrospective in nature) had changed. Furthermore, as Lynn Dumenil has observed, the
importance of local and regional politics were changing as well, for interest groups and lobbyists
were permitting voters to move beyond geographical boundaries in their efforts to achieve
representation (Modern Temper 53-54). Nevertheless, many Americans, especially Southerners,
continued to find regional identification an important tool for articulating resistance to both
nationalism and consumerism. This was the modern America for and about which Fitzgerald
wrote: a country clinging to not-quite-vestigial notions of regional difference in an era when
technology and politics worked, to varying degrees of success, at minimizing that difference. It
was a place in many ways not unlike our present United States.
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Mapping the course of Fitzgerald‟s life reveals a wild confusion of eastward and
westward trajectories further complicated by conflicting Northern and Southern social
allegiances. In 1896, on the cusp of the twentieth century, Fitzgerald was born in St. Paul,
Minnesota to parents of mixed regional heritage: his mother‟s family was part of the Midwestern
nouveau riche, and his father‟s was old Maryland stock. The Fitzgeralds soon moved to New
York state, where they lived until financial concerns forced them to move back to St. Paul in
1908. The family also made semi-frequent trips to visit relatives in southern Maryland. Because
Mollie and Edward Fitzgerald were upper-middle-class parents with hopes that their son would
rise even higher, in 1911 they sent young Scott east to the Newman School in Hackensack, New
Jersey to prepare him for entry into Princeton University. He visited New York City, the
metropolis that would inform so much of his fiction, during his prep school and college years.
After flunking out of Princeton in 1917, Fitzgerald joined the US war effort and was stationed at
three army camps in the American South, first at Louisville, then at Camp Gordon in Georgia,
and finally in Montgomery, where he courted Zelda Sayre. World War I ended too soon for him
to be sent overseas, so in 1919 he moved to New York City and pursued a career in advertising.
Unsuccessful in this venture, he moved back to St. Paul. There, he revised a draft of the
book he had been working on since his army days. When the novel, This Side of Paradise
(1920), was accepted for publication, he moved to New Orleans (but only stayed for a month)
and then to New York City. He married Zelda, and the couple took up residences in Westport,
Connecticut and New York. They travelled to Europe briefly in 1921, then again, following a
sojourn in Long Island, for an extended stay from 1924 to late 1926. After Fitzgerald worked in
Hollywood for a short time in 1927, the family undertook another short trip to France in 1928
and one final long visit from 1929 to 1931. Between trips abroad, the Fitzgeralds lived in
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Wilmington, Delaware and visited family in Minnesota and Alabama. In 1931, they settled
briefly in Montgomery, though Scott also travelled to Hollywood in another failed attempt to
break into the motion picture industry. From 1932-37, the family, coping with Zelda‟s
worsening mental condition, lived near treatment centers in Baltimore, Maryland and Asheville,
North Carolina. Finally, Scott moved back to Los Angeles alone to work as a screenwriter so
that he could pay for his wife‟s treatment and his daughter‟s college education. There he died of
a heart attack in 1940.
Fitzgerald wrote from the perspective of Southern “jelly-beans,” spoiled Westchester rich
boys, starry-eyed Midwesterners, and washed-up Hollywood screenwriters. That he could
effortlessly adopt a variety of distinct regional voices in his fiction suggests one of two things:
either he sympathized with no particular American region and thought of himself as a special
outlier, or he came over time to envision himself as intimately connected with them all. The
truth is probably a synthesis of the two. As a native Minnesotan of middle-class background,
Fitzgerald was born into a geographic, financial, and cultural midsection, but, like the young
protagonist of his short story “Absolution” (1924), he wanted to be where “things go
glimmering” (Short Stories 270). One intuits from his biography that his definitions of success
were tied to place as much as wealth. He coveted American Northeastern pretensions of
aristocracy that were themselves absurdly provincial by European standards. He affected, in
imitation of his prep school and university peers, an urban East Coast form of detached irony that
had yet to catch on in the Midwest, which still touted an increasingly unfashionable sincerity.
But in his father‟s old Maryland lineage, Fitzgerald found the grounds for claiming a special
pedigree preferable to material wealth; this Southern heritage was useful as well for
counterbalancing the embarrassing newness of his mother‟s Midwestern money. Further
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complicating matters, the film industry‟s 1911 migration to California, coupled with the
skyrocketing popularity of motion pictures, put the West Coast on the map as a new kind of
cultural center: tacky but glamorous, brainless but rich. Fitzgerald would spend the greater part
of his career half-disparaging, half-desiring a career in Hollywood screenwriting. And, during
his famous expatriate years, he pursued in Europe something—perhaps an enlarged sense of
history, class relations, or global perspective—he could not locate in America.
All of this information contributes to the paradoxical portrait of Fitzgerald as intimately
tied to and apart from the America in which he lived. It is equally telling that he never owned
real estate, even in years his income would have easily permitted it. As a descendant of Francis
Scott Key, the nineteenth-century lawyer who penned the lyrics to the US national anthem,
Fitzgerald was genetically fused to America, but he refused or was unable to put down roots, and
his writings reflect his ambivalent feelings about the places he lived. Although his career
spanned two World Wars that both found the US employing jingoistic nationalism to downplay
sectional difference (and even, temporarily in wartime, racial and gender difference), the author
rejected these efforts to conjure up an unrealistically homogenous United States and turned
instead to nineteenth-century models of regional identity that had begun to be discarded in
popular culture. When writing about Americans abroad, he was usually careful to explain where
in the States they hailed from, because he felt this was a fact necessary to understanding their
behavior. The pattern holds true even in his fictions set on American soil, for most of his
characters are people out of place, individuals displaced from their homes—where, we often
learn, they did not fit in in the first place. And yet, in spite of his insistence upon the realities of
sectional difference, he was capable of writing lovingly about the US in the abstract, as in the
cadenced prose that concludes The Great Gatsby (1925) or at the end of “The Swimmers”

9

(1929), when he proposes to “utter” American-ness as “a willingness of the heart” (Short Stories
512). But even in these cases, Fitzgerald‟s conceit of the nation is calculatedly ephemeral and
retrospective, not unlike the “country of illusion” abandoned by his character Dexter Green in
“Winter Dreams” (236). He can only get at its myriad significance by writing about it in parts,
and those parts are demarcated by regional boundaries that persist in the face of a totalizing
modernity on the verge of globalization.

Imagined Geographies in Fitzgerald‟s “Country of Illusion”
For a writer so preoccupied with place, Fitzgerald showed a terrible sense of direction in
his prose. Matthew J. Bruccoli has noted that Fitzgerald‟s “geography was shaky” and that the
author did not “[restrict] himself to checkable, verifiable facts” (Classes 91, 189). Virtually all
of the Southern towns in his stories—ostensibly located in Georgia, Tennessee, or elsewhere—
are modeled on Montgomery, Alabama. Nevertheless, Fitzgerald‟s readers recognized early in
his career that problems of place played a significant role in his work. Even a lowly
undergraduate literary critic for the Harvard Crimson appreciated the geographic dislocation that
takes place in This Side of Paradise. In his 1920 review of the novel, he found “interesting” the
narrative of a protagonist “brought through his boyish years by relatives in the Twin Cities,
prepared at an expensive eastern school and sent to Princeton” (In His Own Time 307).
Commenting similarly on the conflict between the Midwest and the Northeast in the writer‟s
work, Edmund Wilson wrote in 1922 that “[w]hen Fitzgerald approaches the East, he brings to it
the standards of the wealthy West—the preoccupation with display, the appetite for visible
magnificence and audible jamboree, the vigorous social atmosphere of amiable flappers and
youths comparatively untainted as yet by the snobbery of the East” (In His Own Time 406). By
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the time of Gatbsy‟s publication in 1925, reviewers commonly acknowledged Fitzgerald as a
writer obsessed with place even if they just as commonly disputed his interpretations of it. A
critic for the New York Herald Tribune Book Review intuited that “Mr. Fitzgerald identifies... the
strange rout of Gatsby‟s incredible parties as „the East,‟ in contrast to a more solid, integrated
society of the Middle West.” But she insisted that in the black market age of Prohibition “these
drunken spenders and migratory merrymakers exist proportionately everywhere” (In His Own
Time 348).
Later, in 1956, Malcolm Cowley would invoke the poetry of Sir Walter Scott to apply a
romantic gloss to Fitzgerald‟s unreal treatments of region. In his tour-de-force essay “Fitzgerald:
The Romance of Money,” he characterized the essence of Fitzgerald‟s fiction as “the ballad of
young Lochinvar come out of the West, out with a tragic ending” because the wealthy, nonWestern background of the hero‟s love interest precludes a happy one (A Second Flowering 44).
Cowley cites the story of Dexter Green and his lost “country of illusion” as an iteration of this
ballad, but it is one of many such repetitions in Fitzgerald‟s work. The critic staunchly rejects
the idea that Fitzgerald reported on any empirical difference between Americans from different
regions; instead, he argues for a “symbolism of place” in the author‟s work—a schema nearer to
“fable” and “legend” than realism—that diagrams conflicts of class and values in Fitzgerald‟s
time (46). Cowley was a contemporary of Fitzgerald, and in his own autobiography he had
earlier evinced skepticism about modern forms of literary, cultural, and political regionalism. He
wrote in Exile’s Return (1934, rev. 1951):
Publishing, like finance and theatre, was becoming centralized. Regional
traditions were dying out as capital consolidated itself; all regions were being
transformed into a great unified market for motor cars and Ivory soap and readyto-wear clothes. This process continued during the childhood of the present
generation of writers. Whether they grew up in New England, the Middle West,
the Southwest, or on the Pacific Coast, their environment was about the same. It
11

varied less with geography than with the financial situation of their parents, yet
even in this respect it was fairly uniform.... [T]hey had the illusion of belonging
to a great classless society. (8)
Though Cowley downplays the role of regional difference in experiential American life, he
admits that local and regional cultures feature prominently in the period‟s fictions. Yet he
reduces their role to nostalgia, the glassy-eyed desire for a bygone, pre-commercialized past
pined for by otherwise avant-garde stylists:
[I]n the midst of their doubts and uneasy gestures of defiance, they felt homesick
for the certainties of childhood. It was not by accident that their books were
almost all nostalgic, full of the wish to recapture some remembered thing. In
Paris or Pamplona, writing, drinking, watching bull fights or making love, they
continued to desire a Kentucky hill cabin, a farmhouse in Iowa or Wisconsin, the
upper Michigan woods, the blue Juanita, a country they had “lost, ah, lost,” the
home to which they couldn‟t go back ever again. (12)
What Cowley suggests is an idea that I will develop at length throughout this book: that
Americans like Fitzgerald imagined and maintained, often to strategic ends, the notion of
increasing regional difference at a time when the significance of place in American culture was,
thanks to developments in transportation and communication technologies, patently on the
decline. As Cowley observes, Fitzgerald‟s representations of American region are by and large
unreal, but so too was the early twentieth-century white middle-income fantasy of “belonging to
a great classless society” (8). These were not simply two separate illusions; they were intimately
related. Consciously and unconsciously, creative individuals drew on illusory nineteenth-century
sectionalisms to represent real twentieth-century inequalities, such as the widening income gap,
political corruption, and institutional racism. There was a literary tradition of employing
regional stereotypes for political purpose, and writers like Fitzgerald continued to tap into it long
after its original significations had been exhausted.
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Fitzgerald‟s letters show that he experienced a dispiriting sameness in his travels across
America, even as he rhapsodized about invigorating differences in his fiction. In 1936, he wrote
his daughter that Americans are “all of one nation and you will find all the lassitude and laziness
there [on Park Avenue] that you despise, enough to fill Savannah and Charleston, just as down
here you will find the same „go getter‟ principle in the Carolinas” (Letters 12). Writing his
unfinished final novel, The Last Tycoon (1941), he used similar language to link the New South
(which he had criticized earlier in his career) with the burgeoning West Coast: “There was
lassitude in plenty—California was filling up with weary desperadoes. And these were tense
young men and women who lived back East in spirit while they carried on a losing battle against
the climate” (80). These cultural overlaps between regions suggest that, like Cowley, Fitzgerald
evidently recognized mass consumer culture as a homogenizing force. His writings about the
fatalistic qualities of regional difference are comparable to imagined geographies of the sort
Edward Said identified in Occidental discourses on the Orient. Fitzgerald and a number of his
literary peers gazed imaginatively at American regions and emphasized differences between
them that had more to do with political, economic, or social desire than with realistic depiction.
This was typically a two-part process of enlargement and projection: in some instances, writers
creatively enlarged extant (if dwindling) social differences between regions, and in others they
projected traits more directly related to racial identity or economic theory than to American
regional character. As a reviewer for the Los Angeles Times observed in 1921 about Fitzgerald‟s
pseudo-Southern short story “The Ice Palace” (1920), the author‟s treatments of place are “clever
literary productions more than accounts of actual happenings” (In His Own Time 316). We
seldom encounter attempts to objectively portray American regions in Fitzgerald‟s work; what
we find instead are Fitzgerald‟s subjective representations of region in America, and these are
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part and parcel of his white, middle-class, passively racist worldview. It is this subjectivity that
gives us a first-person account of how regionalist writing changed between the two World
Wars—changed in a manner that reflected and responded to the firmly isolationist, tepidly
nationalistic mood of the era.1 Modernist fictions about region—produced by Fitzgerald and his
circle of friends—capture and resist these forces by expressing skepticism about the endurance
of American capitalism in the twentieth century.
Fitzgerald‟s works also exemplify the strangely transnational quality of American
regional discourse in the interwar era. After the trauma of WWI, the majority of US voters
opposed their country assuming an interventionist role in foreign affairs. They supported elected
officials who opposed the League of Nations, who envisioned draconian immigration reform
measures, and who forsook internationalist political rhetoric in favor of insular “business
government” nationalism. Writers displeased with the national environment engendered by
1920s Republican administrations and by Prohibition commonly expatriated to war-ravaged
Europe, where they tended to cultivate a cosmopolitan perspective on America‟s place in the
global community. While abroad, they wrote about their home country, and many of these
expatriates chose to address American region. In doing so, they made explicit and implicit
connections between domestic and foreign contexts. Fitzgerald linked the French Riviera‟s
“Arab streak” to the American South‟s color line (In His Own Time, 107, 113-14); Hemingway
noted similarities between the Montparnasse and Greenwich Village café scenes (Dateline 114);
and a number of authors projected Orientalized and Arabicized fantasies onto US settings. These
modernist literary strategies for using region to broach international concerns in an isolationist
era deserve critical attention, for they prefigure post-WWII reconsiderations of US foreign
policy. When American modernists transplanted domestic regional space into a transnational
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context, they displayed a canny global awareness that prefigured WWII and post-WWII
internationalist discourse, such as the stern warning issued by FDR‟s financial advisor James P.
Warburg in Foreign Policy Begins at Home (1944):
Today America has irrevocably become a part of the world society.
We can refuse to recognize this and go back to the isolationist illusion, as
we did after the last war.
Or, we can reverse the illusion by pretending that the world has become a
part of us instead of our becoming a part of the world. If we do this, we shall try
to impress upon the world an “American century”—selling our cornflakes, our
machine age, our bathroom fixtures, and our business cycle of booms and
depressions, along with our poll tax and our pressure groups.
Or, recognizing our own shortcomings, we can overhaul our own system
in the process of international co-operation and make the necessary changes and
improvements in order to help establish the firm foundations of world-wide
justice and peace. (7)
Echoing these sentiments, Nathaniel Peffer claimed in America’s Place in the World (1945) that
“America is no longer insulated geographically.... [It] is now incorporated into the scheme of
world forces, fully and beyond possibility of concealment from itself” (220-21). Such statements
direct us back to interwar modernist literary discourse, to works by the many American
modernists who, like Fitzgerald, mixed regional and transnational themes to form a creative
vanguard for internationalist thinkers to come. For our purposes, then, a theoretical framework
that combines Said‟s “imagined geographies” and Benedict Anderson‟s “imagined communities”
provides a means for tackling these problems of transnational representation, but Welty merits
mention as well for having recognized much earlier that “[s]ometimes two places, two countries,
are brought to bear on each other... and the heart of the novel is heard beating most plainly, most
passionately, most personally when two places are at meeting point” (794). International
intersections, such as those she describes in Place in Fiction, feature in this dissertation when
they overlap with the modernist regional discourse that informs Fitzgerald‟s literary context.
Close consideration of these moments reveals that, in their fiction, this era‟s writers often
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practiced a creative prototype of the twenty-first century scholarly approach that Paul Giles has
termed “critical internationalism,” an interpretive schema “designed to cut across conventional
formations of American literature, suggesting how, despite the ways in which it has been
buttressed by the ghosts of American exceptionalism, forms of global space have always been
inherent within it” (Global Remapping 24).
Four chapters in this project examine how an individual US region assumes special
political significance in the works of Fitzgerald and his contemporaries; the last chapter treats the
effect of these nationalist and regionalist projections on a specific foreign context, 1920s Paris.
Although the very process of individuating American regions reveals how nebulous and
imaginary such distinctions are, I use the same four general categories employed by the US
Census Bureau throughout the twentieth century: Northeast, South, Midwest and West. I refer to
these four primary regions for several reasons. Not only are they the geographic delineations
with which Fitzgerald and his fellow authors would have been most familiar, but they are the
ones that endure in our popular imagination even today as regional identifications continue to
mutate. More importantly, the US government‟s endorsement of these regions as discrete, nonoverlapping zones on the nation‟s map means that they are recognized as distinct places that
nevertheless contribute to an abstract national character. The troubled relationship between
regionalism and nationalism is a theme central to my project.
My first chapter, “Region in Reverse: Southbound and Backwards with Fitzgerald and
Faulkner,” is largely about correlations between place and progress in works by the two authors,
but it also addresses biological imaginings of regional difference that persisted in an era when
the science strongly insisted otherwise. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the
South was synonymous with social, economic, and cultural backwardness. It had already been
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on the wrong side of history in the slavery debate, and in the postbellum era the region did not
share in the prosperity of the larger nation, nor did it support a viable arts movement until around
the 1920s. I analyze how Fitzgerald and Faulkner depict the significance of this general
backwardness differently in their fictions. I find that Fitzgerald‟s “The Curious Case of
Benjamin Button” (1922), which Faulkner greatly admired, excoriates Southern states for not
following the economic example of the North, while Faulkner‟s The Sound & the Fury (1928)
praises the region‟s agrarian resistance to industrialization. Interestingly, several of Fitzgerald‟s
other writings about the South seem to participate in the period‟s eugenic discourse on biological
variance between white Americans from different regions. I argue that the writer envisions
white Southerners as racial (not just regional) others: they have, he hints, been genetically
darkened or tainted by their close proximity to Southern blacks.
In my second chapter, “Oriental by Occident: Rajahs, Sheiks, and Samurai in Fitzgerald‟s
American East,” I posit that Orientalist conceptions of the hemispheric East become entangled in
the writer‟s imagining of the urban American Northeast. Such portrayals are not exclusive to
Fitzgerald‟s work but are in fact widespread in an American literary tradition, dating back to the
eighteenth century, of gazing at the United States through a fantasized Oriental perspective.
Authors including Peter Markoe, Ralph Waldo Emerson, and Walt Whitman imagined what the
young country would look like through the lens of the ancient East, but their efforts were more
construction than representation—especially the imaginary distinctions they drew between
republican and faux “Oriental” virtues. Similarly, Fitzgerald‟s attempts to overlay a fantastic
Orient atop his American Northeast are constructions designed to other the region. In an era in
which it was popular to associate corrupt, business-friendly Republican administrations with the
urban US East, Fitzgerald‟s works invoke Oriental tropes to characterize the latter as dissipated,
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dangerous, and alien. These fictions intersect with an isolationist period of intense anti-Asian
sentiment, and the author capitalizes upon fear of the Far East to generate distaste for the
materialistic preoccupations of the domestic East.
My third chapter, “Fitzgerald, Midwestern Modernists, and the Place of the Political
Center in the Urban Midwest,” argues that Fitzgerald‟s writings about the American Midwest
must be evaluated in the context of an early twentieth-century literary genre, the Midwestern city
novel, which came into being during his lifetime. A successor to the turn-of-the-century Chicago
novel as envisioned by Theodore Dreiser, this slightly later genre features narratives set in
newly-booming cities in Indiana, Minnesota, Iowa, and elsewhere. The authors of such works
include Booth Tarkington, Sinclair Lewis, Grace Flandrau, and Ruth Suckow, lesser figures in
literary studies today who in their time were widely read and who wrote thoughtfully about the
rise of right-wing politics in the urbanizing Midwest, a zone once popularly regarded as the
geographic embodiment of the progressive US middle class. Each of these writers also criticized
the homogeneity of urban American environments—a uniform waning of difference which they
saw spreading to the Midwest, blotting out the identities of local and regional cultures. I identify
points at which this line of criticism intersects with the social-scientific discourse of Robert and
Helen Lynds‟ influential Middletown sociological surveys, published in 1929 and 1937. Linking
up with the forms of the Midwestern city novel and the Midwestern sociological survey,
Fitzgerald‟s middlebrow fiction flirts with populist regional nostalgia even as it expresses desire
for metropolitan glamor.
My fourth chapter heads further west. “Westward Expansion, Economic Contraction:
The „Semi-Cowboy‟ Politics of Fitzgerald‟s Last Tycoon” considers the partial but powerful
influence of Western genre works on the author‟s unfinished final novel. Fitzgerald‟s entire
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body of work is marked by his divided sympathies for self-interested capitalism (which he felt
was the foundation of American ingenuity) and equality-minded socialism (which he believed
would solve the problem of income inequity). This dialectic comes to a head in The Love of the
Last Tycoon: A Western, a novel about a film producer who rejects the ideological lure of
communism by insisting upon the virtue of his own success story. I argue that the novel‟s
subtitle, which obviously ties the text to the Western genre of literature and film, also links it to
the Western‟s historic engagement of the capital-versus-labor dialect. Since the publication of
Wister‟s 1901 novel The Virginian, Western works have showed deep interest in American
social and economic relations. This is to be expected, because in the late nineteenth century the
Western region saw some of the worst abuses of capitalistic power in US history: the railroad
infrastructure relied on the exploitation of immigrant workers; ranchers took justice into their
own hands; and mining barons abused their laborers and used deceit to increase their holdings.
The Western narrative, the form of regionalist writing that sprang from this environment, recalls
these roots, even if works within the genre vacillate wildly in their allegiances to capital or labor.
Fitzgerald‟s own “Western,” written as WWII loomed large on the horizon, bears traces of the
genre‟s split economic interests. This division provides us insight into evolving American
conceptions of what the closed western frontier signified during the Great Depression, and it also
demonstrates how in this era the Western form emerged as a trope for Western Civilization writ
large.
In my final chapter, “The American Revolution of the Paris Café: Expatriate Writers,
Cocktail Culture, and Transnational Nationalism,” I transition from domestic regional studies to
the significance of American regional and national phenomena abroad in an interwar French
context. If we take Anderson literally when he writes in Imagined Communities: Reflections on
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the Origin and Spread of Nationalism that “[c]ommunities are to be distinguished, not by their
falsity/genuineness, but by the style in which they are imagined” (6), then the “American
colony” of 1920s Paris deserves study for its fantastic stylishness alone. But, truer to the intent
of Anderson‟s words, this community is especially noteworthy for how it has been retroactively
re-imagined. Novelists and screenwriters have celebrated the post-WWI Parisian expatriate
scene as a transnational “zone franche” in which intellectuals from diverse backgrounds met to
exchange ideas on art. While bohemian ideals were certainly part of this environment, historians
and critics are now recovering the dark side of the expatriate experience, recognizing its
imagined community as sometimes exclusionary, nationalistic, and capitalistic. American
permanent residents and tourists altered the commercial landscape of Paris, creating a market for
saloon-style bars, cocktails, and a number of other American cultural exports. These exports and
the expatriate colony they accompanied were oftentimes tethered to American regional
imaginaries; for example, the bars and hotels that practiced informal segregation by turning away
French-African colonial subjects borrowed from the exclusionary racial policies of the US South.
Fitzgerald and some other members of his expatriate literary cohort, recognizing the conflict
between the bourgeois and bohemian elements of their life abroad, critiqued in fiction these
strange impositions of American space onto French soil. They responded to instances of
“transnational nationalism,” moments when, from within the French Empire‟s metropole,
Americans imposed US-privileging values on Paris.
I have arranged these chapters in a sequence that proceeds from the domestic to the
foreign, starting with inter-regional conflict in modernist and pre-modernist literatures, following
through to regional anxieties about interwar nationalism, and concluding with regionallyinformed tensions between US and French nationalisms during the 1920s. This order is intended
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to convey how Fitzgerald and his peers politicized place, often promoting it from setting to
platform, between the two World Wars. By imagining spaces in which regional identifications
mustered resistance to the growth of an exploitative, capitalistic, and xenophobic nationalism,
these authors inveighed against what they saw as the heinous American excesses of their time.
By linking these imagined spaces to foreign contexts, they showed remarkable foresight in
recognizing that the interwar US ideal of isolation from foreign politics and culture was and
would continue to be unrealistic in the changing modern world.

Notes
1

The binary “isolationist” and “internationalist” labels entered popular usage during the debate

over American participation in the League of Nations, but, as many historians and political
scientists have noted, the term “isolationism” can be misleading. Nathaniel Peffer observes,
“[T]here has never been any belief in literal nonassociation with the outer world. No American
of any responsibility has ever advocated that the United States should shut itself off
economically”; what has existed instead is the enduring sentiment that “the Union should steer
clear of European affairs” (America’s Place 29). In his oft-cited essay “The Legend of
Isolationism in the 1920‟s,” William A. Williams seeks to qualify the term in light of early
twentieth-century American economic expansionism, remarking, “A closer examination of the
so-called isolationists of the twenties reveals that many of them were in fact busily engaged in
extending American power” (216). Nevertheless, isolationist political practices are readily
evident in the American immigration policies during the era and in claims of neutrality and nonintervention in interwar European concerns. Even if the term appears reductive at times, it was
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circulated with regularity in the period‟s political discourse and remained a topic of debate for
several decades following the end of WWII.
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REGION IN REVERSE: SOUTHBOUND AND BACKWARDS WITH FITZGERALD
AND FAULKNER
Few imagined geographies are as flat and uniformly envisaged as the regional fantasy of
F. Scott Fitzgerald‟s South. His fictional Southern settings—whether they ostensibly represent
small-town Georgia, semi-urban Kentucky, or rural Mississippi—are typically patterned on
Montgomery, Alabama, the Southern town he and his wife inhabited for intermittent periods of
time in the 1920s. The Alabama state capital, Zelda‟s hometown and the site of Scott‟s former
army camp, was the one Southern place the Fitzgeralds returned to frequently, both in person and
in prose, throughout the decade. Fitzgerald lifted elements of the Montgomery townscape and
set them down in fiction, patching them onto alternative Southern settings. In “The Ice Palace”
(1920), he recycles Montgomery‟s Confederate graveyard, sending it and Zelda‟s melodramatic
speech about the Rebel dead east to Tarleton, Georgia. In The Great Gatsby (1925), Judge
Anthony Sayre‟s house migrates northward to Louisville, Kentucky; there, its front porch
provides a spot for Jay Gatsby to romance Daisy Fay. And in the fantasy piece “The Diamond as
Big as the Ritz” (1922), Fitzgerald moves Montgomery‟s welcome sign, “MONTGOMERY:
„Your Opportunity‟” (Cruise 3.68), to a sinister-sounding backwater called Hades, Mississippi,
where the citizens are considering replacing the current motto, “Abandon all hope ye who enter,”
with “Hades—Your Opportunity” (Short Stories 183). The author‟s tendency to over-simplify
the diverse region by treating its geographies and communities as interchangeable calls to mind
Jennifer Rae Greeson‟s recent assertion that the general creative effort to represent the South
“both exceeds and flattens place,” thereby producing “a site of national fantasy” (Our South 1).
Nevertheless, a handful of Fitzgerald‟s national fantasies and imagined Southern geographies are
notably rounder, less static than others. In these represented places, discourses on progress and
eugenics meet at the shifting North-South cultural border. Following a nuanced look at the
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nationalistic motivations underwriting Fitzgerald‟s regional reductions, this chapter will focus on
the sociopolitical mutability of these dynamic sites—particularly Fitzgerald‟s Baltimore and his
projections of the American South onto foreign settings.
Fitzgerald‟s career-long fascination with the South has in turn fascinated generations of
scholars and critics. Some of Fitzgerald‟s sharpest readers, including Scott Donaldson and
Bryant Mangum, have turned time and again to the problematic place of the Southern region in
the author‟s fiction. In analyzing his family connections to Maryland and Alabama, his
friendship with the H.L. Mencken, and his depiction of the section‟s unique socioeconomic
setbacks, these critics have tended to find that for Fitzgerald the South is synonymous with
nostalgia and regression, two related forms of endemic cultural backwardness. Robert Roulston
speaks for the majority of Fitzgerald critics in describing “two distinct” varieties of Southernness in the author‟s work: one that embodies the aristocratic “glamour and romance” of the old
regime and another that “represents sloth, inertia, failure” in the modern era (158). As a writer
who identified both as a Midwesterner and a Northerner—he was only intermittently proud of his
family‟s Southern heritage—Fitzgerald chose to depict in fiction a backwards-facing South
cartographically situated at the base of the nation and ideologically relegated to the bottom rung
of national progress. Through this coincidence of geography and progressive rhetoric, his works
portray a Southern region bent doubly downward against the dominant political sentiment
exhorting the nation to progress upward and onward. Due to differences in worldview, work
ethic, and even physiological characteristics, his Southern characters fail to commingle with the
inhabitants of other regions, thereby confining themselves to the American hinterlands and
remaining separate from the larger nation. Fitzgerald captures a conflict, in many ways still
resonant today, between nation and region, nationalistic discourse and regionalist literature. For
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the purpose of examining these oppositions, this chapter looks at the politically progressive roots
that undergird his critique of the retrograde South, and it pays special heed to the author‟s
reification of regional difference as a matter of biological make-up.
In the Progressive Era that formed the historical background for Fitzgerald‟s literary
apprenticeship, the political rhetoric of progress drew on directional metaphors of trajectory to
contrast big government social reform with holdout small government conservatism. Progressive
politicians synthesized the radical agendas of agrarian populism and Marxian socialism into a
tamer liberal ideology that nevertheless broke sharply from laissez-faire conservative capitalism
by supporting nationalized welfare programs, anti-trust initiatives, and workers‟ rights. The
American socialist thinker William English Walling described the Progressive movement in
1914 as “State Capitalism,” a political form that earmarked national funds to remedy problems of
labor and society and to address issues appealing to “the practical and scientific interest of all
forward-looking persons” (xviii). For Walling, this forward orientation is what most basically
distinguishes the progressive‟s desire for social change and fair play in the market from the
conservative ideal of mutual and immediate self-interest. Progressivism, like Marxism, is a
science, thus he explains, “Science looks to the future, not because we are more concerned with
the future than with the present, but because that is the only way which we can understand the
present. Insight presupposes foresight” (xxi). Walling‟s fixation on Progressivism‟s future
sight—its anticipation of an increasingly socialized America—finds echoes in the movement‟s
political discourse, as in Teddy Roosevelt‟s 1912 promise to the National Progressive Party to
see “the nation go forward along the path of social and economic justice” (Social Justice 362).
And, of course, the very word “Progressivism” implies a political investment in progress, in
trudging forward as a nation towards vaguely defined goals of fairness, equity, and prosperity.
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Yet assertions about progress are contingent upon their distinction from regress.
Progressive nationalism—born about the same time as Fitzgerald at the turn of the century,
interrupted in the 1920s by Coolidge conservatism, and renewed in the FDR era—operated not
only by encouraging positive identification with forward-oriented institutional components
(social welfare programs, support of higher education, etc.) but also by inviting negative
identification with alternative and undesirable modes of backwardness. In the US, one finds that
the Southern region often served the latter function by providing a foil to the larger progressive
nation—a reluctant and sometimes recalcitrant political ally in the cause of national progress. As
Leigh Anne Duck writes in The Nation’s Region: Southern Modernism, Segregation, and US
Nationalism, the early twentieth-century US was a country in which region was demarcated
chronologically as well as cartographically, “a collection of communities moving at different
rates in trajectories characterized by different customs, goals, and belief systems” (5). Political
rhetoricians and members of the media promulgated the popular notion of a progressive,
industrialized, and liberal American nation while some regions (such as the South) failed to
conform to these ideals and were thus deemed regressive, facing backwards in time. For Duck,
the most problematic result of this chronotypic rhetoric was the sustaining of a harmful Southern
exceptionalism as the region and the nation alike endorsed the idea of a South so backwards that
it must be exempted from the more liberal aspects of Progressive reform. This treatment of
regional difference as an empirical given and not a social construction permitted the South to
practice legalized apartheid and allowed the nation to avoid considering how the example of the
South complicated notions of American progress sponsored by men like Woodrow Wilson
(himself a displaced Southerner). From the nationalist perspective, the South was a region lost in
time: an outlier chronotype alternately meriting legal concessions and political derision. But
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national tolerance of these policies also revealed a color-coding of Progressive ideals, providing
assurance that forward-thinking would still prioritize middle-class whiteness.
Various strains of American literary modernism address this conflict in ways that speak
to the politics of place in the nation‟s interwar literature. For instance, the broad national scope
of Fitzgerald‟s writing engenders a response to the Progressive Era and post-Progressive South
quite distinct from that enacted by William Faulkner‟s regionally-minded fiction. Fitzgerald, a
rootless remover who never owned a home but rented houses across America, favored the
progressive goals of the nation. He critiqued the South for its purported indolence and
intellectual bankruptcy. His work portrays the South as stubbornly turning away from a body of
social and economic reforms intended to promote individual freedoms and collective financial
security. But Faulkner, who spent most of his life in the Mississippi home he owned, saw the
nation as foisting its destructive crass capitalism on the historically agrarian Southern region,
whose “backward” fixation on the past represented a productive rejection of American
commercialism. Directionality and place are central to both authorial agendas, for Fitzgerald
interrogates the crisis of Southern regress while Faulkner questions the value of national
progress.
Fitzgerald‟s “The Curious Case of Benjamin Button” (1922) and Faulkner‟s The Sound &
the Fury (1928) are two especially illustrative works for charting the literary eruptions of this
political conflict. Not only do the two writers treat in different ways the theme of Southern
backwardness but both embed it as a trope in abnormal male bodies. In the physical forms of
Benjamin Button and Benjy Compson, the authors embody Southern regression to different
political ends. The two Benjamins are similarly displaced in time from the clockwise,
progressive logic of American “State Capitalism,” but they differ in their manner of
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displacement and in how they respectively stand in for the counter-clockwise South. In the case
of Faulkner‟s Benjy, the character‟s mental retardation, infantilization, castration, and existential
experience of being outside the sequential narrative of chronological order coalesce into the
wounded cry of a man-child South irrevocably traumatized by Reconstruction. Fitzgerald‟s
“Benjamin Button” likewise features a Southern protagonist pried loose from the conventional
experience of progressive time, but Button‟s reversed aging process articulates a related but
distinctly different message about regional backwardness. As Button ages from old to young and
eventually disappears, Fitzgerald elegiacally mourns the dwindling imagined geography of the
Old South; while the region maintains its empirical presence, its cultural distinctiveness has in
places been slowly fading, much like Button, since the Civil War. Faulkner writes about the ruin
of the South, while Fitzgerald addresses the possibility its eventual disappearance from liminal
spaces like Baltimore. In either text, the retrograde region appears in opposition to the
progressive nation, exempt from the nationalistic rhetoric of the liberal American dream and the
culture-blending melting pot.
There remains the matter of bodies, since both writers place representations of their
troubled Souths in disabled masculine forms. Though Faulkner generally concerns himself with
the mind-body crisis of solipsism and the manifold problems of racially coded bodies,
Fitzgerald‟s work evinces a specific fascination with physiological differences that distinguish
Southerners from other Americans. In his numerous stories about Southerners failing to be
romantically compatible with either Northerners or Midwesterners, we see nature conspiring
with culture to keep inhabitants of disparate regions apart. Southern men and women cannot
adapt to colder or drier climates; their minds work in a slower, more leisurely fashion; and their
bodies bear the traces of an ancestral history they cannot flee. Anxieties about regional
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difference assume corporeal form in Fitzgerald‟s stories, manifesting as regionally distinct
bodies that fail to consummate any possible union—reflecting a crisis of cultural unity on the
national level. Faulkner, too, gives us characters whose regional associations are encoded in
their very genes. We might say that both writers seek the tangential point where memetic
(cultural) and genetic (biological) traits meet, and they likewise hypothesize about how this
collision informs the political problem of regional difference.
In writing about intersectional conflict between the South and other regions, Fitzgerald
addresses the problem of national unification in the Progressive Era and the subsequent Roaring
Twenties. He also alludes to crises of Southern regional identification in the earlier periods of
Reconstruction and Redemption, historical moments during which the South scanned other
regions in search of economic and political structures to buttress the ruin of antebellum
paternalism. What he depicts in his fiction is a New South struggling to attain the progressive
economic and social goals of the larger nation while still asserting its regional difference and
independence. As Fitzgerald writes it, this conflict always favors the side of irreconcilable
difference, for his Southern characters are physiologically hardwired to clash with their sectional
rivals. To interrogate Fitzgerald‟s treatment of regional difference as essentially biological in
nature, I will implement a three-pronged critical approach: a comparison of his fictional
depiction of inter-regional romances with the biographical reality of his marriage to Zelda; an
examination of his intellectual investment in Baltimore, a city in transition from Southern
regional alignment to Northern; and, lastly, a comparative treatment of disabled Southern male
bodies in Fitzgerald and Faulkner. In each instance, I will regard how the politically charged
directional tropes of backwardness and forwardness impact nationalistic discourses on regional
difference and the literature that replies to them.
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Regional Incompatibilities, Political and Biological
Since Fitzgerald‟s death in 1940, regional diversity in the US has decreased steadily as
media technologies such as cinema, television, and the internet have offered access to a shared
national (and increasingly global) storehouse of culture. This cultural homogenization is
especially pronounced in the case of the American South, which has transitioned from being
regarded as a place of outlier upstart politics and presumed intellectual backwardness to being
the near the heart of the US mainstream. As Fred Hobson writes it, the modern South
contributes to national character much as the nation exerts a larger influence on the region:
Dixie has to some extent become Americanized, but America has absorbed much
of Dixie too. Country music, fried chicken, stock car racing, evangelical religion,
and opposition to busing children—all these have replaced cotton as Dixie‟s
leading export, not to mention a distrust of analysis, bureaucracy, big government,
and impersonality in human affairs. (Tell About the South 16)
But during Fitzgerald‟s life, regional cultures like the varieties of Southern-ness spread from
Maryland to Texas remained diverse and identifiable, serving as viable means for recognizing
social differences between groups of Americans inhabiting different parts of the country. The
highly salable literary genres of American regionalism hung in the recent past both as an effort to
memorialize local cultures irrevocably modernized by the railroad industry and, according to
Richard Brodhead, provide a form of vicarious travel to the rising upper and middle classes.
From a political perspective, Fitzgerald‟s short life intersected with a golden age of post-bellum
regionalist politics. The year of Fitzgerald‟s birth coincided with the regionally divisive BryanMcKinley presidential election. Voters from the South and the West showed their support for
Bryan‟s populist “Free Silver” platform, while those from the Northeast largely favored
McKinley‟s pro-capital defense of the gold standard. Such divisions persisted throughout the
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author‟s lifetime. Senators and representatives from the “Solid South” continued to vote as a
seemingly indivisible bloc to promote economic security and restored autonomy for the region,
even though internal disputes over fiscal policies formed small fissures in the solidity. Labor and
agrarian disputes in both the West and Midwest challenged the national government to pass
legislation sympathetic to beleaguered workers and impoverished farmers, while the tycoons of
the East lobbied for the primacy of capital over labor. Place also played an essential role in
education, as the Ivy-fixated mindset of Fitzgerald‟s early fiction reminds us. The author wrote
at a time when, in Arthur Mizener‟s words, non-Eastern universities “hardly existed for the
American understanding” (Afternoon 70). Bearing in mind all these sectional considerations, it
is unsurprising that Fitzgerald returned so frequently to the theme of region in his writings.
He found regional difference an appropriate tool for fleshing out complex characters in
correspondence as well as in fiction. In letters, Fitzgerald shows an odd propensity to generalize
about social groups using geographical or topographical language. Writing to Carl Van Vechten
in 1926, he described African Americans of the North as “virgin soil... dug out of its context”
(Letters 490). And he remarked to his daughter in 1940 that “the faces of most American women
over thirty are relief maps of petulant and bewildered unhappiness” (96). These and other
examples (especially his occasional hypothesizing about how habitation in a region affects
children‟s growth) portray Fitzgerald as eager to conflate people and places, to consider habitat
as a definitive factor in determining a person‟s character and physical composition. But the
various regional associations he earned by marriage and inherited through blood contributed to a
complex set of beliefs about regional difference, and his patriotic self-identification with
American ideals of progress complicated matters further, especially when he sought to diagnose
the societal woes of the Southern region in fiction.
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Many of Fitzgerald‟s Southern-tinged stories entertain vaguely nationalistic notions even
as they insist upon the rigidity of regional difference. At the conclusion of “The Swimmers”
(1929), the Virginian Henry Clay Marston looks out over the prow of a ship at the American
coast and regards his country as “indomitable and undefeated,” secure in the knowledge that “the
best of America was the best in the world.” He turns optimistically towards the future and
praises “the men coming on, the men of the war” who will succeed his “lost generation” (Short
Stories 512). There is irony in Marston‟s rhetoric, however, for it enters his mind as he leaves
the US for France; his progressive patriotism is actually the product of the expatriate‟s
backwards gaze. Moreover, his national pride is suspiciously out of character, given that he is
described early in the story as being “a Virginian of the kind who are prouder of being
Virginians than of being Americans” (498). The conflict in ideologies is jarring. Even as
Marston distinguishes himself from his fellow Americans first as a proud Southerner and
subsequently an expatriate (two subject positions invested in different ways of looking back),
Fitzgerald shows us that his character is inevitably enmeshed in the forward-minded rhetoric of
progress and patriotism. In this story, as is often the case in Fitzgerald‟s stories that concern the
South, the conflict between region and nation is phrased in bi-directional terms.
In his fiction, Fitzgerald consistently erects romantic barriers between Southerners and
the inhabitants of other American regions, contributing to what biographer James Mellow refers
to as the author‟s “unusual theme, the effect of geography on love” (Invented Lives 146). If
these inter-regional relationships misfired in only a couple stories, one could reasonably dismiss
them as incidental plot devices. But Fitzgerald recycled relationships doomed by region in tens
of stories and several novels, suggesting either a repetition automatism rooted in biographical
trauma or the expression of a biological theory of regional difference. It would require a great
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spillage of ink list each fiction of this sort, but a brief summary of the high notes should illustrate
the trend. In “The Ice Palace,” Sally Carroll Hopper leaves her Georgia comfort zone to pursue
romance with a Northern beau in St. Paul, Minnesota; she returns home in mere weeks after
recognizing that she is incapable of loving either a Northerner or the North. “The Last of the
Belles” (1929) offers a variation on this schema, as it relates the story of a WWI officer from the
Midwest who fails to attract the romantic attention of a Georgian femme fatale. She toys with
the affections of her Middle Western and Northeastern suitors, even leading one to kill himself,
before finally tying herself to a fellow Southerner. Southern men fare no better in their pursuit of
Fitzgerald‟s fast and intelligent Northern women. Jim Powell, protagonist of “Dice,
Brassknuckles & Guitar” (1923), finds himself outclassed and out-bred by the New Jersey
debutante he pursues, though she pities him enough to befriend him. The Virginian expatriate
Marston of “The Swimmers” discovers abroad that he and his French wife are incompatible; he
makes a better match with a fellow Southerner he first encounters on the Riviera. There is also
Gatsby, a novel in which virtually all the major characters are displaced from their home regions
and none find solace in love. Daisy‟s Louisville origins and her class pretensions make Gatsby
an especially intolerable suitor. The general idea uniting these examples is the regionalreproductive thesis that Southerners cannot mix productively with Northerners, Middle
Westerners, or foreigners. The tension and anxiety resulting from such unions prevents any sort
of synthesis. Little cultural blending takes place; not even the couple‟s shared national identity
as Americans saves the romance. They might as well be different species of an aesthetically
similar humanoid stock. What is especially striking about such fictions is how they toy with the
short story model Fitzgerald frequently employed, the reiterative tale of the young man going to
creative extremes to impress and win his dream girl. In these works, however, no amount of
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effort can catalyze the consummation of unions predestined to failure by sectional
incompatibility.
Rare exceptions to this rule of irreconcilable regional difference do occasionally surface
in Fitzgerald‟s body of work, but the convolutions of storytelling required to bring these interregional matches to bear highlights their irregularity; true to the cliché, they are the exceptions
that prove the rule. One of these tenuous romantic alliances appears in the 1940 potboiler “The
End of Hate,” the plot of which concerns a Union nurse‟s infatuation with a physically tortured
and thumb-less Confederate prisoner-of-war. The odd story, which borrows its threadbare
themes from romances of reunion like The Clansman (1905), ends with the engagement of
kindhearted Josie Pilgrim and crippled Tib Dulany on the night of Lincoln‟s assassination. But
this exception to the rule is hard-earned, reinforcing the realness of the cultural and physical
barriers hindering inter-regional romance. The narrator assures us that Josie is an atypically
beneficent nurturer and that her love for Tib represents the crossing of “a bridge as definite as the
rivers that mark the Virginia border.” Even with Josie‟s Victorian sense of duty, it takes the
“shocking news” of the president‟s death to bring the couple together; the spirit of Lincoln gives
“life its impetus again even in the accident of his death” (The Price Was High 751). The
improbable series of events that conspire to put Josie and Tib together—thumb amputation,
presidential assassination, the surprising forgiveness of her Yankee brother—speaks to the nearly
insurmountable obstacles of place and politics.
Fitzgerald‟s repetition of this theme reflects both his marital problems with Zelda and his
belief in the biological basis of regional difference—matters that are inextricable because of how
deeply his experiences with his wife informed his opinions on the South. The general outline of
the tumultuous Scott and Zelda romance, which has captivated scholars, biographers, and the
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national reading public for nearly a century, is so frequently rehashed in popular literary history
that it hardly bears repeating here. Nevertheless, its regional aspects merit our attention.
Throughout his stressful married life, as he questioned how he had come to make such a bad
match with his wife, Fitzgerald believed that regional difference had predestined their
relationship to failure from day one. Sectional conflict played a pivotal role in their initial
courtship; in 1918, Fitzgerald began courting Zelda as a young US army officer from the
Midwest, competing against fellow military suitors brought to Camp Sheridan from across the
US as well as local Southern men. His anxiety in measuring up to such sectionally diverse
competition was itself facilitated by the Old Southern tradition of belles entertaining multiple
suitors, a practice which Zelda melded with the sexual adventurousness of the modern East Coast
flapper to produce exhilarating results. Later in life, as Fitzgerald dealt with the financial burden
and emotional toll of his wife‟s schizophrenia, he expressed in private that regional differences,
including oppositional work ethics and attitudes towards social change, had made them
incompatible all along. In a confessional 1938 letter to his daughter, he lamented,
The mistake I made was in marrying her. We belonged to different worlds—she
might have been happy with a kind simple man in a southern garden. She didn‟t
have the strength for the big stage—sometimes she pretended, and pretended
beautifully, but she didn‟t have it.... She never knew how to use her energy.
(Letters 32)
Besides plainly stating that Zelda would have paired better with a non-intellectual Southerner
than with a literary-minded Midwesterner like himself, Fitzgerald also alludes to the popular
contemporary notion that post-bellum Southerners lacked both intellect and vitality. Zelda‟s
childhood friend Sara Haardt (who later married H.L. Mencken) once remarked, “If you have a
mind, and you don‟t want to use it— or you can‟t use it—the place to live is the South” (Cline
39). The hero of Fitzgerald‟s youth, Midwestern industrialist James J. Hill, held that “No man
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on whom the snow does not fall ever amounts to a tinker‟s dam” (qtd. in Smith 8). But the most
eloquent and influential articulation of this idea is Henry Adams‟s pronouncement that the
Southerner possesses “temperament” in the place of mind. Fitzgerald met Adams early in life,
and he seems to have remained in agreement with the historian on the subject of the vitally
sapped, intellectually defunct South.1 Like Hill and Adams, Fitzgerald saw a connection
between temperature and temperament; he believed the intense heat of the Southern region
burdened its inhabitants with a predisposition for indolence. Thus in “The Ice Palace”
temperature plays a pivotal role in the plot as the Southerners bask luxuriously in their hot
climate and the Northerners find themselves motivated by the oppressive cold to move and work.
This climatic determinism resurfaces in the author‟s life and letters as a loose explanation for
regional difference. In a 1939 letter to Zelda, Fitzgerald remarked that the lack of genuine
entrepreneurial “sink or swim spirit” proved to be “the difference of attitude” between the
progressive North and the regressive South (108).
By then, Zelda had reflected publicly on regional differences between Northerners and
Southerners in a short College Humor piece entitled “Southern Girl” (1929) and in her novel
Save Me the Waltz (1932), but her opinions were largely indistinguishable from the ubiquitous
conventional wisdom that two factors, oppressive heat and dispiriting defeat in the Civil War,
had made Southerners uniquely indolent. “Southern Girl” is a dense block of prose devoted
mostly to describing the fictional town of Jeffersonville in meteorological terms that echo Scott‟s
Southern reductions: “Nothing ever seems to happen in Jeffersonville; the days pass, lazily
gossiping in the warm sun. A lynching, an election, a wedding, catastrophes, and business
booms all take on the same value, rounded, complete, dusted by the lust softness of the air in a
climate too hot for any but sporadic effort, too beneficent for any but the most desultory
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competition” (Collected Writings 299-300). In the enervating heat, even cold-blooded murder is
burned out, wan and lackluster. Later sections of the story indulge in the familiar Fitzgerald
theme of doomed inter-regional romance, as Jeffersonville native Harriet and an Ohioan named
Dan discover their mutual incompatibility. This relationship falters, but, interestingly (and in the
tight space of two short paragraphs), Zelda has Harriet marry a subsequent Ohioan who comes to
town a few years later. Thus, “Southern Girl” ends as a narrative of escape, communicating the
message that to be productive one must flee the vitality-sapping, seductive South.
Save Me the Waltz likewise shows overlap between the regional sensibilities of the
Fitzgeralds, especially their shared beliefs about the deterministic relationship between region
and wealth. The novel‟s plot follows the courtship and expatriate life of Southern belle Alabama
Beggs and Northern painter David Knight, thinly-veiled caricatures of Zelda and Scott. In the
novel, Zelda fictionalizes her father, Alabama Supreme Court Justice Anthony Sayre, as Judge
Austin Beggs, the honorable but rash scion of the Beggs family, whose modest income from the
state inhibits his ability to provide for his family and himself. An avatar of the Old South right
down to his “Confederate gray” hair (Collected Writings 184), Austin frets over finances even on
his death bed, muttering, “We can‟t afford this sickness.... I‟ve got to get up. It‟s costing
money” (187). David, on the other hand, proves to be an inveterate provider for his new family;
his success draws the envy of Alabama, who pursues a career in ballet to remain his creative
equal. Yet Alabama fails in her endeavor at the exact moment in the narrative that her father
falls fatally ill, and the family sulks back home to “the lull of the South” (181)—a plot
contrivance that fatalistically attributes Alabama‟s failure to her flawed Southern roots.
Throughout the narrative, Alabama and, by connection, Zelda express wonder at David‟s Yankee
ingenuity, his professional pride in his craftsmanship, and his breadwinning proficiency. By
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contrast, Zelda imagines the bankrupt, war-ravaged, agrarian South as “a troop of Confederate
soldiers who wrapped their bleeding feet in Rebel banknotes to keep them off the snow” (41).
The semi-autobiographical content of Save Me the Waltz suggests that Scott‟s experience
with Zelda‟s family reinforced the anti-Southern stereotypes he carried with him from St. Paul
and Princeton to Alabama. Other evidence argues that the Sayres‟ conventionality on matters of
social change and religion further colored Fitzgerald‟s perception of the South‟s political
sensibilities. Tony Buttitta—Fitzgerald‟s conversational sparring partner during a mid-1930s
stay in Asheville, North Carolina—posits in his memoir that the Sayres‟s traditionalism
irrevocably skewed the author‟s stance on racial issues even as the political trajectory of his life
displayed a steady progression towards secular leftist thought (After the Good Gay Times 173).
Zelda‟s family was inextricably tied to Southern political conservatism. Her father briefly
headed the Alabama state legislature and oversaw a project to disfranchise illiterate black and
white voters by prohibiting aid in marking ballots; the resultant “Sayre Election Law” bore the
family name (Woodward 275). Montgomery itself remained, in the words of Zelda‟s biographer
Sally Cline, a “stronghold of segregation” (22); the former Confederate capital historically touted
a political ethos “that ran counter to the moral beliefs of its time” (14). The socially conservative
politics of the Sayres stood in marked contrast to those of the left-leaning author who debated
socialist ideology with fellow radicals in New York and Hollywood. The subject of religion,
however, seems to have been even more volatile. Zelda‟s worsening schizophrenia found her
increasingly religious (to the point of outright fanaticism) and morally conventional. In a 1940
letter, Fitzgerald pleads with his wife to read something besides “early Hebrew metaphysics”; in
the place of the Bible, he recommends Russian fiction (Letters 115-16). The primary Southerner
in his life had, to his mind, regressed intellectually, and her early religious indoctrination had
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metastasized into Bible-Belt evangelism. Fitzgerald took steps to protect Scottie from her
potentially detrimental influence by training her in socialist thought. In 1939, he even
considered sending Scottie to Russia on an “economically organized tour” to learn firsthand
about the communist “experiment” (Letters 56).
It is likely that Zelda‟s schizophrenia influenced Fitzgerald‟s insistence upon the
biological foundations of regional difference in his fiction. After marrying Zelda, in whom he
had already noticed varying degrees of instability that sometimes manifested as petulance and
sometimes as violence, Scott discovered that both sides of her family suffered from mental
illness and suicidal tendencies. As a result, he learned that Zelda‟s psychiatric problems were
more than merely the products of Southern culture and spoiled upbringing; they were
physiological in nature by way of genetic heritage, and they would require a life-altering series
of treatments and institutionalizations to address. What had previously been attributable in
Adams‟s terms to “temperament” proved in actuality to be a matter of the body as well as the
mind. In an interview with Cline, one of Zelda‟s Alabaman friends reflected, “In the South most
of our good families are tainted with insanity. We handle it by thinking of the insane as
„special‟” (29). The strange interrelationship between good breeding and poor mental health
stuck with Fitzgerald, who addressed the topic most directly in Tender is the Night (1934).
Besides his experiences with Zelda, Fitzgerald‟s biological analysis of Southern
difference finds its most immediate source in the critical work of his friend and mentor, H.L.
Mencken. Mencken‟s contentious 1917 article “The Sahara of the Bozart” achieved notoriety in
its time for lambasting the literary and cultural void of the post-bellum South, but modern
readers may well find the text‟s casual discussion of regional bloodlines its most curious aspect.
Like Fitzgerald, Mencken leads with commonplace observations about Southern intellectual

39

flight, remarking that after the Civil War “the first-rate Southerners that were left, broken in
spirit and unable to live under the new dispensation, cleared out.” His subsequent comment, “A
Southerner of good blood almost always does well in the North,” appears innocuous enough,
until one discovers soon thereafter that Mencken references “blood” not in the abstract cultural
terms of ancestral heritage but in the specific scientific terms of genetic lineage (The American
Scene 162). Finding reasons for Southern cultural decline in biological make-up, Mencken
posits that in the South the Celts, spawned from “some of the worst blood of western Europe,”
predominate over their Anglo-Saxon counterparts (163). In addition to this genetic
predisposition towards mediocrity, aristocratic male Southerners have poorly disseminated their
good genes. Mencken correlates prominent social status with literal good breeding, mocking the
“delusion that class distinctions are merely economic and conventional, and not congenital and
genuine.” He argues that in an ideal social setting strong genetic traits trickle downward. Rich,
well-bred men marry or carry on affairs with poor women, with whom they share an ethnic
background. In either case, their progeny unite the best genes of the upper and underclass,
improving upon the breeding of the “plebeians” while doing little to harm the aristocrats (164).
But in the American South, this ideal has been rendered obsolete by racial interbreeding. White
men prefer secretive affairs with black or mulatto concubines, Mencken argues, and this has
worked to the genetic detriment of the region‟s poor whites. In a passage rife with the spliced
terminologies of eugenic pseudoscience and animal husbandry, he explains:
As a result of this preference of the Southern gentry for mulatto mistresses there
was created a series of mixed strains containing the best white blood of the South,
and perhaps of the whole country. As another result the poor whites went
unfertilized from above, and so missed the improvement that so constantly shows
itself in the peasant stocks of other countries. (165)
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Mencken jarringly transitions from regional literary and cultural differences to biological and
physiological distinctions as they pertain to region. His race-baiting observations are clearly
intended to rile Southerners with the accusation that they are poorly bred and now culturally
impotent—human variations on the mule.
Mencken‟s biological treatment of regional difference—compounded with the
contemporary phenomenon of eugenic discourse circulating in the intellectual ether—seems to
have impacted Fitzgerald‟s writing on the subject as much as did his problems with Zelda.2 We
know from his own testaments that he found Mencken‟s intellectual influence inescapable; in his
1934 introduction to the Modern Library edition of Gatsby, he describes himself and writers of
his time as “spoiled” by the critical input of this ratiocinative “lion” with “his bravery and his
tremendous and profound love of letters” (In His Own Time 155). Fitzgerald freely owns that
Mencken‟s impact upon his work extended beyond the realm of style, and this is most evident in
his related discourse on the American Sahara—for, like Mencken, Fitzgerald writes about
Southerners who are biologically distinct from their regional counterparts around the nation. In
“The Ice Palace,” Sally Carrol‟s boyfriend Harry Bellamy channels Mencken when he rants
about the New South being full of “degenerates” who have “lived so long down there with all the
colored people that they‟ve gotten lazy and shiftless” (63). Some even nastier related comments
appear in the minor 1931 story “Indecision,” in which a Minneapolis-born banker refers to a
white Southern girl from Louisiana as a “pickaninny” and jokes that “all the boys are spics down
in New Orleans” (Price 301, 295). Against this racially and regionally coded decadence, these
narratives position not only the well-bred aristocrats of the Old South but also members of the
“Northern races,” ethnic groups of Scandinavian heritage inhabiting the American Midwest
(Short Stories 60). Of the former party, the best representation one finds in Fitzgerald‟s fiction is
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the character of Henry Marston in “The Swimmers.” By nature a gentleman of discretion and
entitlement, he possesses traits “peculiar to old stock” that indicate a congenital predilection to
assuming command (505). The latter party, made up primarily of Middle American Swedes,
Fitzgerald depicts as remarkably industrious, practical, and unemotional. Between all these
groups there exists a considerable amount of racial difference, despite their superficial whiteness.
Like Mencken, Fitzgerald associates Southerners (of the new breed especially but also to some
extent the old stock) with African Americans, who have apparently acted as a cultural and
genetic siphon on white Southern culture.
Mencken explicitly alludes to racial mixing as the most significant factor contributing to
Southern backwardness; Fitzgerald more subtly hints at its role in cultural degeneration. Both
suggest that the average inhabitant of the New South is simply not as white as his forebears.
This is a step backwards, for the cultural logic of race commonly maintained by Fitzgerald and
his contemporaries held that blackness was retrograde. Buttitta recalls that racial mixing
represented a personal as well as a national threat for Fitzgerald, who recoiled bitterly upon
learning that a North Carolinian prostitute he had slept with repeatedly was in fact a mulatto
(171-73). According to Buttitta‟s account, the writer objected that “our race was superior and we
shouldn‟t weaken it by mixing” as his lover assured him that in the South “a white boy wasn‟t a
man until he... had himself a nigger gal in the barn” (172). What we see in the pejorative
rhetoric of miscegenation employed by Mencken, Fitzgerald, and others is that race plays a key
role in the progressive portrayal of the South as backwards. The reiterative claim is that
Southern culture and bloodlines have been polluted by blackness, either through the cultural
exchange facilitated by close proximity with African Americans or by interracial relationships
between powerful white men and exploited black women. The cost of economic progress would
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be further disassociation from blacks and a re-inscribing of the WASP-ish nativism outlined in
the 1896 Plessy v. Ferguson ruling, adjudicated the year of Fitzgerald‟s birth.
Just as Fitzgerald‟s fascination with regional incompatibility in romance paints the
problem of sectional difference in physiological terms, so too does his fixation on Southern
miscegenation insist upon the firm biological foundations of regional identity. Concerns of race
are inextricable from those of region; in these literary and critical discourses, themes of race
emerge as strategies for addressing regional matters, and vice-versa. Mencken and Fitzgerald‟s
race-baiting of Southerners hints at the dark side of Progressive nationalism, which promoted
national unity and social reform even as the civil rights of American blacks continued to
disappear in regional pockets across the country. Modern historians marvel that the rise of
national welfare programs was accompanied by state-level disfranchisement acts, antimiscegenation restrictions, and segregation laws tolerated by the federal government. Eileen L.
McDonagh observes that while government flourished in size and scope during the Progressive
Era, political participation remained the demesne of white males at or above middle class income
(Progressivism and the New Democracy 159). That these racist regional policies earned the
approbation of progressive politicians and left-leaning idealists like Fitzgerald tells us a great
deal about the period‟s middle class nationalism, which projected a lily-white political body that
provided common ground between sectional factions otherwise divided on government spending.
As McDonagh reminds us, racially charged pieces of national legislation like the Johnson-Reed
Act and the Eighteenth Amendment passed by linking “a broad coalition of southern and
northern interests,” even if statewide segregation policies remained local affairs (161). The
upshot of the political connection is this: Fitzgerald‟s writing about the South strives to distance
the retrograde region from the progressive nation in terms of economic infrastructure and work
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ethic, but it actually draws them together on the uneasy subject of race relations. By insisting
that subversive blackness (bred into the region‟s inhabitants and permeating its culture) is a key
factor in the hindering of Southern progress, Fitzgerald unites the interests of Southern
politicians ever eager to reverse the civil liberties advancements of Reconstruction with those of
national politicos invested in the perpetuation of white middle-class authority. Thus the South,
which Hobson has productively referred to as a “mirror image for America‟s flaws and
blemishes,” proves to work in tandem with and also reflect the seedy underbelly of Progressive
idealism (16).

Baltimore and the Bozart, the Sahara and the Riviera
Even while abroad, considerations of American place and race occupied Fitzgerald‟s
mind. In his 1924 Saturday Evening Post article “How to Live on Practically Nothing a Year,”
he projected elements of the US South onto coastal France, imagining himself and his family
racially darkened by “the Arab streak” of the French Riviera (Afternoon 107). In one section, we
find that the Fitzgeralds have gone native, their skin “burned to a deep chocolate brown, so that
they seemed to be of Egyptian origin,” and their daughter Scottie appears as “a small black child
with cotton-white hair” (Afternoon 113). The waiter who serves them, ostensibly a
“Senegalese,” is revealed by his “accent from well below the Mason-Dixon Line” to be an
African-American expatriate (114). For his Post readership, Fitzgerald packages the Riviera as a
European corollary to the American South: its Moorish heritage implies racial and cultural
miscegenation, its high temperatures link it to the South‟s enervating heat, and the dark-skinned
French poor who hassle rich expatriates on the beach call to mind the Southern region‟s postbellum African-American underclass. In an earlier letter to Edmund Wilson, Fitzgerald had
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referred to impoverished interwar French as “slave[s],” suggesting that not only racial hybridity
but also economic devastation linked the American South and the French south of the Riviera
(Letters 326). In the wake of the Great War, the franc was decimated in value—not so severely
as the worthless Confederate dollar after the Civil War, but Fitzgerald‟s mocking reference to
French currency as “gold-colored hat checks” suggests a comparison (Afternoon 114).
Meanwhile, the US emerged from an immediate postwar recession into booming 1920s national
economy. The facility with which Fitzgerald‟s makes these transnational connections shows that
by the early twentieth century the American South had become shorthand for postwar economic
ruin and cultural bankruptcy. Its significance was mobile, applicable to other places, other wars,
even other countries. Yet, while the South as an abstract entity retained this pejorative meaning,
Fitzgerald explored in his fiction the idea that domestic Southern spaces might become unSouthern over time, reversing regional alignments as a magnet reverses its charge, becoming
committed to period ideals of progress over the dilapidated aesthetics of regress.
Fitzgerald‟s opinions on the South were inevitably influenced by certain nationalistic
sentiments of his time, in particular the Progressive and post-Progressive discourse on the
region‟s position in relation to the nation. But a troubled history of intersectional conflict in the
US precedes the author‟s 1896 birth, and his fiction frequently demonstrates an engaging
awareness of it. Two of Fitzgerald‟s most fully developed juvenile short stories—“A Debt of
Honor” (1910) and “The Room with the Green Blinds” (1911)—make use of Civil War plots and
sympathized with the doomed Confederacy. In adulthood, he published two professional stories
specifically about the war, “The Night Before Chancellorsville” (1935) and the aforementioned
“The End of Hate.” Moreover, the care he put into contributing script revisions for MGM‟s
Gone with the Wind (1939) and the attention he paid to Margaret Mitchell‟s 1936 novel suggest a
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continuing interest in the popular perception of Civil War and Reconstruction history. But
“Benjamin Button” is the widest in historical scope of his fictions on the South—and it provides
his richest exploration of regional mutability. Set in Baltimore, it opens at the beginning of the
Civil War; speeds through the eras of Reconstruction and Redemption; and ends at an
unspecified moment in the near future following the story‟s publication. The strange tale, one of
Fitzgerald‟s few forays into fantasy, offers an interesting take on the evolving Southern region,
and its setting hints that Baltimore, a place to which Fitzgerald returned semi-frequently in life
and in writing, might provide insight into political tension between regions during and before the
Progressive Era. Fitzgerald‟s paternal associations with the state of Maryland (including his
distant relation to Francis Scott Key) and his professional connections to the city itself assign
Baltimore a special importance in his treatment of the Southern region. Moreover, the sectional
politics of post-bellum America affirm that “Charm City” occupied contested territory in the
cultural conflict between Northern and Southern interests.
Fitzgerald‟s fascination with Baltimore suggests that his interest in the South is tied in
part to its cultural and geographic mutability, for the city, once considered quintessentially
Southern, became in his time only liminally so. Baltimore‟s close proximity to the Mason-Dixon
Line speaks volumes about its regional identity; it occupies a borderland between the American
Northeast and Southeast, and in the past two centuries the city has increasingly self-identified
with the North. In 2010, The Baltimore Sun addressed these conflicting identities in an article
provocatively titled “Are We Northern? Southern? Yes.” Raising more questions than it
answers, the piece ends with a fourteen-point list of Baltimore‟s hybrid regional traits as
originally outlined by the Maryland State Department of Information in 1956. The fact sheet
notes that while the area is the southernmost source of Northern-style maple syrup, it is also the

46

northernmost location in which Southern cypress swamps may still be found. Though the
department concluded in the fifties that “the truth” behind the identity question rested
somewhere between the polar “extremes” of absolute North and South, Baltimore‟s regional
identification has definitely crept northward since the mid-century. Politely unmentioned in the
article is the fact that the Baltimore of the 1860s was a hotbed of Confederate sentiment, and
Lincoln had some of its most prominent civil servants arrested to ensure that Maryland would
not be led to secession. How the city has changed in the span of a century and a half. Once
memorialized in Frederick Douglass‟s autobiographical writings as a slaveholding port city of
the South, in 2012 Baltimore is more recognizable as “Bodymore, Murdaland” on TV‟s The
Wire. David Simon‟s gritty modern portrayal of the city invites comparisons to its Eastern
Seaboard fellows New York and New Jersey more so than to Charleston, Mobile, or New
Orleans, other major Southern ports. Between Douglass‟s 1845 treatment of the city and
Simon‟s 2004 depiction of crime-riddled urban sprawl falls the early twentieth century
Baltimore-in-transition of Fitzgerald and Mencken.
Fitzgerald‟s biography reveals a lifelong connection to the state of Maryland and to
Baltimore in particular, and his citation of this cultural borderland in his fiction is predicated
upon his personal understanding of Maryland‟s role in the production of regional difference. In
1939, near the end of his life, he wrote an foreword for Don Swann‟s Colonial and Historic
Homes of Maryland in which he testified to being “a native of the Maryland Free State through
ancestry and adoption”—a claim as complex as it is accurate. Fitzgerald‟s anecdotes as detailed
in the foreword suggest that he experienced the state‟s Southern heritage secondhand through his
father‟s anecdotes and firsthand through family trips; he encountered the culturally progressive
Baltimore later through his interactions with Mencken and through the years he spent in the city
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(In His Own Time 158-59). The young Fitzgerald grew up listening to his father‟s stories of
Civil War-era Maryland, learning that, despite the state‟s refusal to secede, a great number of its
citizens sided with the Confederate cause. Edward Fitzgerald regaled the young Scott with
stories of childhood rebel heroism; he claimed to have covertly aided Southern soldiers at the
tender age of nine. The Fitzgerald family also took great pride in their ancestor Francis Scott
Key, whose poem “Defence of Fort McHenry” (1814) provided the lyrics for “The Star-Spangled
Banner,” the patriotic song that became the national anthem in the early twentieth century.
Later, as a married man, Fitzgerald returned to his family‟s former home to address
Zelda‟s mental breakdowns. In 1932, while she received psychiatric treatment at the Johns
Hopkins University Hospital, Scott moved to Maryland and rented a house just outside
Baltimore. One year later, the family moved to a home in the city proper as Fitzgerald began to
receive treatment for his alcoholism (also at Johns Hopkins). The same year, Zelda had her play
Scandalabra performed by an amateur troupe in Baltimore. These incidents and occurrences,
spaced out as they are from the beginning of Fitzgerald‟s life to its near-conclusion, suggest a
complex relationship with Maryland that runs the gamut from Civil War-era nostalgia to
extensive use of the state‟s cultural, academic, and medical resources.
As a lifelong resident of Baltimore, Mencken had a privileged perspective on Maryland‟s
displacement from the South, and his intellectual mentorship of Fitzgerald ensured that his views
on the region would impact the young author, who at times fancied himself an honorary
Southerner by virtue of his father‟s family history. Mencken‟s “Bozart” polemic accused the
American South of being uncultured, impotent in the practice of the beaux arts and dismally
unconcerned with education. Mencken‟s taunts succeeded in riling the Nashville Agrarians, who
responded by writing political tracts, poems, and fictions that reinvigorated the production of
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white male Southern literary discourse. Yet Mencken‟s wrote “Sahara” in Baltimore. From the
vantage of a historically Southern city, the critic used his caustic wit to rail against the decline of
art and intelligence in the South. This suggests either that Mencken wrote from the perspective
of a Southern insider concerned about his region or that he considered Baltimore non-Southern.
His biographers, including Hobson, have tended to presume it entails both.
In Mencken‟s time, Maryland was outside the Southern cultural void he observed in
Georgia and Virginia. Home to the esteemed Johns Hopkins University as well as to a
respectable arts scene, Baltimore could exclude itself from Mencken‟s censure by virtue of its
sophistication, even if the city had traditionally been associated with the South. But its cultural
and economic progressiveness (including the city‟s affinity for trade unions) further served to
distance it from the Southern region, which was more and more coming to be defined in relation
to the forward-looking nation as backwards and unrefined. One sees a parallel trajectory in
Baltimore‟s cultural progress and its increasing identification with the North; as the urban center
aligns itself first with the commercial promises of Republicanism and later with the tenets of
Progressive nationalism, it likewise proceeds to become more commonly associated with the
culturally productive, union-tolerant American Northeast. In the directional terms of
sociopolitical rhetoric, both gestures proceed forward to progress, on the same track as the
upward-tending nation that proceeded through the Progressive Era into the Jazz Age.
Outside Maryland‟s few urbanized areas, the intertwined problems of progress and
regional alignment dogged the economically troubled South as they had since Reconstruction.
With the feudal power structure of slavery entombed with the Lost Cause, the repatriated
Confederate states scanned the nation‟s regions for a viable replacement. While Southern
Democrats and Republicans alike tended to view the wealthy, industrialized Northeast as a
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model for progress, Southern populists admired the radicalized labor politics of the American
West and beheld a kindred spirit in Western agrarianism. In miner strikes, in subversive
resistance to the cattle barons, and in the rage of Western farmers at the unprofitable national
market, Southern agrarians and populists saw their own financial concerns echoed in a different
region. The Northeast came to be associated with powerful banks, sprawling factories, big
government, and academic institutions far removed from the local concerns of impoverished
farmers; it represented progress in the direction of capital and industry, and for many
Southerners, especially inhabitants of the urbanizing South, it remained alluring. The labor and
agrarian sympathies of the West presented a logical alternative, even if detractors made
dispiriting connections between populist movements and communist thought. Whether the
ideologically divided “Solid South” would align itself with the North or the West proved to be a
major concern in American politics at the turn of the century. At the St. Louis Industrial
Conference of 1892, the convention from which the populist People‟s Party sprang, organizers
arranged a symbolic reconciliation between South and West by inviting a former Confederate
colonel from North Carolina to clasp hands on stage with a Union Navy commodore from
Nebraska (Kazin 37). An oppositional fascination with the more industrialized Northeast is
evident in the pro-business journalistic discourse of popular Southern publications. Newspapers
and trade journals evinced in C. Vann Woodward‟s terms a “heedless iconoclasm” in promoting
a new “Yankee” middle class business ideology over antebellum economic structures that linked
agriculture with aristocracy (Origins of the New South 150-52). Thus the Southern region
mulled two directions for moving forward from the devastation of the Civil War: northern
towards capital and industry or westward towards labor and agriculture. But the dawn of the
Progressive Era found Washington more amenable to labor concerns, thereby changing the terms
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of the debate even as the South continued to remain culturally, economically, and politically
distinct from other regions. By renouncing two regionally coded possibilities for social progress,
the South risked appearing (and indeed did appear) backwards in the eyes of the larger nation.
This was the backwards South that Fitzgerald, following Mencken‟s lead, attacked not
only in stories but in creative nonfiction articles. In “The Cruise of the Rolling Junk” (written in
1922 but not published until 1924), he deployed some of his sharpest barbs against the region,
harping on its economic inefficiencies and its abundant African-American populations. The
piece is loosely based on an actual trip undertaken by the Fitzgeralds in July 1920 when they
traveled by car from Westport, Connecticut to Montgomery. Fitzgerald initially buys into the
arch-tragic Southern myth, writing of Virginia, “Here under the gay wistaria life at its mellowest
had once flourished—not as on Long Island with streets and haste and poverty and pain just
twenty miles away, but in a limitless empire whose radius was the distance a good horse could
travel in a morning and whose law was moulded only of courtesy and prejudice and flame”
(2.43). On the very same page, he suffers immediate disillusion: “And at the moment when we
became aware of Virginia‟s picturesqueness we became aware also of its selfconscious insistence
on this picturesqueness. It seemed to cherish its anachronisms and survivals, its legend of
heroism in defeat and of impotence before the vulgarities of industrialism, with too shrill an
emphasis. For all its gorgeous history there was something tinny and blatant in its soul” (2.43).
Having intuited a vacuity behind the veneer of Southern honor, Fitzgerald‟s romance of the
South turns to horror; he and Zelda encounter a bandit on the road, and afterwards they can‟t
shake race conscious “images of murderous negroes hiding in bottomless swamps and of waylaid
travelers floating on their backs in black pools” (2.58). In South Carolina, they are mocked as
Yankees by locals, leading Fitzgerald to comment on “the negative morality of the poor white”
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(2.76). Their destination affords them no respite, however, for Alabama is a place where people
have “no confidence in Progress” (3.58). Fitzgerald ends the narrative with the ironic image of
Montgomery‟s motto, “Your Opportunity,” festooned to a burnt-out electric sign (3.68).
But Baltimore—unencumbered by Union occupation or economic devastation after the
Civil War—met Northeastern standards of progress while other parts of the South failed to
balance mass industrialization with cultural development. During the Redemption period,
Southern states often gutted their education budgets as they strove to industrialize. And while
many state governments envied Northern prosperity, advocacy of Western agrarianism and
nostalgia for the bygone Old South alike cluttered Southern political discourse and complicated
the search for regional identity. If the South was to become prosperous by turning to the North
for examples of social progress, a position advocated by many Southern Democrats, few states
were able to make the realignment quickly—although nearly all professed the desire to move
forward with the rest of the nation. Therefore Maryland might be envisioned as the disappearing
coastline of the South, the result of Northern waters bearing down for decades on Southern land,
effecting irrevocable sea change. When Fitzgerald invokes the city of Baltimore in fiction, it is
typically for the purpose of observing great cultural change in the New South, which he saw as
steadily losing hold on Southern identity in traditionally Southern areas. “Benjamin Button” is
especially invested in this project, for it tracks the history of the city and its reverse-aging
protagonist from the beginning of the Civil War to the conclusion of World War I, thereby
chronicling the American South‟s crisis of regional identification and its coming to terms with
progressive nationalism. In some letters and fictions, Fitzgerald treats these fluctuations in
identity as the lamentable loss of the Old Southern caste rigidity that once provided the
democratic US with its closest approximation to validated aristocratic pretension. More
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commonly, however, the author depicts the South as a colonial economy easily capable of
sparing some Confederate culture for an injection of Midwestern work ethic and an investment
of Northern capital. Yet in his most thought-provoking stories of the Southern region, and we
may count “Benjamin Button” among them, Fitzgerald pulled off the Keatsian feat of negative
capability he so admired and juggled these contradictory ideas, simultaneously sympathizing
with and excoriating the post-bellum South.

Sons of the South: Southern Backwardness in Fitzgerald and Faulkner
For the purpose of interpreting what the titular protagonist of Fitzgerald‟s “Benjamin
Button” signifies about the changing Southern region, the character of another prominent
modernist literary Benjamin, Faulkner‟s Benjy Compson, provides a productive comparison.
The two characters are both disabled in ways that frame the discourse on Southern identity in
terms of regression and chronology. Interestingly, these Benjamins also overlap in Faulkner‟s
intellectual investment in them. Faulkner greatly admired Fitzgerald‟s “Benjamin Button” and in
1943 sought to adapt it into a screenplay. His two letters on the subject to Harold Ober indicate a
prior familiarity with the story, though it is difficult to determine whether he read it near its 1922
publication date or much later, perhaps after Fitzgerald‟s 1940 death. Regardless, by 1928
Faulkner had created in The Sound & the Fury his own disabled Benjamin, saddled like Button
with a conflict of time, mind, and body. Whether or not his interest in Fitzgerald‟s Southern
fantasy influenced this characterization, thematic similarities between the characters persist.
Benjamin Compson suffers from a congenital intellectual disability, while Benjamin
Button‟s condition of aging in reverse resembles, in its initial state, an exaggerated form of
progeria, the aging disease. In both cases, the deliberate selection of the name “Benjamin”
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reflects the authors‟ shared interest in its various translations from the Biblical Hebrew. One
such meaning is “child of my sorrow,” echoed by Quentin Compson in his stream-ofconsciousness narrative as “Benjamin Benjamin the child of my sorrowful,”—although this
translation actually refers to “Ben-oni,” the Biblical character‟s birth name before it is changed
by Jacob (172). Regardless, the Button and Compson families alike regard their Benjamins as
children of sorrow, for their disabilities prevent them from participating normally in the various
rituals outlined by the social protocol of child-rearing. But the name “Benjamin” possesses an
alternative meaning of great significance to these two writers in their grappling with problems of
region; religious scholars have translated the name as “son of the south,” and, indeed, Benjamins
Button and Compson are both children of the American South (McKenzie 88). Faulkner and
Fitzgerald use these characters and their inherited backwardness to comment on the role of the
South in relation to other regions and to the nation. Yet while the familiar directional tropes of
Progressive and post-Progressive political thought are present in both fictions, the two authors
employ the concept of regional backwardness to different ends and reach divergent conclusions
about the effects of social change on the South.
While the free-association tale related by Faulkner‟s Benjy Compson suggests an outright
rejection of linear time, in another sense the character is more accurately temporally backwards
because of the discrepancy between his physical and mental age. He possesses, as each of the
novel‟s four narrators confirms, an adult body and adolescent mind in conflict. Visitors to the
Compson property are greeted by a sight described by Jason the younger as “a thirty year old
man playing around the yard with a nigger boy” (222). Compounding this inverse or backwards
relationship between mind and body, Benjy‟s disjointed narrative runs in circles and adheres to
no set temporal order as the character relates thirty-three years of family anecdotes. As such, his
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section of The Sound & the Fury hits readers with a dual-cylinder displacement from modern
rhetoric of progress and Coolidge-era faith in industrial capitalism. The character‟s narrative
approach to looking and being backwards effects a disassociation from the Progressive emphasis
on urban-industrial economies—an important thematic gesture in light of how binary conflicts
between nation and region, urban and rural, figure prominently in the novel. Benjy‟s everdwindling cattle pasture represents the clearest impingement of alien ideals of progress onto the
hesitant Southern region. To fund Quentin Compson‟s education at Harvard, the family sells the
land in parcels; the bulk of it is eventually turned into the golf course that provides the setting for
the novel‟s opening. The land‟s transition from practical agrarian plot to business capital and
finally to infertile playground is one of the text‟s many tragic arcs—a tragedy facilitated by
regional conflict. In pursuit of a desirable Northeastern education and its attendant social
connections for their son, the Compsons divest themselves of their land and displace Quentin
from his native soil. These actions reject regional agrarianism in favor of commercial capitalism
vitalized by waves of national-level economic reform.
The evolution of the Compsons from a family of agrarian landowners to a brood of petty
bourgeoisie culminates in the younger Jason Compson‟s failed investments on the New York
Cotton Exchange. In this section of the narrative, Jason sells short on the national market against
the interests of Southern farmer, participating in an economic system that historically devalued
the crops grown by local farmers and left them in debt to their lenders.3 As Wayne W.
Westbrook explains, men like Jason “have no interest or stake in the underlying commodity but
seek to profit by predicting market moves on futures prices” (55). Jason openly mocks the
exploited cotton farmers of the South, but he likewise expresses disgust for the “dam eastern
jews” who supposedly conspire to control the Cotton Exchange (191). Uninterested in the
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agrarian movements of the South or the West and suspicious of Northeastern market capitalism,
Jason embodies an ultimately rudderless New South—a devolving region that Faulkner would
later embody in the mercenary Snopes clan. On the whole, the novel relates a series of instances
in which disassociation from the Southern region and from agrarian economic values results in
suffering for individuals, families, and communities. As Faulkner‟s readers have frequently
noted, Benjy is the human embodiment of this suffering, and his idiosyncratic narrative voice is
inflected by concerns of region and time. Gail L. Mortimer refers to the character as a “timeless
creature whose present experiences are undistinguished in vividness from his memories” and
suggests that his fixation on the past reflects the South‟s obsession with the “unrealistic and
archaic self-image” of an unbowed Confederacy (233, 235).
One of Faulkner‟s grim jokes in the novel is the unintended regional appropriateness of
Benjamin‟s name change. The Compsons rechristen Benjy, formerly Maurice, to avoid the
humiliation of a mentally handicapped son sharing his uncle‟s name, leading younger brother
Quentin to believe incorrectly that the new name signifies the family‟s sorrow at the burden laid
upon them. However, because “Benjamin” translates more directly to “son of the south,” the
Compsons have accidentally appointed their son to be a regional representative, and his
temporally coded disability is part and parcel of this representation. Benjy‟s “backwardness”
and his displacement from linear time both serve to reflect the unique sociopolitical conditions of
the post-bellum South—a proud region infantilized by repatriation, crippled by a young colonial
economy. But Benjy‟s difference is also expressed in biological terms, some of which may
apply to the South writ large. His mental condition—critics disagree ferociously as to whether it
is retardation or severe autism—is the most apparent factor contributing to Benjy‟s difference,
and Faulkner treats it in the narrative as a blessing and a curse; it limits the character‟s ability to
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communicate through traditional linguistic means and experience the world as his peers do, but it
also allows Benjy to remain powerfully attached to his family and to the land. One may read this
as a response to Adams‟s comment on the temperamental and inherently feeble Southern
intelligence. What Benjy lacks in mind, he more than makes up for in body, as his sense of
physicality, his emotional capacity, and his sensual awareness are almost unbearably heightened.
Likewise, Faulkner‟s idealized conceit of Southern identity devalues commerce and ostentatious
scholarship in favor of communal spirit, luxurious corporeality, and attachment to ancestral land.
Benjy‟s condition disassociates him from the commercial interests of the New South and the
progressive nation, but it correlates him with traditional Southern agrarian values.
In addition to the general biological distinctions mentioned above, Benjy‟s physiological
difference is articulated specifically in terms of race. In one flashback, Versh Gibson remarks
that the Compsons have made a “bluegum” (a pejorative designation of race generally referring
to dark, unmiscegenated African-ness) of Benjy by renaming him (69). Versh‟s pronouncement
addresses how the Compsons have made a pariah of their handicapped son, treating him as a
second-class family member who fares little better than the blacks of the segregated South.
Though white, Benjy is cared for almost exclusively by the Compson‟s black servants. He is
surrounded by and marked by blackness, which irrevocably colors his identity as a mentally
handicapped Southerner.4
Like Faulkner‟s Benjamin Compson, Fitzgerald‟s Benjamin Button is a Southerner
whose fractured, backwards experience of time speaks to the region‟s fitful post-bellum
reassessment of identity and its disassociation from the forward-oriented nation. Born on the eve
of the Civil War, Button lives his life in reverse as an old man who grows younger year by year.
Fitzgerald ties the Baltimorean Button to the Southern region through several narrative gestures.
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He presents the well-connected Button family as part of the “enormous peerage which largely
populated the Confederacy” (Short Stories 160); he marries the character to the daughter of a
Confederate general; and he shares a bit of Baltimore gossip positing that Button is actually
“John Wilkes Booth in disguise” (172). The implication is that the fantastic story serves as a
parable of the South, with the backwards-living Button representing the region and capturing its
strange mutations.
For the conceit undergirding the narrative‟s exploration of chronological backwardness
and Southern regional history, Fitzgerald owes, and in his preface to the story admits, a debt to
Mark Twain. Fitzgerald‟s interest in Twain rose in 1920 when Max Perkins forwarded him a
copy of Van Wyck Brooks‟s The Ordeal of Mark Twain, published the same year. In it, the
critic relates Twain‟s “fanc[y]... that life should begin with old age and progress backwards,” and
he follows this anecdote with the pronouncement that Twain‟s artistic vision was “essentially
retrospective” (175). Brooks cites this as the reason why so much of Twain‟s work concerns
young boys; he rejected the adult desire for “commercial success,” so he bent his gaze backwards
to an idealized, childish, pre-capitalistic state. Fitzgerald himself would later praise the
retrospective vision of Twain‟s Huck Finn, whom he described in 1935 as “the first to look back
at the republic from the perspective of the west” (Correspondence 424). But what Brooks does
not discuss in the 1920 volume—and what has perhaps the greater bearing on Fitzgerald‟s
“Benjamin Button”—is the regionally coded retrospection of Twain‟s A Connecticut Yankee in
King Arthur’s Court (1889). This comedic fantasy is the author‟s sendup of Sir Walter Scott‟s
fictionalized chivalric fictions, but its Camelot setting serves as stand-in for the plantocratic
American South. Earlier in Life on the Mississippi (1883), Twain had mocked Scott‟s influence
on the feudal pretensions of Southern plantation owners; here, he follows his criticism through to
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a creative conclusion by sending an industrious Northerner back in time to clean the place up.
Things do not end well for the Yankee reformer, but this is by and large a fantasy of
Reconstruction-done-right, for by the time Twain wrote the book, Southern Democrats had
reversed the civil rights gains and political reshufflings of the post-bellum era. As in Fitzgerald‟s
story, the political commentary of A Connecticut Yankee hinges on temporal displacement;
Twain lampoons the recalcitrant South, positions it backwards in time, as a medieval state in dire
need of democracy and industrialization.
As a 1920s update to A Connecticut Yankee, the plot of “Benjamin Button” spans the last
gasp of the antebellum era to the predicted future of the 1930s. The story depicts the
troublesome rebirth of the South in the wake of the Civil War, addressing in particular the pangs
of repatriation. Just as the elderly newborn Button must cope with his family‟s expectations of
how a baby boy should behave, so did some of the nation‟s oldest colonial properties—including
Virginia and the Carolinas—deal with the political anxiety of joining the US anew. Most
pertinent to the story‟s gerontological themes, the region‟s oldest political families were
frequently marked as traitors and barred from voting in Reconstruction Era state and national
government matters, making way for new politicians from poor white and freed black families—
recently empowered groups, young in political history. Button embodies the idea of a Southern
region growing younger in political power as its traditional power brokers, men who were more
often than not the ideologues behind secession, compete with the new faces favored by the
Republican administration. His regressing age also speaks to the section‟s newly weakened
economy. The disestablishment of the South‟s mature slave-based agricultural economy resulted
in the unsteady rise of a new, immature commercial capitalism in the region. Heather Cox
Richardson describes the immediate postwar economy as one unable to shake the old trappings

59

of slave labor as recalcitrant landowners tried to avoid paying free laborers in cash, preferring
instead to pay them in room and board, as they had paid slaves, or in crop shares, deferring
payment for a day‟s or week‟s labor (West 83). Local agricultural economies suffered as
employers struggled to pay for work and laborers pessimistically questioned whether they would
be paid fairly. Button, on the other hand, is able to profit in the post-bellum era because he is not
one of these affected rural farmers but is instead a young industrialist in Baltimore. And, a step
ahead of the self-destructive Quentin Compson, Benjamin Button finishes his studies at Harvard
and returns to Maryland with a degree in hand. As a manufacturer of nuts and bolts and also a
graduate of a prominent Northeastern institution, Button is oriented away from traditional
Southern agrarianism and toward a promising future in entrepreneurship and commerce.
Despite his generally leftist political leanings (to which he became more and more
dedicated over the course of his career), Fitzgerald thought very little of regional agrarian
movements or their literary representations; in a 1925 letter to Gilbert Seldes he derided the
contemporary interest in “serious” writing about “the Great Struggle the Great American Peasant
has with the Soil” (Letters 484). “Button” reflects his distaste for rural settings and agrarian
themes. Fitzgerald‟s portrayal of Button as a possible harbinger of change in the South is a
selective one that deliberately emphasizes Southern urbanity over far more common Southern
rurality. In identifying Button with the increasingly Northern-aligned Baltimore, the author
distances his character from the economic devastation of the countryside farmlands, including
those just south of the city in the lower parts of Maryland where Fitzgerald‟s own father grew up.
The writer James M. Cain, a Maryland native who spent time with Fitzgerald in Hollywood,
described the rural bottom of the state as “poor, backward, and still numb from the slave
economy that had riled it for hundreds of years, a world of runt corn, scrub tobacco, and tired
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land; of ox-carts, dirt roads, and bucket wells, of saloons, gambling, blood feuds, and dark,
clandestine sex” (qtd. in Cloud Nine 188). Button‟s environment is decidedly not this desperate
place but the bustling, ever-developing city of Baltimore.
Nor is Button‟s defining war the still-smoldering embers of “our late conflict,” as it is for
so many of Faulkner‟s characters. Fitzgerald‟s hero serves valiantly in the 1898 SpanishAmerican War, overseen by the Northern-favored McKinley administration. This is, of course,
the same war that helped substantiate the gubernatorial and presidential aspirations of
Progressive Republican Teddy Roosevelt, and Fitzgerald draws a number of corollaries between
BB and TR. The character, who becomes a “lieutenant-colonel just in time to participate in the
celebrated charge up San Juan Hill,” shares the same military rank and combat history as the
future president (174). Like Roosevelt, Button is nominated for a medal commendation
following his heroic participation in the conflict.5 Roosevelt, born like Button on the eve of the
Civil War, was the son of a New York philanthropist and a Georgia belle. As Fitzgerald‟s use of
it suggests, Roosevelt‟s biography neatly expresses the dynamic repulsion and attraction that the
North and South exerted on one another, an antimonial relationship between “rich Yankees” and
Southern trophy wives in which Northern-nationalistic values typically paved over Southern
decadence. Aside from the Roosevelt connections, Button‟s adopted Yankee work ethic plays a
significant role in his military career, for it is though “business influence” that Button initially
earns his officer commission, and it is because “his business require[s] attention” that he finally
leaves the army (174).
The character‟s thematic alliance with future Progressive Republicans and successful
businessmen stands in contrast to Fitzgerald‟s depiction of the story‟s other Southern war hero:
Button‟s father-in-law, the Civil War veteran General Montcrief. These are two wholly different
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types of Southern military men. Montcrief is a stereotypically nostalgic, mannered, and fiscally
irresponsible ex-Confederate who rears his daughter in the courtly “old tradition” (171). His
obsession with the South‟s involvement in the Civil War results in his composing an
unmarketable twenty-volume history of the conflict, published only through the private
investment of his pitying son-in-law. The upwardly mobile Button provides an infusion of
energy and money to the downward spiraling Montcrief line, even though the general threatens
at first to “fall upon his sword” in response to his Hildegarde‟s engagement (172). The
industrious Button is, despite his strange condition, an inveterate provider, a responsible family
man, and a successful independent businessman. Prosperous but by no means a capitalist
magnate, he embodies the Progressive Era upper-middle-class financial ideal and clearly profits
from the period‟s business boom. Unlike Montcrief, who represents the threat of Southern
backwardness in his unhealthy fixation upon the defunct Confederacy and his apparent
unwillingness to adapt to industrial modernity, Button is in general terms a progressive, at least
in his economic practices and cultural outlook. In the regional borderland of Baltimore, Button
identifies with the forward-looking Yankee work ethic and progressive political nationalism over
the backwards Sodom-gazing and financial insolvency frequently associated with the postbellum South. If the terms of the ideological conflict at work here are North and nation versus
Southern region, then the narrative makes it clear that Button‟s sympathies lie with the former
pair, as evidenced by his business scruples, his affinity for modern technology, and his eagerness
to serve his country.
But for all his progressive tendencies, Benjamin Button still lives in reverse. Like his
corollary in The Sound & the Fury, this “son of the south” cannot escape the trappings of a
regionally coded backwardness. In Button‟s case, his Baltimore home and his forward-oriented
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economic outlook, considered alongside his birth on the eve of the Civil War, suggest that
Button‟s experience of dwindling into youth and subsequently disappearing reflects the
threatening possibility of cultural change in the post-bellum New South. All of the progressive
traits that draw Button into alignment with Northern sensibilities and nationalistic attitudes
toward US citizenship also distance him from the traditions and values that historically provided
cultural identity for the South after the regionally divisive debates on slavery in the early
nineteenth century. By rejecting the paternalistic agrarianism of the past and looking towards a
future defined by industry, capital, and technology, Button sacrifices a large portion of his
Southern identity and proceeds to dwindle into nothingness—a process we might interpret as the
representation of cultural homogenization, the merging of the weakened South into the
financially and politically dominant North of the Progressive Era. “Button” finds the author
ruminating on the potential erosion of Southern identity much as he would later fret over the
possible decline of Western civilization in The Last Tycoon. And, given that the setting of the
story is the rapidly transitioning city of Baltimore, Fitzgerald‟s concerns were not entirely
unfounded. The Southern port city that had in the 1850s supported the acting career of future
assassin John Wilkes Booth and had in the 1860s been such a threat to Union forces that it had
been subjected to martial law had by Fitzgerald‟s time begun to casually lean towards a Northern
regional alignment as pronounced as that of nearby Washington, DC. Writing from progressive
Baltimore, a fiery intellectual like Mencken could rail against the culturally bankrupt South with
little to no cognitive dissonance. Nevertheless, the evidence of Fitzgerald‟s other Southern
stories assures us that Button‟s transition would be unlikely to take place in a different part of the
South; the short works that comprise his Georgia series, for example, argue that industrious
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Southerners must migrate northward to actualize their potential. In the Deep South, at least, the
regional displacement of intellectual flight is the high cost for success.
Reading the story with an eye to region leads us to consider that perhaps Button does not
disappear at the end so much as Fitzgerald propels him and the city forward through history
away from the paternalistic agrarian trappings of the Old South towards a repatriation rebirth into
the industrialized, capitalistic fold of the progressive nation. As is also the case for Faulkner‟s
Benjy Compson, Button‟s experience of backwards time signals incongruity between regional,
inter-regional, and national standards of progress—but in Fitzgerald‟s fantasy, social and
economic differences dissolve over the course of the narrative, while they remain opposed in
Faulkner‟s novel. The works find common ground, however, in their use of disability and
physical abnormality to convey the momentous weight of regional difference. Cultural variance
between regions is, the authors insist, so pronounced and of such consequence to the nation that
it merits representation in male bodies disabled by its multidirectional force. Of course, the
preponderance of Southern male literary characters crippled by sectional conflict extends beyond
Fitzgerald‟s Button and Tib Dulany or Faulkner‟s Benjy to include the vast assemblage of
grotesque and gothic types long recognized as hallmarks of Southern literature. Reflecting the
tense experiences of thwarted wage-earners and regionally-minded voters, these damaged or
disabled men all speak to the myriad problems of economy and sectional politics in the postbellum nation. But the particular examples provided by the fictions of Fitzgerald and Faulkner
employ temporal narrative tropes, chronotypes, to allude specifically to complex Southern
responses to American Progressivism.
For Fitzgerald in particular, the South‟s shifting regional identity and changing sectional
alliances demonstrated the cost of socioeconomic progress. He plainly recognized the
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importance of a revitalized Southern economy that would promote industry in the region, as
stories like “The Ice Palace” and “The Jelly Bean” harshly censure a purportedly indolent South
and praise an industrious North. But Fitzgerald also feared the progressive mutation of Southern
character into something unrecognizable. The spread of the urbanized Northeast‟s grubby
industrial capitalism risked irrevocably altering the gentle aristocratic South of his father‟s
anecdotes and of sentimentalized history. Fitzgerald favored the popular memory of the
Southern planter‟s natural aristocratic manners to the petty greed intrinsic to what he called the
“Yankee Push,” the vicious upward mobility of men like “Jay Gould who began by peddling bad
buttons to a county and ended, with the same system of peddler‟s morals, by peddling five dollar
railroads to a nation” (Letters 12). Thus his fiction articulates the desire for regional progress
with minimal consequences, social change mediated by an untenable compromise between
antebellum Southern temperament and Progressive bourgeoisie mindset. Although Fitzgerald‟s
work envisions this ideal synthesis of backwards-gazing regional past and forward-oriented
national present, the author leaves it unrealized even in fiction. Rather, the stories commonly
portray two alternative outcomes; either Southern-ness is subsumed by larger national or more
economically viable Northern influences, or it turns dangerously inward, basking self-satisfied
and backwards in its own proud past. This fretting over assimilation and incompatibility is
ultimately inseparable from the author‟s depiction of doomed inter-regional romances and
physiologically distinct Southerners. For while Fitzgerald‟s expression of regional difference in
biological terms reflects his intellectual investment in eugenic thought and also his marital
frustration, it more importantly shows how seriously he regarded the problematic demarcations
separating region and nation. Regional identifications transcend mere rhetoric in his work.
These are matters of bio-political significance for Fitzgerald, who observes that regional
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difference causes tangible change to American bodies, through war or romance, in physical
conflict or in reproduction.

Notes
1

Adams‟s dismissal of the Southern mind and work ethic is the most memorable, enduring

sound bite on the topic, but it is prefigured by a history of post-bellum Northern claims about
labor malaise in the South. Richardson reminds us that soon after the Civil War, Northern
Republicans were quick to accuse the region‟s surviving aristocrats of failing to promote
agricultural production (West 83).
2

In March 1921, Fitzgerald reviewed The Second Series of Mencken‟s Prejudices for The

Bookman. Thus it is the version of “Sahara” reprinted therein with which he would have been
most familiar. In the review, Fitzgerald praises the harshness of “Sahara” and its imagining of
“all the region south of Mason-Dixon to be peopled by moron Catilines” (In His Own Time 120).
3

Woodward observes that dissatisfaction with the national cotton market and with the lien credit

system led many Southern farmers to sympathize with labor advocates from the West as well as
with homegrown populists.
4

Nor was Faulkner the only writer in the 1920s to pair mental deficiency and childlike

mannerisms with race consciousness in depictions of the “backwards” South. In “The South”
(1922), a poem originally published in W.E.B. Du Bois‟s literary magazine The Crisis, AfricanAmerican poet Langston Hughes referenced “The sunny-faced South,/ Beast-strong,/ Idiotbrained;/ The child-minded South/ Scratching in the dead fire‟s ashes/ For a Negro‟s bones,”
foreshadowing Faulkner‟s portraiture of Benjy (Collected Works 38). Such representations
magnify long-standing charges of Southern anti-intellectualism.
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5

Interestingly, Fitzgerald also compared Monroe Stahr to Roosevelt in his working notes for The

Last Tycoon. He wrote that the character “walked softly and carried a big stick.”
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ORIENTAL BY OCCIDENT: RAJAHS, SHEIKS, AND SAMURAI IN FITZGERALD‟S
AMERICAN EAST
During the 1920s and 30s, the two decades that constituted the bulk of F. Scott
Fitzgerald‟s professional career, the global East commonly assumed two contradictory identities
in American culture. On the one hand, the word “Oriental” connoted material luxury: Asian
silks were in high demand; rich Americans threw Eastern-themed dinner parties, danced Oriental
foxtrots, and collected fine china; and entertainment clubs, such as the several owned by Jazz
Age entrepreneur Joe Zelli, adopted a mock-Oriental style to erect a façade of fashionable
debauchery. On the other hand, the rhetoric of eugenic pseudoscience and the politics of
jingoistic nationalism contributed to an ideology in which the Orient was represented as a feudal,
barbaric, impoverished zone flooded with undesirables. The twenties saw the passage of
immigration reform bills like the Emergency Quota Act and the Johnson-Reed Act, both of
which severely restricted the entry of Asian immigrants into the United States. Interwar
Americans were eager to appropriate cultural objects of the “mysterious East,” but they
objectified and derided Asians and Middle-Easterners. The Orient was paradoxically alluring
and repulsive, decadent and decrepit, rich and poor. The fiction of Fitzgerald and his literary
cohort engages these irreconcilably dichotomous imaginings of the Orient‟s cultural geography.
This chapter, in addition to analyzing such examples, pays special heed to how American
regional concerns, reflected in literature and popular discourse, intervened in the era‟s Oriental
imaginary.
To illustrate how easily these geographies could overlap in early twentieth century
literature (including Fitzgerald‟s own works), it may suffice to look first at a 1920s trend in
literary humor: the Rubaiyat parody. Because Edward FitzGerald‟s 1859 translation of The
Rubaiyat of Omar Khayyam was so widely known, newspapers, literary journals, and humor
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magazines regularly used it as a parodic frame for a number of topics, invoking a British
translation of a Persian text critique American culture. One of the most famous of these, “The
Rubaiyat of Ohow Dryyam,” addresses Prohibition (“Wail! For the law has scattered into flight/
Those drinks that were our sometime dear delight”).
Fitzgerald saved in his scrapbook one such sendup of This Side of Paradise (1920).
Undated, unsourced, attributed only to “H.W.H,” “The Rubaiyat of Amory Khayyam, as
Translated by F. Scott Fitzgerald” is a savvy bit of doggerel, a versified, Orientalized burlesque
of the novel. The piece pivots on a jumbling of Fitzgeralds; Edward, English poet and translator,
is swapped for Scott, Jazz Age chronicler and notorious reveler. The textual shift from serious,
stoic Victorianism (FitzGerald‟s translation of The Rubaiyat is often criticized for pandering to
nineteenth-century English values) to dissipated American modernism (“WAKE! For the bun
that scattered into flight/ Dead sober reason all the jazz-long night/ has gone”) offers via its
humor a thoughtful commentary on culture in transition. The parody thus reinforces Paradise‟s
reputation as a novelistic portrait of the new generation even as it has some fun at the book‟s
expense. Contrasted with FitzGerald‟s translation, the verse of the parodic Fitzgerald suggests
broad changes in the valuation of wealth in society across time and place. Consider, first,
Edward FitzGerald‟s translation of The Rubaiyat‟s twelfth stanza:
“How sweet is mortal sovranty!”—think some:
Others—“How blest the paradise to come!”
Ah, take the cash in hand and waive the Rest;
Oh, the brave music of a distant drum!
To a nineteenth-century British readership, the significance of the poetry might lie in its semisecular balancing of worldly and spiritual values. This certainly held appeal for the PreRaphaelites who were the text‟s first serious readers; and, as Daniel Schenker has posited, a
wider English audience later appreciated the work‟s capacity for pre-industrial “retrospection”
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(54). But the early twentieth-century voice of Scott Fitzgerald as imitated by H.W.H. points to a
distinctly different side of “paradise” and an oppositional set of fiscal values:
Some for the heavy Wall Street deal, and some
Sigh for the fat inheritance to come.
Ah, take Dad‟s Stutz and let the Rolls-Royce Go;
It is the scion‟s privilege to bum.
Whereas the FitzGerald translation of the text has the potential to be read as a dismissive
response to middle-class capitalistic aspiration, since the English poet himself hailed from a
wealthy family of English aristocrats, the “Fitzgerald” parody wryly embraces the seediness of
nouveau riche Yankee privilege. In the place of an aristocratic sensibility superior to petty
financial concerns, we encounter an American setting in which money and materialism rule,
where capital is king in the booming twenties. Much as Fitzgerald‟s prose Paradise critiques the
essential grubbiness of this environment, the poetic parody assembled in his name emphasizes
the vacuity of the young American rich who perambulate within it.
What ultimately unites these two Rubaiyats is their creative appropriation of an Oriental
source for the purpose of addressing Western socioeconomic forces. Omar Khayyam‟s actual
quatrains and their place within an eleventh-century Persian context become irrelevant in the
face of a transliterating modernity. Today, critics regard FitzGerald‟s Rubaiyat first and
foremost as a work of Victorian literature, and in his own time the translator recognized the
resultant product as a “transmogrification,” a hybrid text that bore the influences of English
culture despite its ostensibly Persian setting. H.W.H.‟s Rubaiyat is an even stranger animal, for
it acknowledges Edward FitzGerald‟s liberties with the poem and then proceeds to adapt them in
the manner of Scott Fitzgerald, doubly displacing Khayyam‟s work from its origin.
I find that the enigmatic H.W.H. exhibited deep insight in linking Fitzgerald‟s depictions
of a dissipated American East to the idealized Orient of the transmogrified Rubaiyat, for the
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novelist‟s fitful love-hate relationship with the region did indeed lead to his mystification of it.
Largely because of the anxiety he harbored as a result of hailing from the unfashionable
Midwest, Fitzgerald portrayed the urban and collegiate East as filled with enchanted places
worthy of pilgrimage. Gatsby‟s riotous “blue lawn” is one such place, as are the Ivy universities
(treated as holy sites by Fitzgerald in poems and essays) and, of course, New York City. But
Fitzgerald‟s fixation on the American East mutates into a strangely Occidental Orientalism in a
handful of stories and novels written after Paradise. In these works, the author presents
hybridized characters rendered rhetorically Oriental by suggestive description, much as H.W.H.
had earlier costumed Paradise‟s protagonist Amory Blain as a turbaned “Amory Khayyam.”
When writing in these stories about men from the Midwest who head east in search of fortune
and fame, Fitzgerald shows a strange tendency to Orientalize them. It is an odd gesture—almost
a tic—and it tends to manifest in fictions loosely patterned on or inspired by the writer‟s own
journey east. Jay Gatsby‟s description of himself as a “young rajah” stands out as one apt
example, but this word choice finds a precedent in the earlier story “The Offshore Pirate” (1921),
in which the titular rover applies the term to himself. The conclusion of the minor tale “Six of
One-” (1932) features similarly jarring use of Oriental terminology; its narrator, describing a
group of young Midwestern men bound for college in the East, refers to the students as
“samurai” (694). While it is tempting to summarily dismiss examples like these as little more
than evidence of the period‟s fascination with American aesthetics inspired by the Middle and
Far East, the incessant recurrence of such tropes in popular culture and literature renders them
worthy of study by virtue of volume alone. Moreover, the presence of a pattern and the
suggestion of a purpose both encourage us to delve deeper into the Orientalist aspects of
Fitzgerald‟s work in particular. The pattern, as I have previously observed, is that Fitzgerald‟s
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allusions to the hemispheric East often appear in relation to discussions of the American regional
East, especially those pertaining to eastbound Midwesterners. As for the purpose—why the
writer frequently Orientalizes white characters and what this action signifies—that serves as the
topic of this chapter, which reads deeply into Oriental allusions in fiction (by Fitzgerald and
others) composed during a transhemispheric historical moment marked by immigration fears and
eugenic panic.
In these literary instances, what occurs is a provocative conflation of domestic East and
Far East, Occident and Orient. Fitzgerald‟s white rajahs and rich boy samurais contribute to the
fetishization of an East Coast outlook so distinct from his enduring Midwestern sensibilities as to
be virtually foreign. Thus in his fictional treatments of differences between US West and US
East, he frequently portrays the latter as a luxuriously strange oriental zone in relation to the
former‟s homely occident.1 To invoke an Orient correlative to the American Northeast,
Fitzgerald lumps together a broad assortment of signifiers lifted from non-European cultures in
the Eastern hemisphere; these are generally Arabic or Oriental in origin, although he alludes as
well to Africa‟s Barbary Coast, an area situated on the Prime Meridian dividing the hemispheres.
This multicultural jumbling suggests that Fitzgerald is less interested in untangling his
confusions of ethnicity and identity than in exploring how popular Oriental abstractions might
inform our understanding of regional differences and class anxieties in America. From the
perspective of a two-pronged, totalizing American Arabism/Orientalism, he critiques the cultural
primacy of the East Coast, the geographic hub of public governmental power and home base for
the private powers of industry and finance.2 Fitzgerald‟s representations position the classconscious US Northeast in relation to a purportedly caste-minded Orient for the purpose of
depicting the American region as simultaneously alluring and repulsive—much as contemporary
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Anglo-American discourse had characterized Arabic and Oriental cultures. In doing so, he
contributes to a discursive history of Americans comparing domestic class distinctions to
Oriental caste, such as how Bostonians have since the nineteenth century referred to their oldest,
proudest, and richest families as “Boston Brahmin.”
Edward Said has treated these mixed emotions as typical of how the Occidental response
to the “Orient at large... vacillates between the West‟s contempt for what is familiar and its
shivers of delight in—or fear of—novelty” (Orientalism 59). As I apply Said‟s analysis of
global-scale Orientalist perspectives to US regional conflict, I focus on instances in which
sectional difference is reified as national difference, highlighting political and cultural conflict
between parts of the US. I also look to Fitzgerald‟s deployment of actual “Oriental” characters
in fictionalized US settings. My general goal in doing so is to assess the relation of a hegemonic
Eastern region to an American Midwest under the East‟s powerful cultural authority: an
authority so alternately repellent and attractive that some period writers label it alien, other,
Oriental. In assigning additional ethnic significance to this geographic and cultural disparity, the
subtext of Fitzgerald‟s fiction gives voice to mingled sectionally-motivated fears and desires.
The urbanized US East is for him and his characters as alluring as the fabled cities of The
Arabian Nights, but to become enmeshed in materialistic East Coast culture is to embrace an
unstable regional hybridity, one that the author likens to racial mixing with eugenically inferior
Asian partners.

“That centre and that brain”
The sepia-toned Midwest of Fitzgerald‟s childhood may have been America‟s heartland,
but the East to which he relocated as a young adult held possession of the nation‟s other
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important parts—namely, its brain and wallet. Malcolm Cowley writes in his seminal essay
“Fitzgerald: The Romance of Money” that “the 1920s were the age when American culture
became urban instead of rural and when New York City set the social and intellectual standards
of the country” (A Second Flowering 25). But that had already been the case for nearly a
century. George G. Foster, who published a series of studies on mid-nineteenth century New
York City, remarked in 1849 that “every powerful nation must have one intellectual centre, as
every one individual must have a brain, whose motions and conceptions govern the entire
system” (New York by Gas-Light 9). He identified New York as “that centre and that brain” for
the US, but his observations are applicable to the American East writ large. The most respected
academic institutions in the nation were (and, in large part, still are) Eastern institutions. Despite
the massive growth of Midwestern state universities during and after World War I—Matthew J.
Bruccoli estimates that their student bodies doubled in population from 1915 to 1930—degrees
from Northeastern Ivy League schools retained a special puissance for the American highbrow
(“Fitzgerald‟s Eras”).
Fitzgerald acknowledges the American intellect‟s easterly bent by tying a preponderance
of his protagonists to Harvard, Yale, and Princeton. Regardless of their respective sectional
backgrounds, he sends them east for education, leaving them linked—a short train ride away—
by football rivalries and scholastic pride. Likewise, a considerable number of his characters find
jobs in Eastern financial institutions such as brokerage firms and banks. The vocationallymandated eastern migration of figures like Nick Caraway speaks to the power of capital in the
American East. The country‟s earliest and most powerful financial hubs—New York, Boston,
and Philadelphia—were Northeastern cities, and, as their various markets and exchanges
provided much-needed economic homogeneity for the developing republic, they rooted the base
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of American capital firmly in the East (Geisst 10). Moreover, while Fitzgerald‟s fiction rarely
delves into the details of specific political events, it bears mentioning that turn-of-the-century
American politicos naturally looked east, to the seat of governmental authority and colonial
prestige, for power. Non-Easterners who ascended to high political office—men like
transplanted Southerner Woodrow Wilson—frequently whitewashed their comparatively
provincial backgrounds by linking themselves to respected Northeastern educational or financial
institutions. The political career of the Virginia-born Wilson, for example, shows an
unmistakable northeasterly trajectory: transferring as an undergraduate from Davidson College to
Princeton, he subsequently undertook graduate studies at Johns Hopkins, taught at Cornell,
became president of Princeton, and ran a successful gubernatorial campaign in New Jersey
before becoming a viable Democratic presidential candidate. Though he personally detested
what he saw as cronyism and corruption in the East, his regional transition from the South
(where his parents had been slaveholders) was essential in securing broad national support
during an era in which politics were still somewhat sectional (Cooper 107, 360). In some
respects, these cartographic divisions would decrease in political significance over the course of
Fitzgerald‟s career. Lynn Dumenil has observed that the 1920s in particular saw the decline of
“political parties based on geographical representation” balanced by the rise of “interest groups”
with participants spread across the nation (53-54). But, as the regional interests of Fitzgerald and
his fellow literati attest, place retained an abstract cultural value as a tool for articulating
competing definitions of American-ness and for imagining communities of socioeconomic peers
united by region.
That the East functioned in the early twentieth century as cultural standard-bearer for the
rest of the nation is hardly surprising, for it had a considerable head start on its fellow sections.
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Few American states boast histories of European settlement dating back to the seventeenth
century, so those that do claim a comparatively long sense of political and cultural perspective.
These twelve, all situated in the East, founded educational institutions, established publishing
centers, and popularized discursive forms of political protest while still colonies, facilitating the
creation of an American culture industry in advance of the nation‟s existence. The political
disputes over slavery that would bifurcate Old America also resulted, especially after Northern
victory in the Civil War, in the popular identification of the Northeast as the American brain and
its writers as the American voice. In New England: Indian Summer, 1865-1915 (1940), Van
Wyck Brooks addresses at length the role of the Northeast as cultural hegemon, and he credits
the region‟s seniority as a major source of its authority:
Two centuries lay behind the New England writers, and, if they were voces
populi, there were reasons for it. They had grown in the great tradition of the
Revolution, they were closely connected with the soil, they were readers and
students of the classics,—three elements, deeply related, that explained their
power and accounted for their prestige outside. As heirs of the Revolution, they
spoke for the liberal world-community. As men who loved the land and rural
customs, they shared the popular life at its roots, at its source. As readers and
students of the classics, they followed great patterns of behavior, those that
Europeans followed also. (13)
Brooks thus portrays a US Northeast eager and able to speak as cultural ambassador, to readers
at home and abroad, for the rest of the nation.
In recent decades, scholars have returned to Brooks‟s regionally-minded analysis of
literary history. Critics such as Jennifer Rae Greeson and Betsy Erkkila have looked closely at
how the cultural prominence of the East controlled the history of American letters as much as it
affected US domestic policy and national economy. In particular, scholars have taken Edgar
Allan Poe‟s lampooning of the Concord “Frogpondians” and his desire to see a real “Republic of
Letters” in publishing as earnest expressions of frustration at the Eastern-dominated American
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literary scene. Poe longed for the disempowerment of the Northeast as the primary hub of
literary production and publishing in antebellum America, but many of his contemporaries
actually desired a centralized site of American literary production; even his friend James Russell
Lowell lamented that “American literature.... has no centre” (“Edgar A. Poe” vii). But what Poe
recognized—and what scholars are acknowledging more and more today—is that the
“American” Renaissance was largely an Eastern occurrence, hardly representative of the varied
literatures, including those of the South and the burgeoning West, spread across the nation.
Though Ralph Waldo Emerson‟s coterie couched their philosophy of composition in nationalistic
terms, they continued to privilege their New England base of operations as a site of authentic
American-ness, much as Emerson himself nationalized Transcendentalism in his 1837
“American Scholar” address. And, as Erkkila has observed, early twentieth-century American
literary critics like F.O. Matthiessen tended to take them at their word, citing the
Transcendentalist writings of Northeastern authors as vessels of true democratic ideology.
Literature after the Renaissance proved to be as contingent upon the East as that produced
before. The body of modernist American literature to which Fitzgerald contributed was
recognizably Eastern in its sensibilities. The vaguely snobbish, decidedly metropolitan tone of
early modernists such as Henry James, Henry Adams, and Edith Wharton set the pace for later
writers, who, outside the Northeast and even abroad, could not escape the erudite, urban,
allusion-laden core of the modernist aesthetic. Novels deeply steeped in the cultures of East
Coast cities—works ranging from James‟s The Bostonians (1886) to Wharton‟s The Age of
Innocence (1920)—celebrated an Eastern urbanite cultural norm, a metropolitan expansion of
how Emerson‟s clique had earlier identified the center of the civilized universe as Concord,
Massachusetts. While these regionally coded texts certainly did not preclude contemporary
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works rooted in alternative regions—for instance, the urban Midwest of Booth Tarkington‟s The
Magnificent Ambersons (1918)—such settings were widely recognized as special deviations
from a standard. And regardless of textual setting and authorial background, virtually all major
literary works passed through the sieve of the East, for in Poe‟s time and in Fitzgerald‟s the East
Coast remained the publishing as well as the financial hub of the United States, with Philadelphia
functioning as the nation‟s print culture capitol until the nineteenth century, when Boston and
New York endeavored to succeed it in prominence.
Certainly the Northeast was no cultural monolith, and literary critics have spilled
considerable ink in trying to sum up the representative urban characters of these three print
capitals. But Lowell succinctly expressed their irreconcilable individuality when he remarked,
“Boston, New York, Philadelphia, each has its literature almost more distinct than those of the
different dialects of Germany” (“Edgar A. Poe” vii). Despite the significant cultural differences
distinguishing major Northeastern cities from one another, politicians, thinkers, and writers from
other sections sought to characterize the East as a place of shared regional values, especially after
the Civil War polarized sectional distinctions and gave rise to the increasingly broad
implementation of the epithet “Yankee.” Historian Stephen V. Ash writes that though many
Southerners “defined Northern culture as an alien „other‟ even before the war,” the act of
secession worked to confirm a deeper “sense of separateness” that would only be exacerbated
during the periods of occupation and Reconstruction (When the Yankees Came 40).
The act of imagining a coherent “Yankee” community glosses over real cultural
differences between members of the Union forces to depict the infiltration of a unified
Northeastern mentality of commercialism, industry, and opportunism in opposition to an implicit
Southern predilection for agrarianism and propriety. This critique of the Northeast as a self-
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interested, mercenary region rich in capital but hostile to American democracy remained
prominent in Southern political and literary discourses through WWII, after Fitzgerald‟s death.
Westerners and Midwesterners involved in the agrarian populist movements of the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries likewise adopted this anti-Eastern rhetoric. In his study
on agrarian radicalism, Peter H. Argersinger writes that participants in such movements found
common ground in their shared disdain for two socioeconomic forces located in the East: “Wall
Street bankers [and] corrupt legislators in Washington” (Limits 70). Prior to and subsequently
throughout Fitzgerald‟s lifetime, political agitators in the South, Midwest, and West sought to
other the comparatively metropolitan American East, denouncing it as a region that had largely
abandoned the nation‟s agrarian and artisanal roots in the soulless pursuit of capital. Certainly,
they would have been aware that the Northeast possessed its own substantial rural subsections
and that it yielded no small amount of the nation‟s produce. But for American writers of all
regions, the abstract East functioned efficaciously as convenient shorthand for referring to the
nation‟s bases of political, financial, and collegiate authority. Depending on its context, use of
the term could either characterize the region as the foundational, powerful, authoritative seat of
national power—or as the home of money-grubbing industrialists, corrupt Harding appointees,
and spoiled blue bloods who perverted the nation‟s historic valuation of labor. In the rhetorical
play of representation, this means the difference between the Northeast being lauded as hegemon
or criticized as other, although these two aspects are by no means mutually exclusive.
Evaluations of the US East informed a great deal of American literature and political
discourse in the massive historical space between the Revolutionary War and World War II. But
American writers from Benjamin Franklin onward have also been intrigued by an entirely
different East—that of the Orient, the much-mythologized zone spread from North Africa to the
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eastern reaches of Asia—and many works of literature posit cultural connections between the Far
East and its American corollary. In “An Arabian Tale” (1779), Franklin makes use of the Orient
to offer something rare in his work: a critique of human reason. The short narrative relates a
conversation between a wise spirit named Belubel and the retired magician Albumazar.
Albumazar confesses to his interlocutor that the existence of evil is defies reason; Belubel
reassures him that the problem is a matter of perspective, reminding the wizard that “there is also
a long gradation of beings, who possess powers and faculties of which thou canst yet have no
conception” (Writings 10.124). The mystical tone of the story contrasts sharply with that of
Franklin‟s dryly reasonable secular parables, such as his work under the Richard Saunders
pseudonym. Poor Richard‟s Pennsylvanian aphorisms emphasize with logical assuredness the
fungible facility of American capitalism; Belubel‟s Oriental wisdom complicates matters by
insisting upon an intangible sublime beyond worldly concerns. Franklin, then, presents Oriental
asceticism as an alternative other to US economic values, the conflict providing a case study in
cultural contrast. The narrative use of an Oriental outsider to comment on the American
democratic political system emerged as a literary subgenre. Aside from Franklin‟s short, the
practice appeared in Peter Markoe‟s The Algerine Spy in Pennsylvania (1787), Henry
Sherburne‟s The Oriental Philanthropist (1800), and George Franklin‟s The Wandering
Philanthropist (1810). The Orient would remain just such an other in the later writings of the
American Transcendentalists, who borrowed from the holistic principles of Hinduism,
Buddhism, and Taoism to draw distinctions between disjointed materialism and the mystical
unity of what Emerson referred to as “the Over-soul.” The Transcendentalists‟ insistence upon a
monistic worldview represented a sharp break from traditional Western dualism; and indeed
many transcendental works, including Whitman‟s “Passage to India” (1870), Thoreau‟s Walden
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(1854), and Emerson‟s “Days” (1857), directly reference Oriental tropes to transfuse stagnant
Western civilization with redemptive Eastern philosophy. Even Poe, Concord‟s great foe, found
a place for the Orient in his writings. Poe‟s self-designation of his prose as “arabesque” assigns
the work a calculated alterity.

“A turbaned „character‟ leaking sawdust at every pore”
I have outlined two markedly distinct but tenuously linked American evaluations of
Eastern-ness: the one invested in prioritizing the US regional East as the nation‟s cultural
hegemon and the other interested in regarding the Orient as the ascetic, transcendental opposite
to a hyper-materialistic America. In several literary instances, these split agendas tentatively
brush up against one another—as in the work of Franklin, whose Philadelphian settings briefly
dissipate into a fantasized Araby, or in that of Emerson, whose backyard in Concord receives a
visitation of Sufi dervishes. By the time of Fitzgerald‟s Jazz Age, however, both these
“Oriental” aspects of American literature had assumed a newly ironic tone and a critical purpose.
In Babbitt (1922), for instance, Sinclair Lewis jokingly compares his upper middle-class and
aristocratic characters to Asian masculine types. In one peculiar scene, Lewis sarcastically
declaims the defeat of traditional Western heroic models by the rise of an alienating modern
commercialism:
To them, the Romantic Hero was no longer the knight, the wandering poet, the
cowpuncher, the aviator, nor the brave young district attorney, but the great salesmanager, who had an Analysis of Merchandizing Problems on his glass-topped
desk, whose title of nobility was “Go-getter,” and who devoted himself and all his
young samurai to the cosmic purpose of Selling—not of selling anything in
particular, for or to anybody in particular, but pure Selling. (616)
References to the Far East permeate protagonist George F. Babbitt‟s upper-middle-class world,
generally representing material opulence or opportunities for leisure. When Babbitt visits an
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expensive barber shop, Lewis observes that, with a towel on his head in the manner of a
“turban,” he looks the part of a commanding “plump pink calif on an ingenious and adjustable
throne” (743). Later, his wife joins a quack philosophical movement, the “Theosophical and
Pantheistic Oriental Reading Circle,” in an effort to bring meaning to her materialistic existence
(806). The city‟s rich elite, an exclusive circle to which the up-and-coming Babbitt lacks access,
throw exotic “Singhalese” dinner parties with “Oriental decorations” to welcome European
visitors (664). These permeations suggest exactly what the Robert and Helen Lynd would later
observe about American appropriations of Oriental culture in their first Middletown sociological
survey: that products from the Orient—things as material as Persian rugs and as immaterial as
spiritual concepts—served to distinguish the business class from the working class (102). In
early twentieth-century American media, “Oriental” was a byword for leisure, style, and
sophistication beyond the earning power of blue collar workers. Writers like Lewis and
Fitzgerald recognized its significance to modern consumers and parodied it in prose.
Fitzgerald‟s fiction intervenes powerfully into this representational scheme of blending
domestic and foreign Easts because it places renewed emphasis on the American regional angle.
As a former advertisement writer himself, he captures the unreal qualities that plague American
mediations of Oriental culture. Yet his own spare depictions of the Orient are simplistic
backdrops rendered in broad strokes, and his allusions to Oriental figures gesture more towards
cardboard cutout stereotypes than to their actual referents. Neither should be read as
contributing to serious-minded, well-informed political discourse on the socioeconomic struggles
of actual Eastern nations. Indeed, relatively few Westerners of the era took the East seriously.
Bigotry towards purportedly inferior “yellow” and “brown” peoples was common in popular
eugenic thought; in his notorious The Rising Tide of Color Against White World Supremacy
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(1920), Lothrop Stoddard stirred up fears of “an Oriental alliance against whites” (23), but he
took a contradictory pleasure in citing the petite stature of the “little Nippons” (205). From a
cultural standpoint, popular interest in Oriental studies seldom went beyond novelty and shock.
The author of a rigorous 1909 study of caste in India lamented that Americans and English
tended to reduce the subject to “nice little table-talk”; laughter at its “absurdities and
contradictions”; fodder for Christian evangelism; or, at best, “the interest felt by an entomologist
observing the habits of ants” (Ketkar 1-2). In the 1920s, the rise of the Japanese military and
economy led some in the States to reappraise the industrializing nation, but, as I will show in a
later portion of this chapter, these reevaluations were burdened by a racialist worldview and
tended to infantilize the Japanese. It was not really until after the events of Pearl Harbor and,
later, the rise of China as a communist power that Americans finally regarded select Eastern
nations as viable military and economic competitors worthy of serious attention.
Fitzgerald died before the Pearl Harbor bombing in 1941 and the establishment of the
People‟s Republic of China in 1949, so his political perspective on the Orient is representative of
a post-Wilson, pre-WWII isolationist American culture that had little interest in the Europeandominated League of Nations and even less in the Middle or Far East. Instead, Fitzgerald‟s
brand of American Orientalism bespeaks his immersion in a consumer culture that located the
proper place for the adjective “Oriental” in front of the noun “foxtrot” and that used stock images
of North African, Middle Eastern, and East Asian subjects to sell American products and
services. In the early twentieth century, commercial illustrators like Maxfield Parrish, whom
Fitzgerald mentions by name in “May Day” (1920) and in various letters, churned out magazine
covers, advertisements, and frontispieces that made liberal use of Oriental imagery to sell
American products and services. In particular, Parrish‟s calendar designs promoting General
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Electric‟s line of Edison Mazda lamps speak to the role of Orientalism in American consumer
culture. Several of his 1923 calendar paintings feature Middle Eastern characters in Oriental
settings with the “EDISON MAZDA” logo emblazoned above the scene. One piece, simply
entitled “Egypt,” shows Caucasian-looking Egyptians basking in the glow from nearby sconces.
Another, “The Lamplighter of Bagdad,” depicts Arabs receiving oil for their brass lamps. The
artist‟s deployment of Eastern imagery reflects the Oriental origin of the product‟s name
(General Electric lifted the word “Mazda” from the Persian god of light, Ahura Mazda). The
seemingly arbitrary jumbling of Arabic cultures that one encounters on the Parrish calendar
suggests the obvious: here, an alluring and outré East has been assembled by Western hands to
spur American consumerism. The represented Orient is little more than a marketing ploy.
Fitzgerald‟s appropriations of Oriental imagery borrow from props and stock footage, echoing
Parrish calendar types. But they are highly significant, even if—or perhaps more so because—
they are radically divorced from their original referents. Fitzgerald employs Oriental
stereotypes, more commonly used to emphasize differences between cultures of the Western and
Eastern hemispheres, to highlight cultural variance between the hegemonic US East and the
nation‟s younger regions.
Fitzgerald‟s work therefore participates in two unique American discursive traditions,
one commercial and the other literary, of invoking the Orient to address the Occident.3 But,
whereas his predecessors employed the tactic primarily to assess the relation of a totalized
United States to an abstract Orient, Fitzgerald maps his own strategy over a divided America
cordoned off into recognizably individual sections, with some regions afforded more prestige
and authority than others. Similar to how Lowell played with ideas of national difference in
likening nineteenth-century America‟s disparate literary cultures to “the different dialects of
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Germany”—and related as well to efforts by rival regions to other the hegemonic US East—
Fitzgerald imaginatively conflates the disparate regional cultures of early twentieth-century
America with hemispheric difference.
An early expression of the Oriental theme appears in “Myra Meets his Family” (1920).
The plot of this strange story concerns an elaborate scheme orchestrated by a rich Easterner
named Knowleton Whitney, who uses theatrical trickery to coerce his Midwestern fiancée Myra
Harper into breaking off their engagement. Myra visits the Whitney estate in wealth-laden
Westchester County, New York, and there Knowleton employs a troupe of actors to convince her
that not only is his family undesirably eccentric but that Chinese blood pollutes their genetic
heritage. The actors who play the role of his mother and father act the part of mad aristocrats.
Myra suspects that something beyond mere eccentricity plagues the family, and Knowleton leads
her to believe that it is their mixed ancestry when he reveals a mocked-up portrait of his greatgrandmother, “a lady dressed as a European but with the unmistakable features of a Chinese.”
Myra‟s racism gets the better of her and in a swoon she experiences horrific visions “of
reversions to type—of Chinese babies.”4 She recalls the patriarch‟s “yellowish face, peculiar
eyebrows and tiny hands and feet” (The Price was High 25-26). Of course, this is part of
Knowleton‟s gothic-inspired plan to scare her away from his fortune, and Myra gets her revenge
at the story‟s conclusion when she jilts her suddenly contrite fiancé, but what we encounter here
is an early appearance of an oft-recycled gesture in Fitzgerald‟s stories: the thematic wedding of
Eastern wealth and material luxury to Oriental tropes, a strategy he borrowed from 1920s
popular culture but modified to better express inter-regional animus. In many cases, this
conflation attends a critical moment of movement between regions, typically a narrative event in
which a Midwesterner or a Southerner risks being relocated into the alluring, dangerous East
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Coast of the Jazz Age. Myra, a native Ohioan of humble social status and family income, risks
such a translation of identity through her engagement to the wildly rich and powerful New
Yorker Whitney. Fitzgerald represents the dangers of sectional incompatibility and class
incongruity as ethnic difference. Knowleton presents himself to his would-be wife as a member
of a race apart—not just a regional Easterner but a bona fide Oriental to boot—forging a weird
rhetorical hybridity of global and domestic East. The Westchester rich, “Myra” playfully posits,
might be racially different from you and me.
Imbrication between the Orient and the American East recurs in Fitzgerald‟s maritime
melodrama, “The Offshore Pirate” (1920), which appeared in The Saturday Evening Post two
months after “Myra.” Like its predecessor, this narrative follows a rich boy‟s Orientalist fantasy.
The story‟s protagonist, a wealthy colonel‟s son masquerading as a modern day pirate king to
win the affections of a bored heiress, explains to his love interest that he plans to take his illgotten gains to India for the purpose of transmuting wealth into class. Toby Moreland,
roleplaying in the persona of musician-turned-swashbuckler Curtis Carlyle, claims that he will
Take ship to India. I want to be a rajah. I mean it. My idea is to go up into
Afghanistan somewhere, buy up a palace and a reputation, and then after about
five years appear in England with a foreign accent and a mysterious past. But
India first. Do you know, they say that all the gold in the world drifts very
gradually back to India. Something very fascinating about that to me.
After India, he concludes, “comes aristocracy”—presumably ascension to American Brahmin
status (Short Stories 84). Moreland‟s playacting is romantic and calculatedly unrealistic, but the
details of his contrived plan reveal a great deal about his regional sensibilities—as well as those
of his creator. Moreland‟s fantasy of the Far East must be positioned in relation to the American
East Coast, for it is with this region that the pirate‟s conjured Victorian dreamscape competes.
Ardita Farnam is a spoiled New York flapper vacationing in Florida; if Moreland is to win her
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heart, the up-from-piracy fiction he weaves must trump her ritzy, sordid experiences in the
metropolis. Thus he cites the fabulous Orient to pique her interest, effectively pitting foreign and
domestic notions of eastern-ness against one another. Florida is an appropriately game setting
for these fantasies, for during the 1920s it was being packaged to investors as America‟s tropical
paradise, a slice of foreign pleasure on familiar soil. New cities springing up during the land
grab were being assigned calculatedly European and even Oriental names, including the failed
Aladdin City, Florida project of 1925, the plans for which featured streets named after
stereotypical Arabic characters and places. Vacationing with her uncle in this new American
Riviera, Ardita confesses boredom with the petty controversies and banal comforts of her New
York life. She finds herself briefly enticed by the further prospect of taking “Curtis” up on his
offer to become a “fabulously wealthy high caste Indian lady”—though in the end it is the real
Moreland who amazes her with his imagination (89). Also of interest is Moreland‟s staging of
regional anxieties in the invented character of Curtis Carlyle. Carlyle, as conceived by
Moreland, is a Tennessee musician who finds success on Broadway but is nevertheless snubbed
by the Northeastern rich for whom he plays.
Moreland has often been read as a prototype for the similarly imaginative James Gatz,
and a perusal of The Great Gatsby (1925) confirms that the novel is likewise suffused with
Oriental imagery. Gatz, adopting the persona of good-natured “old sport” Jay Gatsby, tells his
confidant Nick that after his parents died he “lived like a young rajah in all the capitals of
Europe... collecting jewels, chiefly rubies, hunting big game, painting a little, things for myself
only, and trying to forgot something very sad.” His rhetoric strikes Nick as feigned: “The very
phrases were worn so threadbare that they evoked no image except that of a turbaned „character‟
leaking sawdust at every pore as he pursued a tiger through the Bois de Boulogne” (65-66). In
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confiding his doubts to the reader, Nick alludes to the old menagerie at the Jardin
d‟Acclimatation, suggesting that the only tigers this charlatan could have seen were ones in a
Parisian zoo—if even that part of his story is true. But after Gatsby produces a few seemingly
credible articles of proof, Nick‟s mind conjures up visions of “the skins of tigers flaming in his
palace” and “him opening a chest of rubies” (67). Fitzgerald continues to associate Gatsby with
Far Eastern tropes throughout the novel. In the infamous (and awkwardly humorous) wardrobe
scene, during which Gatsby seeks to impress Daisy Buchanan with his luxurious collection of
imported English shirts, Nick reports that each item is imprinted “with monograms of Indian
blue”—an offhand comment that alludes to the indigo dye‟s historic ties to the Orient.5 We later
learn that Gatsby, sailing alongside mentor Dan Cody, travelled in his youth to the Barbary
Coast, skirting the edges of an African Araby considered Oriental in the early twentieth century.
His exotic travels are also vaguely alluded to in the novel‟s citation of the popular Jazz Age
instrumental “The Sheik of Araby,” a snatch of which sneaks into the text during one of Gatsby‟s
parties. Fitzgerald‟s invocation of the song further Arabicizes the already Orientalized Gatsby,
who becomes by association a “sheik” as well as a “rajah,” but the effect proves to be even more
interesting if we follow the complex chain of citation leading up to and radiating from the 1925
allusion.6 As Fitzgerald and his readers would have known, this Tin Pan Alley song was one of
the many popular “oriental foxtrots” of the early twenties; the form, a jazz subgenre which seems
to have originated in Turkey, fused foxtrot dance music with vaguely Oriental themes and
sounds (Sufism 108-09).7 “The Sheik of Araby” itself pays homage to the most notable sheik in
American popular culture, Rudolph Valentino‟s titular protagonist in the silent film The Sheik
(1921). This movie, the immediate source of the song alluded to in Gatsby, deals with the fictive
life of Sheik Ahmed Ben Hassan, played by Valentino. A hybrid figure, Hassan is culturally
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Arabic but biologically European, the son of an English father and Spanish mother. The film
contains a subtle but controversial rape scene in which Hassan forces himself on a white woman.
His licentiousness carried over to the bawdy pop song quoted in the novel and to Fitzgerald‟s
depiction of dissipated Jazz Age men as sheiks in Gatsby and after.
For a detailed consideration of what Fitzgerald implies by labeling the Midwesternerturned-New Yorker Gatsby a “sheik,” we must turn to a two-part article entitled “What Became
of Our Flappers and Sheiks?” that he published (with Zelda as co-author) in the McCall’s
October 1925 number, following the publication of Gatsby in April. His essay, a piece about
debauched youth culture, makes it clear that Fitzgerald uses the term “sheik” taxonomically to
refer to a particular masculine type: the “male flapper,” a young man who has become dissipated
early in life through drink, women, and jazz (In His Time 202).8 The Middle Eastern title is
clearly borrowed from the popular movie, whose eponymous protagonist displays the same
sexuality and worldliness as the men who form the subject of Fitzgerald‟s essay. The author
writes about a hypothetical “sheik” named Tommy, supplying him with enough biographical
details and mannerisms to sketch a thumbnail image of his dissipation. The geographical
trajectory of Tommy‟s life overlaps rather compellingly with that of Amory Blaine, Jay Gatsby,
and their creator. Like Blaine, Gatsby, and Fitzgerald, Tommy is a Midwesterner transplanted
onto the East Coast. Much as the author left his home in St. Paul to attend the Newman School
in Hackensack, New Jersey, Tommy heads east to “some small prep-school in New York state or
New Jersey” and then a tutoring school—“one of those curious institutions that are springing up
all over the east”—to prepare for college (203). His weekend alcoholic binges in New York City
have desensitized him to the comparatively minor pleasures of his “home town... in the middle
west,” which “bores him now” (204). Early experiences with wealth and privilege—even that of
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the secondhand variety acquired from interacting with rich boys at prep school—have ruined
Tommy and predestined him to learn nothing of value in college or in life. Fitzgerald
pronounces him “healthy, good-looking, a bit vacuous—perfectly useless” (205). He ends the
essay with “no solutions” to the problems of American sheikdom; instead, he concludes that US
culture “cannot produce an aristocracy that is capable of surviving” (206).
As Fitzgerald ruminates on the cultural significance of men like Tommy, he clearly has in
mind his own experiences, as well as those of the regionally displaced, class-conscious
characters of his most recent novel. In his later years, Fitzgerald remarked in letters upon his
parallactic personal vision of class disparity, self-diagnosing the “two-cylinder inferiority
complex” he developed in recognizing the powerful differences between his native identity as a
middle-class Catholic Midwesterner with Old Southern roots and the leisurely post-prep school
Eastern mannerisms he affected (Letters 503). In his essay “One Hundred False Starts” (1933),
he would characterize himself as possessing “a New England conscience—developed in
Minnesota” (My Lost City 89). But Edmund Wilson had long before explicated the problem of
transregional perspective in a 1922 essay in which he criticized Fitzgerald for transposing
Midwestern values onto an alien East. He complained,
It seems to me rather a pity that he has not written more of the West: it is perhaps
the only milieu that he thoroughly understands. When Fitzgerald approaches the
East, he brings to it the standards of the wealthy West—the preoccupation with
display, the appetite for visible magnificence and audible jamboree, the vigorous
social atmosphere of amiable flappers and youths comparatively untainted as yet
by the snobbery of the East.
But, the critic clarifies, the half-Irish, middle-class Fitzgerald could not consider himself “a
typical well-to-do Middle Westerner, with correct clothes and clear skin, who had been sent East
for college” (In His Own Time 406). Therein lies the problem, according to Wilson, for the real
disparity that defined Fitzgerald‟s class anxieties was intra-regional, not inter-regional, in nature.
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Yet Wilson misses what must have been a major sticking point for Fitzgerald: the Midwestern
elitism he encountered as a youth held as its model a more fashionable and better established
Eastern snobbery. Thus in writing imaginatively about America‟s Northeastern rich, a nebulous
community from which he was at a double remove, Fitzgerald struck directly at the reified,
idealized source. Heading east for education and vocation allowed privileged Midwestern males
to distinguish themselves from their peers, but it also contributed to an obsession with the
manners, trends, and institutions of the American East Coast.
This is what Fitzgerald expresses by emphasizing the sheik-ness of the eastbound male
flapper. The sheik‟s Orientalization stages the abandonment of a native regional culture and the
adoption of an effectively foreign one—an “Eastern” culture so desired and fetishized that
Fitzgerald equates it with the alluring, mysterious Orient. As he relates in the 1932 essay “My
Lost City,” New York was for a Midwestern boy such as himself “inevitably linked up with
Bacchic diversions, mild or fantastic.” On his first visits, he felt like a dazzled bumpkin, “Dick
Whittington up from the country gaping at the trained bears” (My Lost City 107). He admits that
he “took the style and glitter of New York even above its own valuation.” But as a young writer,
he became a part of a New York community that would adopt him “not as a Middle Westerner,
not even as a detached observer, but as the archetype of what [the city] wanted”: a talented,
moldable youth to be urbanized into the environment. But his respect for New York fades as he
and his new wife come to sense a moral lack in the place; tellingly, they return to St. Paul for the
birth of their daughter. In the essay, Fitzgerald links both initial love for the Eastern city and his
subsequent disillusion with it to the Far East. Bridging the hemispheric gap between America
and Orient, he recounts how in the glory days of the twenties he enjoyed “cool Japanese gardens
at the Ritz” and how later he was “somewhere in North Africa” when he got word of the 1929
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stock market crash. It was this economic crisis, here oddly framed in an African-Arab context,
which Fitzgerald thinks led the Eastern urbanite to “the awful realization that New York was a
city after all and not a universe” (114-15).
The McCall’s piece and the early 1920s portions of “My Lost City” essay both provide a
simple cultural gloss for why Fitzgerald marks Gatsby as a sheik. Although the character is a
decade older than the hypothetical Tommy, Gatsby does assume the carefree trappings of a
“male flapper” to win Daisy‟s admiration.9 His West Egg pleasure dome is a haven of gin, jazz,
and sexual permissiveness; his gaudy clothes and vehicles betray a crass showmanship; and he
forges a background of privilege to align himself with genuinely dissipated Jazz Age types like
Tommy and his prep school peers. Gatsby‟s pretentions to sheik-ness are all the more pitiable
because he is perpetually sober and ten years too old for the role. The one sheik-ish trait he
actually possesses is the sense of regional and social transition, eastbound in direction and
upwardly mobile in terms of class, common to the type.
Similar to how the filmic sheik proves to be an Occidental variation on an Arabic type,
Gatsby‟s Oriental tropes are firmly planted in their American setting, the US Northeast where
James Gatz and his lost love presently reside. When at the book‟s conclusion Nick ruminates
over differences between America‟s East and West, he imagines an anthropomorphic East
“[sparkling] cold with jewels”—language that sends us back to his fantasy of Gatsby-as-rajah
toying with his rubies (176). Indeed, the hemispheric East seldom exists anywhere in the story
save for inside Gatsby and Nick‟s fantasies, but even there it retains a thematic potency, for
Fitzgerald‟s Orient participates in an understated critique of postwar US capitalism and the
cultural supremacy of the American East. For, in Gatsby as well as in the earlier “Myra,” the
protagonists‟ shared fascination with the East is treated pejoratively as a willingness to sell
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oneself into the service of a crude, corrupt American materialism rooted in the urbanized
Northeast. Fitzgerald praises the (admittedly stereotyped, decidedly reductive) regional values
of the Midwest and the South—a stoic work ethic and an antebellum sense of propriety,
respectively—and he lampoons East Coast snobbery and corruption by inscribing an Oriental
palimpsest upon it. Because Fitzgerald wrote during an age in which non-white ethnic others
were commonly seen as inferior to their Caucasian counterparts, this gesture is inherently
critical. But it is also inseparably linked with the author‟s own class pretensions, his regional
allegiances, and his glum take on American politics in the twenties and thirties.

“The bitter selfishness of the „Merican peoples”
Viewed from a biographical-psychoanalytic vantage, Fitzgerald‟s occasional tendency to
Orientalize white characters seems to result from the juxtaposition of social position and
sectional place: his Midwestern self-deprecation, under the influence of caste-minded class
anxiety, responding imaginatively to presumed Eastern snobbishness. The perceived rift
between his ancestral roots in Minnesota and Maryland versus his early experiences with the
Eastern elite is so great that it warrants representation in Orientalized terms; the effort required
for a native Midwesterner to adopt the alternately cultured and crass mannerisms of the East is
comparable, at least in Fitzgerald‟s fiction, to renouncing one‟s citizenship and adopting a
foreign identity. He was, as Cowley put it, “a little Midwestern boy with his nose to the glass,
wondering how much the tickets cost and who paid for the music” (A Second Flowering 31). To
emphasize the ethical implications of betraying one‟s regional heritage, Fitzgerald inflates the
problem so that it resembles more distinctly a crisis of ethnic identity—a decision like the one
Midwestern Myra faces when she considers marrying into Whitney‟s Eastern-Oriental line. In
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the Esquire version of “The Snows of Kilimanjaro” (1936), Hemingway famously took
Fitzgerald to task for worshipping the “very rich” as a “special glamorous race,” but to classify
the wealthy, especially moneyed Northeasterners, as a race apart is not necessarily to worship
them; the action can be critical, even radical. Karl Marx, who Fitzgerald greatly admired,
executed such a gesture by neatly dividing bourgeoisie from proletariat, capital from labor, haves
from have-nots. Thus, while it is unproductive simply to regard Fitzgerald as “an idealistic boy
with a lot of caste nonsense in his head” (91), as Ardita remarks of Carlyle, it is worthwhile to
examine how he uses Oriental conceits of caste to address problems of class distinctions and
power distribution across American regions.
This strategy, nascent in the earlier stories, is revived in Fitzgerald‟s later “Six of One-,”
a minor piece published during the Depression about the mixed results of a wealthy benefactor‟s
sociological experiment. Ed Barnes, incensed by how his friend Schofield spoils his sons and
their rich friends, offers prestigious scholarships to a group of relatively poor young men from
his small hometown in Ohio. Barnes turns his philanthropic gesture into a contest, pitting his six
scholars against Schofield‟s party of six (two sons and four friends). All twelve will head to
school in the East (to Yale and Princeton), and in a decade‟s time Barnes will measure the
success of the wealthy sons against his assemblage. The rich boys would have headed eastward
regardless of the experiment, but Barnes‟s half-dozen could only afford to do so with his
financial assistance. Schofield‟s sons and their friends are involved in a scandalous car accident
which scars a young actress‟s face and results in a highly publicized lawsuit. The spoiled young
men all wind up being leeches on their parents‟ money. Barnes‟s six, on the other hand, turn out
well, generally modest and hard-working.
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At first glance, the story appears to be another of Fitzgerald‟s studies on the corrupting
influence of ill-gotten or unearned wealth. Ignoring the novelty of the sociological experiment
frame, it could be read as “The Rich Boy” (1926) times six. But several regional elements
complicate and enrich the story. Both parties, Schofield‟s rich or upper-middle-class youths as
well as Barnes‟s lower-middle or working-class boys, consist of aspirational Midwesterners
hoping for the sublimation of their outré tackiness into social poise through the practical magic
of geographical transition. This, the accident of being born in the young West instead of the old
East, is their shared regional heritage, regardless of family income. The primary goal of
attending school and subsequently working in the Northeast means for these men the osmosis of
a regionally vested power—the hope that they might internalize the affectations of Eastern
metropolitan culture well enough to “pass” in that section‟s powerful institutions, thereby
escaping what the author depicts (rather unfairly) as inconsequential Midwestern life. Fitzgerald
had mockingly labeled this tendency the “respect for a New England education which is the bane
of all provincial places, which drains them yearly of their most promising young men” a decade
earlier in 1922‟s “The Diamond as Big as the Ritz” (Short Stories 182), and the gravity with
which he treats Barnes‟s philanthropy here suggests that the donor is not merely footing their Ivy
tuition but offering them something like the chance to study abroad in a fantastic foreign nation.
The students, rich and poor alike, fix their gaze on the alluring American East very much as if it
were the mysterious Orient. But the narrator specifically remembers the eastbound rich boys as
“samurai” at the story‟s conclusion (679). What we have previously seen in the examples of
Gatsby, Carlyle, Blaine, and even “Tommy” is all the more pronounced in the hybridized
Midwestern-Eastern scholars of “Six”: the story reifies regional difference as hemispheric, the
transposition of Oriental characteristics onto Occidental subjects, and an intense focus on
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characters in the midst of geographical transition. The idiomatic, unspoken completion of the
title—the “half-dozen of the other” to which the dash alludes—proves strikingly appropriate, for
Fitzgerald strives to other the Easternized six.
When white characters are rhetorically marked as both Oriental and class conscious in
these works, the connotations of their caste pretensions tend to be overwhelmingly pejorative and
typically part of a sham act. Knowleton Whitney‟s strategic false admission of Chinese ancestry
reveals his antagonistic attitude towards the American middle class; he is willing to demean his
family name and embrace a eugenically problematic identity if it will keep the unworthy Myra
out of his hair. Jay Gatsby‟s “rajah” loot and his Barbary Coast past are tied to his morally
questionable actions as a bootlegging gangster. Schofield‟s eastbound “samurai” affect a
mannered East Coast collegiate attitude even while slumming in their unfashionable Midwestern
hometown. In the schemes and pretensions of these plots, Fitzgerald splices the notorious
corruption of the interwar era with a xenophobic caricature of Oriental identity to create
characters whose social and financial aspirations mark them as flawed—a flaw expressed
through the rhetoric of racial difference. In each case, rhetorical Oriental markers serve as
shorthand for a form of cultural decadence represented by materialistic, pretentious, fauxaristocratic industry captains and political leaders in the American Northeast.
By recirculating the popular dichotomous rhetoric of the desired and undesirable
Orient—and by directing this rhetoric towards Jazz Age materialism—Fitzgerald was able to
write critically about the cultural hegemony of the East and about perceived political corruption.
The gesture is especially significant in light of the fact that, though Fitzgerald held largely leftist
political beliefs and privately criticized the decade‟s Republican administrations, little of his
1920s creative output was expressly political. Some of his least popular, most unprofitable
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works made bold statements in support of socialism and against career politicians, as in “May
Day” (1920) and The Vegetable (1923), respectively. Later, in the dour environment of the
Depression, Fitzgerald lamented in print that during the twenties his “political conscience had
scarcely existed... save as an element of irony in [his] stuff” (The Crack-Up 79). He and Zelda
had taken potshots at the Teapot Dome scandal in the pages of College Humor but not in fiction.
However, his sympathetic, if often racist, writing about Oriental others let him experiment in
prose with a political conscience that rebuked American materialism, xenophobia, and
isolationism.
Fitzgerald deployed Oriental tropes and characters in the historical context of a pivotal
moment in American immigration policy, for this era of growing private power was notable as
well for an extreme cultural insularity that resulted in the National Origins Act of 1924, which
itself tightened restrictions pre-established in 1907, 1917, and 1921. These “gatekeeping” laws
(so termed by historian Erika Lee) severely diminished the possibilities for Asian immigrants to
achieve citizenship or even enter the country (37). Japanese immigrants faced even greater
scrutiny and were, thanks to a US-Japan “gentleman‟s agreement” to severely restrict immigrant
passports, largely barred from America (Dumenil 207-09). Children of immigrants might still
qualify for citizenship by American birth, but their parents would never be eligible. The period‟s
Parrish-style romanticizing of the Orient was inapplicable to actual Asian immigrants, who were
marked as “permanently alien, threatening, and inferior on the basis of their race, culture, labor,
and aberrant gender relations” (Lee 38). Even African Americans, who faced comparable
discrimination through institutionalized segregation, at least retained US citizenship as a
technicality. If the consequences of xenophobia and insularity seem at a remove from
Fitzgerald‟s biographical experiences, it should be remembered that in the summer of 1920 he
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and his wife hired a non-resident Japanese servant named Tanaka who, likely in the States as a
nonimmigrant laborer, worked through the “Japanese Reliable Employment Agency” at a
bargain rate (Epic Grandeur 142, Taylor 70-71).10 Both Scott and Zelda fictionalized him in
their writings, with the former referring to him as “Tana” and the latter as “Tanka,” and if either
The Beautiful and Damned (1922) or Save Me the Waltz (1932) offer a reasonably accurate
account of his daily life, then Tanaka fulfilled the dual role of butler and butt of jokes in their
Westport, Connecticut household, suffering an existence somewhere between stoic manservant
and alien day laborer. In Zelda‟s novel, “Tanka” is a two-dimensional caricature who
“construct[s] botanical gardens out of cucumbers and floral displays with the butter” (Collected
Writings 52). But her husband‟s work, in spite of its racist overtones and cheap laughs at Tana‟s
accent, at least signals an awareness that the Asian non-residents of the 1920s, individuals
largely stripped of political agency and earning power, are the polar opposites of the decade‟s
powerful tycoons, privileged men who used their seemingly inexhaustible resources to influence
politics and national economy. Tana, who tells the Patches that many Japanese in his home
country go hungry, comments on “the bitter selfishness of the „„Merican peoples‟” after seeing
the moneyed, drunken excesses of the Northeasterners who frequent the residence (236).
Lee writes that the history of Asian exclusion, which contradicts the popular fiction of the
immigrant and the American dream, is a “different narrative highlighting the limits of American
democracy” (40), and I would argue that, despite his limited social consciousness, Fitzgerald
intuitively grasps the subversive aspect of this counter-narrative. If we plot the points at which
his censuring of the Eastern rich and the wealthy Northeast intersects with his vaguely racist
citation of Oriental types, we see the moments of convergence that this chapter has addressed. In
such instances, Fitzgerald uses race humor (likely offensive to modern readers) to confront US
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consumer culture, materialism, and democracy with an embarrassment of riches. He paints his
hyper-privileged Americans with an Oriental hue, imbuing them with the contrasting
characteristics of a large social group that is, at least within US borders, wildly underprivileged.
Knowleton Whitney‟s adoption of Chinese identity for the purpose of scaring off his middle
class fiancée seems an especially apt example, but Gatsby‟s pitifully contrived Oriental
pretensions also hover near the mark due to their absurdity. An important scene from The
Beautiful and Damned follows a similar model. When Anthony Patch‟s rich, teetotaler
grandfather arrives on the scene of a particularly riotous fete at his grandson‟s Westport home,
he decides to disinherit the young man. In the background of this familial/financial conflict
between debauchery and prudery, Tana plays away at his Japanese flute, casting a strange
musical otherness on the scene. Both Anthony and Adam Patch are implicated by Tana‟s
Oriental soundtrack, for his music insinuates an alien, frequently humiliated powerlessness into
the presence of two comparatively powerful (or at least influential) Americans.11
The connection between the Japanese Tana and the capitalist Adam Patch might have
held an additional significance for Fitzgerald‟s contemporary readers, for it was widely assumed
by Americans that the Japanese economy was corrupt. In the early 1920s, issues of the popular
Saturday Evening Post were as filled with praise for the rapidly-industrializing Eastern nation as
they were with accusations of its corruption. In conflicts with Russia and China, Japan had
asserted its military might; in the silk trade, it had proven to be fiscally savvy. On June 26 1920,
commentator Edward H. Smith wrote in the Saturday Evening Post that, from an economic
perspective, “King Cotton” faced serious competition from “Queen Silk,” ninety percent of
which entered the States via importation from Japan (10-11). Earlier that year on April 3,
financial contributor Floyd W. Parsons had already embraced Japan as an industrialized ally by,
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oddly enough, praising their dietary habits: “The various peoples of the earth can be divided into
two classes—the bread eaters and the rice eaters... The Japanese, who were once rice eaters, are
fast becoming a bread-eating people.” He assured readers that “bread is... the chief food of
leading nations” (38).
But, following a sharp rise in silk prices and a series of international market slumps, the
Post‟s attitude toward the Japanese economy turned accusatory. Isaac F. Marcosson wrote on
September 2, 1922 that “the one-time so-called political yellow peril is on the verge of becoming
an economic menace” (18). He cited the country‟s backwardness and refusal to make cultural
progress commensurate to its industrial developments as the reasons Japan posed such a threat to
the global markets: “Western civilization in Japan is a veneer that masks a persistent feudal idea.
The whole conduct of business is along feudal lines because most financial and industrial control
is vested in a few interlocking families, who make the old American money trust look
amateurish.” He observed dispassionately that “the Japanese is inferior to the white man in
efficiency” and went on to criticize the country‟s irresponsible credit economy, its religious
superstitions, and its “loyalty to ancestors” (18-19). Even though Marcosson was writing in a
decade during which the American government was frequently accused of corruption, nepotism,
and excessive conservatism, he and his readers seemed to miss the parallels between the
industrializing Japan and the industrialized United States. What they recognized was that Japan
was a contradictory place: part-innovative and part-retrogressive, part-religious and part-secular,
part-rich and part-poor. They simply failed to acknowledge the reflection of these very
contradictions in the West. Thus, Tana‟s original readers, the 1922 consumers who purchased
the first copies of The Beautiful and the Damned, would likely have had contradicting opinions
about the Japanese—if they really thought about them at all. Japan was the richest, most
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“Western” nation in the Far East, but its common people were some of the poorest in the world.
Many Americans believed them to be a superstitious and inefficient people, but the business
power of Japanese immigrants in California was becoming so great that reformatory state and
national laws were being designed to discriminate against them. Yet, while some whites felt
threatened at the time by Asian investors, landowners, and laborers pouring in from a seedy
Orient, Fitzgerald‟s fiction finds fault in a more domestic East, home base of an unchecked
capitalism funneling the wealth of the nation into fewer, whiter hands. His sympathetic
treatment of characters like Tana, regarded in tandem with his antipathy for men like Patch,
suggests that he appreciated the irony inherent in the conservative American critique of
economic inequity and corruption in the Far East.
I have so far focused on instances in which Fitzgerald‟s region-conscious critique of the
American East hinges on an ethnocentric appropriation of already commercialized Oriental
tropes. I have sought to convey him as a writer primarily interested in domestic economic and
social ills but eager to borrow from American culture‟s “stock footage” of the Orient and of
Oriental subjects in order to better make his point. However, in rare examples we see in
Fitzgerald‟s work a more nuanced take on the Orient and on Orientals—a sympathetic approach
that seriously considers the value of the global East as a mirror for reflecting American excess.
In these cases he remains largely uninterested in Oriental nations and peoples as autonomous
agents, opting instead to make their identities contingent on those of the Americans with whom
they are contrasted, but he nevertheless stages some provocative conflicts when incorporating
actual Asian characters (instead of Orientalized whites) into his work. It bears noting that prior
to WWII, Asian and Asian-American identities were nearly voiceless in US art and culture.
What little positive representation they received was typically mediated through white American
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perspectives that, despite their good intentions, tended to reinforce negative stereotypes. Such
was certainly the case for Earl Derr Biggers‟s Charlie Chan detective stories and the films they
inspired. Fitzgerald‟s efforts to sympathetically represent Oriental characters provide similar
examples of this conflicted mediation, though sometimes his cross-cultural comparisons are
remarkably insightful.
A handful of scenes involving Tana in The Beautiful and Damned are peppered with such
insights. In these, his identity is weirdly entwined with protagonist Anthony‟s; the Japanese
servant‟s relationship to his white master produces a strange cultural mirroring that reflects
American exceptionalism back on itself. As Tana acclimates himself to the Patch household,
Fitzgerald derives some cheap laughs from the immigrant‟s accent and naivety, but he also
highlights problems of cultural misunderstandings—particularly in one scene about ethnic facial
traits. After Tana shows Anthony one of his sketches, “a rather good copy of an etching of
Abraham Lincoln, to whose face he had given an unmistakable Japanese cast,” the scene
immediately reverses itself as Tana criticizes the cartoon image of a “facetious Japanese butler”
in a newspaper for having been sketched with “an American face” (194). The cases are
curiously paralleled. In the one instance, Anthony sees Oriental features in the sketching of an
American historical figure by a Japanese artist; in the other, Tana sees white traits in the
caricature of a Japanese subject rendered by an American artist. The humorous confusion is
politically suggestive, for it assigns privilege to Patch‟s Western perspective and then
immediately revokes it by calling its ethnocentrism into question. Fitzgerald‟s refusal to let
Anthony except his perspective as normative is a savvy gesture in an often bland book, and it
also serves as a reminder that a hugely complex world lies outside the insular, commerce-driven
context of 1920s America.
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At the opposite end of Fitzgerald‟s career appears another instance in which Asian
characters (Indian princes, to be specific) function as cultural mirrors to reflect American excess
and exception. But, because “Pat Hobby, Putative Father” (1940) is a story of the Bust and not
the Boom, these Oriental characters more accurately echo an aporia, a central problem of
American wealth: Why, in a country obsessed with money and famous for its tycoons, do
poverty and strife persist? Income inequality is embedded implicitly in the story‟s plot structure,
which finds broke screenwriter Pat Hobby tasked by his rich studio bosses with leading
fabulously wealthy Indian princes on a tour of the lot. These are real rajahs, the sort of Oriental
royals to whom Fitzgerald frequently alluded in earlier fictions but never actually presented.
One of them is Sir Singrim Dak Raj, “third richest man in India” and brother to Rajah Dak Raj
Indore (Pat Hobby 65). The other is Prince John Brown Hobby Indore, Singrim‟s nephew and
adopted son of the aforementioned patriarch. Per Fitzgerald‟s plot, he is also the son of Pat
Hobby and Delia Brown, the latter of whom fled to India and married into royalty after divorcing
the boy‟s biological father. John is, then, a Valentino-esque hybrid figure, culturally Oriental but
racially white. In large part, the story is about his attempt to reconcile the materialistic
democracy that produced him with the semi-feudal state that has adopted him. Fitzgerald
employs this narrative structure as a late-career opportunity to gaze at bankrupt US culture
through an Oriental lens.
Much as Fitzgerald illustrates in Beautiful and Damned how Patch and Tana are
powerfully influenced by their native cultures, here he demonstrates how his American and
Indian characters view one another from humorously skewed perspectives. Yet both
perspectives are mediated by and filtered through the Hollywood film industry. The studio guide
who informs Hobby of his assignment tells him that Singrim “seems to be kind of colored.... like

103

the extras they had at Paramount for Bengal Lancer.” Pat too views the visiting Indian nationals
through a filmic lens. Upon meeting Prince John and Sir Singrim, he assumes that the studio he
works for is producing a film to rival Bengal Lancer, and he fantasizes about being hired to write
it. In his mind, he casts Singrim as “the heavy who owns the Khyber Pass.” He then envisions
scenes of “British troops wheeling out cannon” on helpless natives (62-63). Hobby and his
colleagues at the studio, including the security guards who later arrest the guests, can only see
the Indians through the heavily mediated lens of their industry; for them, the foreigners are little
more than extras or props, necessary to capture a certain Oriental flavor on screen but themselves
possessing little to no agency. Because their sphere of influence exists primarily outside
Hollywood, US, and even Western hemispheric contexts, Fitzgerald‟s Indians require mediation
via film imagery before they can be processed by other characters.
If the story‟s Americans possess only as much insight into India as their media
consumption affords them, something similar can be said for how John and Singrim try to
interpret their American experience through the Hollywood movies they have seen in advance of
their visit. John is tempted by American women while Singrim is fascinated by American
wealth—though both discover that the big screen fantasies they have in mind are in life little
more than facades. John treats star actress Bonita Granville as “an idol more glorious than Siva”
(67), though his fervent desire to be near her results only in detainment in the studio guardroom.
Singrim‟s disillusion in American wealth is more profound. On the studio lots, he assumes he
will witness the opulence his film-viewing has encouraged him to expect—luxury commensurate
to his own vast riches. What he discovers instead is a series of “false fronts” which he finds
“disappointing.” In a deeply symbolic scene, he enters the back lot mockup of a “Fifth Avenue
jewelry store” and is chagrined to “find nothing but carpenter‟s rubble inside” (65). Fitzgerald
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has Singrim discover something that Pat Hobby learned years ago: that the veneer of American
privilege is plastered over a dense base of working-class poverty. The Depression-era setting of
the story only compounds this message and the narrator‟s assertion that the ostentatious sets are
“all phony” (65). Faced with a rich façade that masks a greater lack, Singrim is disgusted
enough to project this emptiness onto Americans themselves, quipping that “perhaps the
actresses have a false front too” (66). At the dispersion of his presumptions about wealth in the
US, he gains insight into a people whose pride in commerce and industry clashes with a vast
disparity in wealth distribution. The proud names of American tycoons and moguls are, by
analogy, “false fronts” erected over the commonplace, nameless poor It is appropriate that
Singrim hails from a country of even starker income inequality and caste divisions, for his
background allows him to see through the illusion of common prosperity promoted on-screen.
Fitzgerald‟s most thoughtful treatment of these perspectival problems appears near the
end of the story when Pat, John, and Singrim stumble onto a “process stage,” a special effects set
used for filming an actor against a “moving background.” According to the narrator, a device
projects a kinetic image onto the back side of a transparent screen, while on the front an actor
performs. The director captures the shot in such a way that “the poor eye could only conclude
that it was being deluded and never quite guess how” (66). Fitzgerald frames the scene—in
which the hapless trio ruin Granville‟s performance in the process shot—as a study in
perspectives, and his description of the events emphasizes how cultural disparity is caught in the
take:
From the director‟s angle something had happened on the screen which, for the
moment, was inexplicable. Three gigantic silhouettes, two with huge Indian
turbans, had danced across what was intended to be a New England Harbor—they
had blundered into the line of the process shot. Prince John Indore had not only
seen Bonita Granville—he had acted in the same picture. His silhouetted foot
seemed to pass miraculously through her blonde young head. (67)
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The sharp cultural contrasts drawn in the passage between light and shadow, blonde hair and
turbans, and New England and India are reflected in the characters‟ relative positions. Granville
and the unnamed director are separated from John and Singrim by a dividing screen; the Indians‟
shadows are projected onto the back of this screen, while the American film crew works at the
front. Fitzgerald constructs an imaginative set in which cultural projections manifest literally
and figuratively—and these are projected upon (quite literally mediated by) a silver screen. The
scene is in many ways a model for the whole story, a diorama that illustrates how real cultural
differences between Orient and Occident risk being caricaturized via filmic mediation.
Moreover, the scene and the story are further evidence of the tolerant, markedly less ethnocentric
Fitzgerald hinted at in Beautiful and Damned. In this late story, we see a very different
Fitzgerald from the casually xenophobic author of “Myra.” “Putative Father” finds the author
fully willing to—if not apply deep political insight to cultural clashes between the global East
and West—at least admit that an Asian perspective on American culture is useful when the
isolated nation, like the “poor eye” duped by the process shot, is “deluded” by its split liberal and
consumer interests.

“Lands of uncharted promise”
Edmund Wilson‟s 1922 complaint that “Fitzgerald approaches the East” with “the
standards of the wealthy West” waxes doubly important if we take the liberty of reading his
comment as applying to global hemispheres instead of American regions, for the writer‟s
American Orientalism insists that political crises in the Arab world and the larger Orient have
little bearing on American culture. In his work, abstract representations of a totalized Orient are
valuable within a US context almost exclusively as tropes for expressing resistance to capitalistic
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materialism. In nineteenth-century American literature, these expressions had generally
celebrated Eastern transcendentalist philosophies as correlatives to Emersonian
transcendentalism; Fitzgerald updates—even upends—this model by instead presenting Oriental
masculine types (sheiks, rajahs, and samurais) as embodiments of moneyed excess. These
correspond to a set of American male types located primarily in the US East: business tycoons,
spoiled rich boys, and especially transplanted Midwesterners making the requisite pilgrimage to
the national seat of culture, finance, and knowledge. The Orient as invoked by Fitzgerald and
overlaid onto the American Northeast suggests an impossible opulence, a splendor conjured to
represent an exaggerated disparity between the East and the younger, less fashionable sections of
the republic. Certainly, the considerable geographic distance separating the US from real
political turmoil transpiring in the Orient (the fall of the Ottoman Empire, the extension of
British colonial policies in India, and the rapid industrialization of Japan, among other
happenings) enabled this fantasy of a Far East suitable for ad copy.
But Fitzgerald‟s Occidental appropriations of the Orient sometimes manage to elevate
this stock footage to something of artistic merit and political comment. The author struggled for
much of his life to perfect the successful amalgamation of a popular, commercial, political, and
artistic fiction. In his career-long effort to adapt for his own purposes the already heavilymediated Orient, we see another facet of this struggle. Furthermore, though the author‟s
perspective on the Orient is woefully limited, his attempt to engage it in fiction opens up
possibilities for transnational readings of Fitzgerald farther flung than the extant discourse on his
European connections. Zelda alluded to her husband‟s geographic expansiveness when she
wrote in an unpublished eulogy that “his heroes were fabulous strangers from lands of uncharted
promise” (Collected Writings 440). By teasing out the Oriental influences on his Occidental
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heroes—and by appreciating how such terms relate to the cultural geography of American
regional difference—we begin to chart this promise.

Notes
1

The particulars of capitalization are significant here, for when I refer to the Occident/Orient

binary, I mean to specifically address the relationship between Western and Eastern civilizations.
But when I cite the terms in their lower-case variants, I allude instead to the relationship of a
non-specific western zone to its eastern counterpart—for instance, the competition between
comparatively young cities in the US Midwest and their established rivals on the East Coast.
2

Another note on terminology: Arabism and Orientalism are related phenomena tied both to the

nineteenth-century study of Eastern cultures and to the later twentieth-century critical discourse
of Edward Said. Said uses the broader term, Orientalism, to refer to efforts by Westerners to
circumscribe the East in discourse—efforts which often reveal more about Western subjectivity
than they do about their intended Eastern objects of study. The Orient alluded to by Said spreads
across Asia from the Middle East to the Far East. Arabism refers to instances in which the
Western gaze looks upon specifically Arabic objects that may be located in the north of Africa or
in western Asia. For the purpose of this chapter, I treat Arabism as a subcategory of Orientalism.
I focus my attention primarily on Orientalism writ large, but specific instances of Arabism will
be noted.
3

Fitzgerald‟s contemporary critics and readers did not entirely ignore his appropriation of

Eastern tropes. We have already seen H.W.H.‟s humorous Rubaiyat of Amory Khayyam. In
addition to this case, we also have the perspicacious comments of The Forum‟s Thomas Caldecot
Chubb, who in 1925 borrowed a turn of phrase from O. Henry in referring to Gatsby as “Bagdad108

on-Subway, a hasheesh dream for a romantic-minded inhabitant of Nassau County” (In His Own
Time 358). Both critical perspectives look beyond the merely romantic in Fitzgerald to highlight
that which suggests an Oriental bent. Adopting uncannily similar rhetoric, Shane Leslie wrote to
Fitzgerald in July 1925 that Gatsby “brings back to me the world of Long Island like an Arabian
Night mixed with a subway swound” (Correspondence 174).
4

Fitzgerald would toy with “reversion to type” again in “Bernice Bobs Her Hair” (1920), which

was published in the Post only a few months after “Myra.” In that story, antagonist Marjorie
jokes that Bernice‟s “Indian blood,” her rumored Native American heritage, prevents her from
mixing in middle class white society.
5

Indigofera tinctoria, commonly known as “true indigo,” is native to Asia and Africa. India and

the Middle East supplied the dye to European consumers as early as the twelfth century (Indigo
in the Arab World 19).
6

Jeffory Clymer and Joss Lutz Marsh have both argued that Fitzgerald modeled Gatsby‟s

character in part on Valentino himself. In a similar fashion, Michael Nowlin has interpreted
Gatsby‟s “seduction” of Daisy as being indebted to the rape scene in The Sheik (Fitzgerald’s
Racial Angles 79-80).
7

A song in this vein—an “oriental dance on a calliope”—appears in Fitzgerald‟s “The Jelly-

Bean” (1920). Besides “The Sheik of Araby,” another popular “oriental foxtrot” in the era was
Paul Whiteman‟s 1921 “When Buddha Smiles.”
8

In the Lynds‟ Middletown sociological survey, they cite the terms “sheik” and “sheba” as

referring to fast-living young people, especially those who are also frequent cinemagoers (267).
9

Kirk Curnutt notes that these gestures “urged original readers to equate Gatsby‟s pursuit of

Daisy with The Sheik‟s chase-and-conquer formula,” while they also intentionally drew attention
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to the hackneyed quality of Gatsby‟s romantic strategies (“The Great Gatsby and the 1920s”
642).
10

A 1920 report by the US Department of Labor indicates that a large number of Japanese

immigrants (10,056) entered the country as aspiring citizens in 1919, but roughly half that
number (4,848) had entered the country in 1920, and these were all “nonimmigrant” in legal
status. The report indicates that the government regarded cheap, illegal Asian labor as a threat to
the economy and therefore actively deported such workers and prosecuted their traffickers. The
upshot of this is that Tanaka was probably a nonimmigrant worker, legally present in the country
but ineligible for citizenship (though, if he dodged deportation, his progeny might be) (Reports of
the Department of Labor 232-34).
11

From the late nineteenth century onward, the connection between white capitalist and Asian

laborer was a politically anxious one, for, as Lee and others have explained, the cheap labor
offered by Chinese, Japanese, and Korean workers was a readily exploitable resource that could
be used to milk the maximum profit from a project at a fraction of the normal expense.
Anthony‟s employment of low-cost Asian labor participates in an infamous tradition dating back
to railroad tycoons‟ mass hiring of expendable coolies. Into the twentieth century, the popularity
of anti-Asian immigration legislation owed as much to whites‟ fears of joblessness as it did to
racist policing of the gene pool.
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FITZGERALD, MIDWESTERN MODERNISTS, AND THE PLACE OF THE
POLITICAL CENTER IN THE URBAN MIDWEST
This is America—a town of a few thousand, in a region of wheat and corn and dairies
and little groves.
The town is, in our tale, called “Gopher Prairie, Minnesota.” But its Main Street is the
continuation of Main Streets everywhere. The story would be the same in Ohio or Montana, in
Kansas or Kentucky or Illinois, and not very differently would it be told Up York State or in the
Carolina Hills.
Main Street is the climax of civilization.
-Upton Sinclair, Preface to Main Street (1920)

In his time, F. Scott Fitzgerald leaned left politically even as he wrote sympathetically
about his self-interested entrepreneur protagonists. His ability to negotiate in fiction a middle
position between socialist desire and free-market conservatism helped him fashion a uniquely
American creative voice during his rise to celebrity in the Jazz Age. Fitzgerald made a career
out of writing about concepts that occupy in-between spaces: the beleaguered middle class, the
changing Midwest, the nation‟s middlebrow literature, and the antipathy between the left and
right wings of American politics. Publicly shying away from extremes, he feigned neutrality by
appearing in his prose to identify with neither labor nor capital, but his left-of-center perspective,
which became increasingly pronounced during his twenty-year career, is evident in any close
reading of his work. Fitzgerald‟s correspondence lends credence to these interpretations. He
acknowledged the need for political reform in the corrupt legislative environment of the 1920s,
largely favored Democratic presidential candidates throughout his life, thought highly of Marx,
and supported government-sponsored relief efforts during the Depression. Fitzgerald wrote for
the masses, but he was inspired by and hoped to curry favor from leftist intellectuals like his
friend Edmund Wilson.
In our time, the author has a right-wing namesake, a Republican Party doppelganger who
also hails from the Midwest: Wisconsin State Senate Majority Leader Scott L. Fitzgerald. In the
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spring of 2011, Senator Fitzgerald achieved fame by helping Governor Scott Walker strip
collective bargaining rights from state employees. The action, attached to a Republican-favored
budget repair bill, became a national news story when Democratic senators fled the state to avoid
having to vote on the measure and face inevitable defeat. Fitzgerald served as one of Walker‟s
key mouthpieces while the political drama unfolded, adopting a confident rhetoric of centrism
and reformism calculated to downplay the obvious partisan angle and anti-labor sentiment
behind this gesture, which through its eventual passing crippled union negotiating power. In
Fitzgerald‟s public statement on Walker‟s budget address, he observed vaguely that the “system
we all know is broken” and promised “real reform to the broken status quo” in addition to “real
reform to collective bargaining benefits in Wisconsin.” Like his literary namesake, then, Senator
Scott Fitzgerald has publically identified himself with the middle of the political spectrum while
less publicly associating with its fringe elements. Governor Walker‟s crusade against
Wisconsin‟s public sector unions was, even as state police pursued those missing Democratic
legislators, revealed to be sponsored by David H. and Charles G. Koch, two ultra-right-wing
billionaire industrialist libertarians.
The Midwestern region where F. Scott Fitzgerald spent his childhood and where Scott L.
Fitzgerald has resided virtually all his life has historically been a place of sharp, strange political
divisions. The region as a whole has been more amenable to labor unions than other American
sections; the plains states played a considerable role in the rise of the populist People‟s Party;
and Wisconsin‟s Robert M. La Follette helped lead the dwindling Progressive wing of the
Republican Party through the mid-1920s. But by the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, consumerism, conservatism, and xenophobia had become significant parts of
Midwestern culture. Chicago emerged as a Middle West metropolis; states began to favor
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fiscally conservative, isolationist, non-Progressive Republican national candidates; the role of
respectability in acquiring credit led to more prevalent social conservatism; and the Ku Klux
Klan gained footholds in small Midwestern cities where laborers feared competition from
immigrants and minorities. Regardless, since the late 1800s many prominent Midwesterners
have, in the manner of both Scott Fitzgeralds, paid lip service to the center. They have insisted
upon the Midwest‟s role as not merely the geographic middle of the nation but its centripetal
cultural force—a place where extremes are undesirable and where political, social, and economic
differences negotiate a healthy in-between average. It has become, as sociologists Robert and
Helen Lynd put it in 1937, the home of “Middletown,” where people take pride in trying “to
stick close to the middle of the road, to move slowly, and to avoid extremes” (Middletown in
Transition 406). So, although the period following the Great War saw the revival of a
conservative nationalism that impacted the entirety of America, Midwestern regionalist rhetoric
still laid claim to the political center. Some Midwestern businessmen, politicians, and authors
even continued to insist that the region‟s “middle-ness” was an accurate reflection of the
supposedly bipartisan, centered, fiscally sound nation to which it belonged. These bickering
voices converge at one point: in assigning to the Midwest—and not to the “backwards” South,
the “decadent” Northeast, or the “wild” West—the dubious privilege of embodying the
American average.
Using Fitzgerald‟s work as both starting point and frame, this chapter tracks competing
literary discourses about the “middle ground” role of the Midwestern region in the generally
conservative decades between the late 1910s and the early 1930s. I identify three distinct (if not
quite discrete) arguments taking place within this discourse: some authors, such as Fitzgerald,
critique American conservatism and consumerism while rhapsodizing about an unspoiled
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Midwestern regional imaginary; others, like Booth Tarkington, pine for the Midwest‟s semipastoral past while still praising the region‟s essential American-ness in moving forward into an
industrial present; others yet, like Sinclair Lewis and Grace Flandrau, emphasize the hypocrisy
inherent in both Midwestern and national claims of bipartisanship in the face of obvious
Republican conservatism. The left-leaning, anti-consumerist agenda evident in most of these
literary discourses predates and foreshadows the not-so-subtle politics underwriting the most
important sociological texts published on the Midwest during this time: the Lynds‟ Middletown
surveys of 1929 and 1937.
This was a time in which the market for classifiably regionalist writing seemed to have
bottomed out, facing stiff competition from the rival literature of the metropolis, the
homogenizing urban form erected over local and regional considerations of place. Some authors
penned elegies to the lost potential of the pastoral Midwest, as Willa Cather did in My Antonia
(1918). But a closer look at novels in the often-neglected genre of the modernist Midwestern
city novel reveals that other authors negotiated a compromise by writing specifically about the
expansion of Middle Western urban centers, thereby blending traditional regionalism with new
literary forms adapted to address industrial modernity. Awareness of the complex varieties of
the era‟s Midwestern regional literatures helps apply a contextual frame to the deceptively
simple nostalgia about the region that pervades Fitzgerald‟s work. But, even more importantly,
cultural geographic readings of literary debates in this vein provide background for our present
political conflicts between labor and capital in the modern Midwest—for, as I have hoped to
emphasize with the example of Scott L. Fitzgerald, these myths persist and endure in our current
political climate.
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Midwestern Pastoralism in American Culture
In American history and popular culture, the Midwest has functioned as an ambiguous
middle space between the settled East and the rugged West. Its location remained fluid during
periods of American expansion. Cultural geographer James R. Shortridge, who has written at
length about the region‟s shifting identity, observes that one of the earliest uses of the term
“Middle West” appeared in 1827 in reference to Tennessee, a state now widely regarded as
Southern (The Middle West 16). Since then, it has more typically connoted “the pastoral ideal—
a haven midway between the corruptions of urban civilization and the dangerous, untamed
wilderness” (27). Shortridge‟s research suggests that the appellation “Middle West,” later
truncated in the portmanteau “Midwest,” peaked in popularity between 1912 and 1920. By that
point in American history, the word had evolved as a convenient means of dividing the
Northwest into two parts; “Middle West” represented the area from Ohio to North Dakota, while
anything farther outside the interior remained classifiably Northwestern.
Such geographic distinctions have usually been politically charged—especially in their
relation to the South and to the Northeast—for discourses on compartmentalized regional
differences often accelerate into heated national debates about collective American identity. In
Shortridge‟s words, “regional labels” commonly function as “depositories for national values”
(135), and Brad Evans‟s more recent work reminds us that in literary discourse in particular
“regional writers most frequently staged elaborate engagements with the older structuring
categories of nation, race, and environment, in some instances (and often inadvertently) showing
their limitations” (Before Cultures 85). In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
regional classifications in literary texts and political speeches were especially freighted with
cultural baggage, though they generally dealt in oversimplifications and exaggerations.
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Frequently, debates about sectional space fulfilled two roles: they sought to chronicle the role of
a region in the nation‟s past, and they sought as well to plan what role it should serve in the
future. In the nineteenth century, the regional dialectic was dominated by the bipolar split
between the irreconcilable values of an urban-industrial North and a rural-agrarian South. But it
was shortly past the middle of that century that the notion of a pastoral Midwest offered a means
of breaking free from “the old North-South schism created by slavery” (Shortridge 20).
Abraham Lincoln, himself a Midwesterner, saw the agricultural productivity of his home region
as proof that the nation could provide for its citizens without relying excessively on either slave
labor or industrial urbanity. During and after the Civil War, the Midwest emerged as an
ideological symbol of moderation and avoidance of extremes, expanding on its prior identity as a
zone between civilization and chaos.
Midwestern politicians like William Jennings Bryan and La Follette helped the region
maintain this reputation well into the twentieth century. Many leaders in the People‟s Party and,
later, the Progressive wing of the Republican Party hailed from the Midwest. These political
factions in turn remained popular on the plains for supporting the economic concerns of the
rising middle class and of beleaguered farmers. But, as Shortridge notes, the Midwest on the
whole grew steadily more conservative over “twenty years of prosperous aging” (50), so that by
the 1920s its regional interests and political alliances were little different from those of the East
from which it had decades earlier struggled to distinguish itself. Oddly, journalists tended to
downplay the “the highly visible and successful urban Middle West as represented by Chicago,
Cleveland, and Detroit,” preferring to focus imaginatively on the hearty work ethic and staunch
moralism of an unrealistic “rural-only view of the Middle West” (Shortridge 55-56). This
imaginary arose in response to a logical contradiction playing out in the popular discourse on the
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Midwest; for decades, it had been regarded as a provincial but unspoiled space, yet it was now,
like the rest of the nation, rapidly becoming urbanized. If ever there had been any truth to the
imagined cultural geography of the Midwest as a place just as sociopolitically centered as it was
geographically situated, the conservative American environment of the twenties eroded it. The
Progressive wing of the Republican Party was dead; popular sympathy for farmers and laborers
had seriously waned; and bustling cities seemed to be paving over rural locales by the day.
Conservative Republican presidential candidates won in landslide elections throughout the
decade, carrying Midwestern states with ease. The Midwest also became a bastion of
isolationist, anti-interventionist sentiment; Manfred Jonas attributes these emergent reactionary
politics to “[g]eographic insularity” and “the affinity between the tenets of isolationism and the
presuppositions underlying various forms of agrarian radicalism” (Isolationism in America 17).
This historical background functioned as an essential component of Fitzgerald‟s
biographical and literary context, informing his response to the Midwestern region and to the
surrounding nation. Fitzgerald, it must be remembered, ascended in literary celebrity prior to the
October 23, 1920 publication of Sinclair Lewis‟s Main Street, the book that sparked a trend of
anti-Midwestern novels by Midwestern writers eager to debunk the positive pastoral myth
attached to their home region. Writers like Lewis, Grace Flandrau, Ruth Suckow, and
Woodward Boyd would be more savage in their mockery of Midwestern provincialism than their
forebears Sherwood Anderson and Theodore Dreiser had dared. Anderson‟s anti-pastoral
Winesburg, Ohio (1919) had directed its censure towards prejudicial small town environments,
and Dreiser‟s Chicago novels (including Sister Carrie [1900] and Jennie Gerhardt [1911]) had
addressed moral ambiguity in that Midwestern metropolis. The post-Main Street urban novel
school avoided these poles and wrote instead about newly-booming Midwestern cities like
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Indianapolis, Cincinnati, Minneapolis, and St. Paul. The sardonic strain in these authors‟ works
typically emerges in reply to the spread of urban-industrial environments across the Midwest, a
social change accompanied by political conservatism and a new, unhealthy reliance on credit in
daily life. Their novels about growing Midwestern cities rage against the popular insistence that
the region remains a symbol of centered-ness—of bipartisanship, moderation, and even
traditional pastoralism—when it has instead become irrevocably linked to national systems of
finance and right-wing politics. Their works in fiction foreshadow the later sociological studies
by the Lynds, who would similarly express concern for the outdated, reductive conceit of the
Midwest as wholly moderate and somehow different from the presumably corrupt East and the
purportedly backwards South.
Fitzgerald‟s earliest work predates this line of discourse, and his fictions written after the
publication of Main Street and Babbitt struggle, as he noted in correspondence with friends, to
overcome Lewis‟s influence. Fitzgerald admired Lewis‟s critiques of American consumerism
and of Midwestern tendencies towards conservatism, but he believed his second-rate prose
targeted “the average type of reader” (Letters 128). Similarly, he saw in Flandrau‟s Being
Respectable (1923) a response to the urbanization of the Midwest that was both “native and
universal” in significance, but in his review for The Literary Digest he quipped, with an obvious
nod towards his own talent, that “when our Conrad or Joyce or Anatole France comes, books
such as this will have cleared his way” (35-36).1 Fitzgerald came to imagine himself as a
competitor within this emergent discursive arena, which specialized in treating the Midwest as
synecdoche of middle-class America and its hypocrisies as symptomatic of those shared by the
nation. He claimed that he wanted to invent a new approach to writing about place in American
culture without succumbing to the pitfalls of agrarian and pastoral thought, philosophies that
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could only “[seek] for the static in a world that for almost a hundred years had simply not been
static” (Letters 187, emphasis in original). Interestingly, Fitzgerald‟s own writings would more
often treat the Midwest setting parallactically from the vantage of a different region than address
it directly. In his short stories set in the Midwest, characters are eager to flee to the urban
Northeast; in stories about displaced Midwesterners, these characters typically wax nostalgic
about their abandoned home region. Regardless, the Midwest retains its special privilege of
representing wholesome middle-income averageness even in works centered on New York‟s
suburbs or rural Georgia, places where the standard of living skews higher and lower,
respectively.

Fitzgerald and Tarkington: Nostalgia, Place, and Pastoralism
Fitzgerald called St. Paul, Minnesota home for most of his childhood, but he spent
considerable portions of time in other cities in different regions, as well. From 1898 to 1908, the
family lived in New York (Syracuse and Buffalo) as Edward Fitzgerald tried to advance his
career as a salesman for Procter & Gamble. And throughout Fitzgerald‟s childhood his parents
took him on semi-frequent trips to Maryland to visit his father‟s family. The most significant
removals began in 1911 when he entered the Newman School in Hackensack, New Jersey;
during this time, he would return home from boarding school only on holidays and breaks. Even
as a youth, then, Fitzgerald was used to seeing the Midwest in retrospect—a perspective he
retained in his adult fiction. He typically set his stories and novels in caricatured locales outside
the Midwest (such as the fast-paced urban Northeast; the slow, sultry South; or degenerate
Europe); nevertheless, his home region often looms in the background as a pleasant place where
unfashionable people retain hardy work ethics. As I will later discuss in detail, the stereotype of
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the Middle West as a large, bland zone of earnest plainness was one shared across the nation, but
it held special significance for Fitzgerald, who in 1919 returned to St. Paul from New York City
a failure, having been rejected by Zelda, given up his career in advertising with Barron Collier,
and failed to publish his first novel. Living with his parents in the Midwestern city he thought he
had escaped, he revised This Side of Paradise (1920) into publishable shape and wrote a handful
of salable stories. He moved back to New York as soon as he could, reclaiming Zelda along the
way. For the duration of his career, the Midwest would feature in his prose as a nice, boring
place in which one worked hard to earn the capital to go elsewhere.
In short stories like “Winter Dreams” (1922) plot events often impel characters to escape
the drab Midwest in pursuit of stranger vistas—such as New York City, to which protagonist
Dexter Green relocates once his rising fortunes permit it. Yet Fitzgerald‟s travelers typically
encounter moral corruption, economic exploitation, and a general dearth of sincerity whenever
else they go, leaving them to pine nostalgically for their pastoral Midwest, which they remember
as a place where things and people were simpler. Tellingly, in his 1932 essay “My Lost City”
Fitzgerald calls the Midwest his “warm center of the world out there,” a safe space enshrined in
memory to counteract the “essentially cynical and heartless” East Coast (My Lost City 107). In
Fitzgerald‟s remembered and fictionalized Middle West, a Puritan work ethic has survived where
elsewhere it has faltered. In meteorological terms, it is a cold place, with the harshness of its
climate sometimes reflected in the cool temperament of its people, but it is far from inhospitable.
It values efficiency over revelry, utility over ostentatiousness. In no story is this stereotyped
depiction clearer than in “The Ice Palace” (1920) in which protagonist Sally Carrol Happer visits
her suitor Harry Bellamy in his St. Paul. She finds that as a leisure-loving Southerner she is illequipped to cope with what she sees as a Midwestern industriousness wholly devoid of frivolity.
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For Bellamy, it all boils down to the warmth of “energy,” something Midwesterners have but
other Americans tend to lack. As Fitzgerald writes it, this vital quality is incorruptible on its
home turf, but outside of the Midwest it is subject to change. Nevertheless, he often treats these
energetic, upwardly-mobile young men less as individuals than the interchangeable, bourgeois
products of mass Midwestern cultural production. In one of his earliest short stories, “The
Camel‟s Back” (1920), he introduces the protagonist as a construction pieced together by an
assembly line of upper-crust Midwestern families, prep schools, department stores, and ivy
league institutions:
I want you to meet Mr. Perry Parkhurst, twenty-eight, lawyer, native of Toledo.
Perry has nice teeth, a Harvard diploma, parts his hair in the middle. You have
met him before—in Cleveland, Portland, St. Paul, Indianapolis, Kansas City, and
so forth. Baker Brothers, New York, pause on their semi-annual trip through the
West to clothe him; Montmorency & Co. dispatch a young man post-haste every
three months to see that he has the correct number of little punctures on his
shoes.... He looks like the advertisement of the young man rubbing his sunsetcolored chest with liniment and goes East every other year to his class reunion.
Fitzgerald‟s characterization of the Midwestern business-class man as “advertisement” here
prefigures similar ideas in Lewis‟s Babbitt, but the most significant features of the passage are its
regional stereotypes. Fitzgerald‟s imagines the Midwestern bourgeois as ubiquitous in the
region; varying little from city to city; essentially mechanical in their predictability and
efficiency; and representative of a cultural tendency towards the urban, the industrial, and the
commercial. He also chronicles the strong influence of Eastern academic and financial
institutions on the comparatively young Middle West.
These regional themes are markedly present throughout Fitzgerald‟s most enduring work,
The Great Gatsby (1925), and in the short story “Absolution” (1924), which he originally
envisioned as a prologue to the larger book. Set in rural North Dakota during the early 1900s,
“Absolution” concerns the James Gatz prototype Rudolph Miller, an eleven-year old boy who
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longs to escape his dull Midwest and strike out for a college town or a big city in the East. He
keeps a Cornell University pennant in his bedroom, and in his private moments, when he
fantasizes he is “too good to be the son of [his] parents,” he pretends he is “Blatchford
Sarnemington,” a “suave” young aristocrat (260, 263). Rudolph‟s ambitions receive support
from a troubled Catholic priest, Father Adolphus Schwarz, who wishes to forsake his own vows
and pursue luxury and pleasure “in the center of the world, wherever that happens to be” (270).
Schwarz‟s “theory” that “when a lot of people get together in the best places things go
glimmering all the time” exerts tremendous influence on Rudolph, who realizes that the modern
“center of the world” is not the center of the country, site of his present immuration. The
implicit connection between Miller and Gatz suggests that the boy will eventually take
“Blatchford Sarnemington” to the urban Northeast much as his novelistic counterpart would
transport “Jay Gatsby” from Dakota to New York.
As in “Absolution,” contrasts between the Midwest and the Northeast frame Gatsby, with
narrator Nick Carraway ruminating at the beginning and end on differences between these two
distinct American regions. Echoing Schwarz‟s language and Rudolph‟s realization, Nick‟s
provincial Middle West is paradoxically a “warm center of the world” and a “ragged edge of the
universe” (3). Though it is not a site of cultural production like the urban East, from whence
fashions and trends originate and then radiate westward, it is in Nick‟s imagination a responsible,
honest place. It is the safe zone to which he retreats when, after Gatsby‟s death, he wants “the
world to be in uniform and at a sort of moral attention forever,” free from “riotous excursions”
(2). Nick is himself an avatar of the balanced, stable Midwestern principles he advocates;
Gatsby opens with his assurance that Nick is “inclined to reserve all judgments” (1), and it closes
with a reminder that he has not lost his “provincial squeamishness” (179).
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By contrast, Nick envisions the Northeast as a place perpetually in moral “riot”: he calls
Long Island as a “slender riotous island” (4); he describes drunks in the New York City Yale
Club as “rioters” (56); and he refers to the state of emotion that led Gatsby to the East as a
“constant, turbulent riot” (99). In New York, Nick bears witness to a catalogue of excesses,
extremes, and revolts against convention. He sees wealth thrown away on extravagant
purchases, bonds of marriage casually violated, crime and corruption openly tolerated, and solid
work ethics sunk in revelry. In Gatsby, Fitzgerald trots out the regionalist essentialism he
evinced more frequently in his short stories. He has Nick remark in the final chapter that “this
has been a story of the West, after all—Tom and Gatsby, Daisy and Jordan and I, were all
Westerners, and perhaps we possessed some deficiency in common which made us subtly
unadaptable to Eastern life” (176).
Even though the novel deals primarily with Nick‟s antagonistic responses to modern New
York vice, the narrative ends significantly on a retrospective note of regional identification—one
that starts from the pastoral Midwest of Nick‟s childhood and recedes into the seventeenthcentury discovery of the Hudson River. Nick, like his creator, has a rosy, nostalgia-lensed
perspective on his Middle America, which he prefers to recollect as passing by on train rides
back to Minnesota when coming home from school:
That‟s my Middle West—not the wheat or the prairies or the lost Swede towns,
but the thrilling returning trains of my youth, and the street lamps and sleigh bells
in the frosty dark and the shadows of holly wreaths thrown by lighted windows on
the snow. I am part of that, a little solemn with the feel of those long winters, a
little complacent from growing up in the Carraway house in a city where
dwellings are still called through decades by a family‟s name. (176)
This imaginary place, which as Barry Gross observes “exists on no map” (“Fitzgerald‟s
Midwest” 125), is where Nick hopes to relocate at the conclusion of his narrative. It recalls
Dexter Green‟s nostalgic remembrance of his Minnesota hometown as “the country of illusion,
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of youth, of the richness of life”—after he has lived in the Northeast for years (Short Stories
236). Of course, the urban Midwest of the 1920s, full of various-sized cities seeking to emulate
East Coast metropolises, was no place like this indulgent fantasy.2 Nor does Nick‟s fashioning
of himself as the perfect, incorruptible Midwesterner—the perpetual withholder of judgments,
the reasonable man slumming amongst a tribe of excessive characters—actually refer to the
political identity of his contemporary Middle West, which was with few local exceptions a place
as conservative, reactionary, and pro-capital as the rest of the nation. Critics have rightly
questioned the validity of Fitzgerald‟s reductive East-West binary, often sharing Alexander C.
Kern‟s opinion that it results simply from the author‟s hometown pride (“Dreiser and Fitzgerald”
86). Others, like Gross, have lamented the “narrow world” of Fitzgerald‟s Midwest (113), a
setting informed by his experiences with St. Paul society and limited by his plains-by-train
imagining of an agrarian Midwest. But I believe that Nick‟s fantasy, the product of Fitzgerald‟s
nostalgic vision and antipathy for materialism, has behind it the force of desire: the need to
articulate resistance to industrial modernity, even if this response invokes a fiction of regional
difference that largely fails to match the objective reality. In Fitzgerald‟s fiction, the strategy of
pitting regional values against one another and against nationalist creeds emerges as an act of
writing back to modernity and laissez-faire capitalism. Such writings certainly deal in
abstractions, but they also participate in an evolving regionalist literary discourse that enjoyed a
large readership and therefore retained the potential to affect American notions of social change.
When this discourse addressed the Midwest, it often did so for the purpose of establishing or
reclaiming a political middle ground between the far left and the far right. In many cases,
however, socially conscious writers were invested in planting a “center” that happened to lean
left or right.
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In the early twentieth century, one of the most important authors addressing this topic of
American “middle-ness” in the Midwest was Indianapolis native Booth Tarkington, whose work
Fitzgerald enjoyed. Born in 1869, Tarkington was a well-established writer long before
Fitzgerald entered college. His career plainly served as a model for the aspiring novelist, for
Tarkington‟s biography reads like a predictive paraphrase of Fitzgerald‟s own: born into a
prominent Midwestern family that had fallen on hard times, he entered Princeton University after
they recovered part of their fortune; he helped establish the Triangle Club, the collegiate musical
society that Fitzgerald later joined in his rise to campus celebrity; he, like Fitzgerald, failed to
matriculate; and both writers turned their skills to fictions of manners. Tarkington was, however,
far more conservative in his political, social, and religious sensibilities than Fitzgerald and most
members of the Lost Generation. He was the product of an older, more unselfconsciously
patriotic, staunchly capitalistic, and confirmedly Christian generation, one that derived more
satisfaction from swimming with the mainstream than against it. From 1919 to 1921, as
American intellectuals on the left were becoming fascinated with socialist and communist
conceptualizations of government, Tarkington wrote three plays lampooning communist
ideology (Woodress 215). These were poorly reviewed by theatre critics, though The Gibson
Upstart (1919) achieved a measure of popularity with the American public when it was reprinted
in The Saturday Evening Post.
By the time Doubleday published The Magnificent Ambersons in 1918, Tarkington was
one of the most influential popular writers in the country. And, though he wrote almost
exclusively about Indiana and the Midwest, critics and consumers alike found his ideas in fiction
applicable to the larger nation. Writing for The Dial in 1919, reviewer Robert Morss Lovett
observed about Ambersons, “The scene of the story is clearly the Middle West, and the
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atmosphere is that of a newly arrived city, Indianapolis, or Cleveland, or Omaha; but the spiritual
values are no less current in Boston, or Atlanta, or San Francisco—in short, they are American.”
Lovett went on to praise the book‟s nationalistic qualities and its avoidance of “foreign
influence” (qtd. in Ambersons 293). The popular attitude towards Tarkington and his works is
perhaps best summed up in the phrasing of a 1920 magazine advertisement for his collected
works: “Our foremost living American author today is Booth Tarkington.... Tarkington hears the
very heartbeats of the American people. He is simple—direct—startlingly real.” Naturally,
some left-leaning critics resisted the hype, finding his fiction sentimental, conventional, and
conservative. Francis Hackett‟s 1918 review of Ambersons for The New Republic bemoaned the
book‟s “American docility” in response to “squalid bourgeois materialism” (qtd in Ambersons
291). Still, negative reviews persisted in classifying Tarkington as an American type—
representative of a casual, widespread conservative ethic that had become the national norm.
Ambersons revives the spirit of nineteenth-century Midwestern regionalism, a genre
Tarkington had previously dredged up in his homey Penrod stories, and hitches it to WWI-era
discourses on nationalism and modernity. This is the very sort of hybrid writing that Fitzgerald,
Lewis, and Flandrau would subsequently practice, so it is worthwhile to look closely at the
sociopolitical arguments nested in the foundation laid by Tarkington. Many of these are
arguments about the role of the Midwest as an embodiment or representation of the larger United
States. The synecdochic aspect of Ambersons‟s setting is evident in the name of the fictional city
in which the action takes place: Midland, a term that evokes both the Midwestern region and the
prospect of normalcy or averageness between extremes. Roughly a decade later, the Lynds
would characterize Muncie, Indiana as “Middletown” to achieve a similar effect. Indeed, many
of the problems in Muncie that the Lynds would identify as typical across the nation—such as
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the instability of the credit economy, the impact of automobiles on the environment, the devotion
to bland national culture, and the great migration from the rural to the urban—plague
Tarkington‟s Midland. His efforts to paint Midland as typical, then, do more than portray the
city as wholesome and moderate; they render its symptomatic social problems pandemic instead
of merely endemic.
Events in Ambersons occur during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, a
period of great social change for Midland. The city evolves from a quiet Midwestern town to an
urban center boosted by the booming automobile industry. The book‟s protagonist, George
Amberson Minafer, is the young scion of Midland‟s powerful Amberson family, whose patriarch
made his fortune after the Civil War by investing in the city‟s real estate. George finds a rival in
Eugene Morgan, an auto engineer who vies for his widowed mother‟s affections. Inventions and
novelties by industrialists like Eugene propel Midland into a progressive future which sees the
magnificence of the Amberson family and their properties swallowed up in grimy urban sprawl.
George, who affects the mannerisms of an aristocrat and believes that “being things is rather
better than doing things” (Ambersons 122), is exceptionally unsuited for this new world.
Simultaneously attracted to and repulsed by Eugene‟s free-spirited daughter, he purposefully
distances his family from theirs in a futile attempt to preserve the haughty integrity of the
Ambersons. In the first half of the narrative, Tarkington‟s sympathies seem to lie with Eugene
and his progress-oriented faith in “the miracles” of “gasoline and electricity” (212), but these
sympathies shift in the second half, which advocates the Ambersons‟ conservatism as a valid
form of resistance to technological changes that wreak havoc on the local environment. In this
way, the novel praises the rise of the modern middle class even as it derides the innovations that
enabled it.
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Tarkington devotes much of the book to mocking George‟s aristocratic pretensions,
which bear the traces of un-American European influences. The Amberson family‟s landholding
power in Midland reeks of feudalism, and, appropriately, George lords his financial and cultural
authority over his fellow Midlanders like a feudal baron. Even when he is in a kindhearted mood
(a rare occurrence), the narrator reports that “his politeness was of a kind which democratic
people found hard to bear” (29). He views his neighbors as tolerable but of inferior “caste”—
“[w]orthy middle class creatures... leading dull lives but appreciative of better things when they
saw them” (35). He sees the working class as intractable, for skilled manual laborers seldom
respect his desire to remain without vocation. Yet George values his idleness as an act of
heroism; he envisions himself as a living contradiction of the Southern and Eastern
commonplace that the Midwest is provincial and “unyachted” (45). George thus embodies a
proud regional elitism founded on family lineage, frontier heritage, and land ownership. This
elitist attitude is prejudiced against modern commercialism for two reasons: commercial culture
caters to the spending power of the working and middle classes, and it provides tempting access
to products and services outside the local sphere, wherein powerful families like the Ambersons
exert the greatest influence. The novel illustrates the dual impact of commerce and technological
progress by showing the Amberson properties (located mostly in the center of town) bulldozed to
make way for cheap apartment housing.
Eugene promises the Ambersons that his inventions and the spread of paved city streets
have the power to “to change the face of the land” (151), and his predictions prove true:
Midland, no longer a feudal town dominated by one family, becomes an industrialized city
reminiscent of a number of such places across the country. Tarkington captures this decline in
idiosyncratic “magnificence” using streets as metaphors: “National Avenue met Amberson
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Boulevard here at an obtuse angle, and the removal of the pillars made the Boulevard seem a
cross-street of no overpowering importance” (242). This homogenizing effect, the result of
national influences squashing local and regional traditions, is a theme Tarkington carries over
from nineteenth-century local color fictions and regionalist literatures, but it is also one that he
would transmit to future Midwestern writers who address urban growth. Fitzgerald, Lewis, and
Flandrau would subsequently politicize the conflict between regionalism and nationalism much
more so than Tarkington. This is hardly unexpected, however, for his followers wrote their most
censorious works during the anti-Progressive Republican twenties, and Tarkington wrote
Ambersons while his college friend Woodrow Wilson, Progressive Democrat, was president.
Tarkington thus tends to neuter the possibility of explicit political critique in his responses to
consumerism and to the homogeneity of American place, leading the author to sometimes make
the Dickensian gesture of countering materialism with mysticism. In one such passage, he
laments that Midlanders have not yet arrived at “the strange and hard discovery that matter
should serve man‟s spirit” (214). In another, he gives rising capitalist Eugene a ghostly visit
from a dead lover who encourages him to put selflessness above self-interest. A different type of
clue to the book‟s lack of political affect rests in its treatment of George‟s uncle, a former US
senator whose party affiliation and policy stances remain wholly undocumented by the narrator.
However, Tarkington‟s most significant gesture towards the political center is his sympathy for
the idea that all powerful men are, regardless of their politics, of the same type—that “[i]t‟s all
the same, in the long run” (218). Behind this idea is the author‟s consolation that death makes
everyone equals: that “dead Caesar was nothing but a tiresome bit of print in a book” and “[e]ven
George Washington is only something in a book” (272). Through these metaphysical concerns,
he distances himself from the divisive realpolitik of labor and capital.
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Despite Tarkington‟s efforts at political neutrality, Ambersons does feature a number of
barbs directed towards the Progressive assurance that advances in technology and commerce are
ultimately beneficial. In the long montage scene that fills the middle of the narrative, Tarkington
pokes fun at boosterism and consumerism, two forms of idealism invested in worshipping the
“god of the market-place” (214). He derides the escalating importance of credit in everyday life,
because he views credit as a perversion of “Prosperity” to be exchanged for “nothing which that
was not dirty, and, therefore, to a sane mind, valueless” (213). Rendering these effects in spatial
terms, Tarkington likens the shift from pastoralism to industry and urbanity to the metastasizing
of a cancer:
It was heaving up in the middle incredibly; it was spreading incredibly; and as it
heaved and spread, it befouled itself and darkened its sky. Its boundary was mere
shapelessness on the run; a raw, new house would appear on a country road; four
or five others would presently be built at intervals between it and the outskirts of
the town; the country road would turn into an asphalt street with a brick-faced
drugstore and a framed grocery at a corner; then bungalows and six-room cottages
would swiftly speckle the open green spaces—and a farm had become a suburb,
which would immediately shoot out other suburbs into the country, on one side,
and, on the other, join itself solidly to the city. (212)
As the geography surrounding the city becomes indistinguishable from it, Tarkington writes, its
occupants are likewise infected by the spreading sameness: “The descendants of the pioneers and
early settlers were merging into the new crowd, becoming part of it, little to be distinguished
from it. What happened to Boston and to Broadway happened in degree to the Midland city”
(212). Tarkington‟s observations suggest that a national culture (one whose primary symbols are
factories, apartment buildings, and syndicated media) is rising not to supplement but to supplant
local and regional identities. Yet as he documents this social change unfolding in the fin-desiècle Midwest, he insists that Midwesterners accurately represent “average” Americans. He
pairs regional and national identities when he writes, “A new Midlander—in fact, a new
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American—was beginning dimly to emerge” (212). This is a claim that most Midwestern
writers of the modernist era would repeat; whether writing in praise or in censure of this
emergent representative, they would seldom dispute its representational force.

Lewis and Flandrau: Writing Back to the Right
In their responses to Midwestern conservatism and consumerism, both Tarkington and
Fitzgerald imagine an idyllic Middle Western past, a bygone historical moment when a regional
community seemed to embody political and economic moderation, thereby serving as a model
for the nation. Their fictions draw on nostalgia and retrospect to illustrate how far the modern
Midwestern city has been displaced from that semi-pastoral ideal. Lewis and Flandrau, on the
other hand, fixate on the repugnant urban-industrial present.
Lewis achieved his first major success in 1920 with Main Street, the novel that
Shortridge credits with being the first to effectively assault the popular conceit of a moderate,
pastoral Midwest. That book had functioned primarily as an unflinching gaze at the xenophobic,
provincial, and closed-minded rural Middle West—an effort to strip the zone of its much-touted
democratic virtues. His 1922 follow-up, Babbitt, is more pertinent to this particular study,
however, for in it Lewis turns his attention to the shifting political sympathies of the region in a
period of rapid urban expansion. He dissects the heartlessness of the American heartland,
seeking to demonstrate to readers that the Middle West of the era is guilty of the same excessive,
corrupt materialism as was more commonly associated with the urban Northeast and the national
government. The support for labor that had decades earlier undergirded the region‟s populist
movements had eroded by the twenties, and any insistences upon pastoral identity now rang
hollow in the increasingly urbanized. No longer a middle ground between the republican
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Western frontier and the corporatized East, the Midwest had turned capital-letter Republican in
the pro-capital postwar environment. But Lewis does not stop at excoriating the region for
betraying the working class in favor of the upper-middle and above; he extends his criticism to
the entire country, which he depicts as being united, even homogenized, under a rising credit
economy by technological innovations like telephones, appliances, and the automobile.
The product of this materialistic modernity is “the Standardized American Citizen,” an
android-like character outlined by Babbitt in a speech before the Zenith Real Estate Board. The
sort of American that Babbitt describes, “the ideal type to which the entire world must tend,” is
notable primarily for his insistence upon normality and his unwillingness to deviate from social
conservative protocol (Main Street & Babbitt 650). The “Standardized Citizen,” elsewhere in
the speech referred to as the “Sane Citizen,” is a white male who reads newspaper poetry,
watches popular films, participates eagerly in the credit economy, votes Republican, despises
liberal university professors, and goes about his business with an indelible quality known as
“pep.” He is also intensely patriotic and forgetful of whatever foreign country from which his
family emigrated. Through these characteristics, Babbitt praises the American melting pot as
annihilator of difference, a crucible designed to reduce ethnicity, class, and place of origin to
WASP-ish whiteness. Men like this are homogenizing America, and Babbitt sings their praises:
Zenith and her sister-cities are producing a new type of civilization. There are
many resemblances between Zenith and these other burgs, and I‟m darn glad of it!
The extraordinary, growing, and sane standardization of stores, offices, streets,
hotels, clothes, and newspapers throughout the United States shows how strong
and enduring a type is ours. (653)
American cities are losing their unique character, as are their denizens, but this poses no threat to
Babbitt‟s pro-business, anti-intellectual philosophy:
[B]y the last census, there were no less than sixty-eight glorious American burgs
with a population of over one hundred thousand! And all these cities stand
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together for power and purity, and against foreign ideas and communism—
Atlanta with Hartford, Rochester with Denver, Milwaukee with Indianapolis, Los
Angeles with Scranton, Portland, Maine with Portland, Oregon. A good live wire
from Baltimore or Duluth is the twin-brother of every like fellow booster from
Buffalo or Akron, Fort Worth or Oskaloosa! (652-53)
Near the end of the speech, Babbitt rhapsodizes about his vision of homogeneity by quoting from
a poem by his friend Chum Frink: “[I]n these States where’er you roam, you never leave your
home sweet home” (654, emphasis in original). What we are left with is the evocation of a
capitalistic utopia, a land in which regional difference has been reduced to flatness of affect by
technology and commerce. In Babbitt‟s ideal America, every place is or will one day be the
same standardized urban environment.
Lewis captures an interesting paradox in Babbitt‟s rant. The character‟s rhetoric is
deeply indebted to left-leaning populist politics in its evangelical mission of spreading “Regular
Guy” values around the nation (651), but he has put this style into the service of promoting
business class values that are socially, fiscally, and religiously conservative. Babbitt‟s speech
implies that his views (and those of his cohort) are representative of a “well-balanced”
sociopolitical middle, yet in every respect, his actual ideas are far right of center. He has no
concern whatsoever for Zenith‟s blue collar workers; he insists instead that “it‟s the fellow with
four to ten thousand a year... and an automobile and a nice little family in a bungalow on the
edge of town, that makes the wheels of progress go round” (650). He believes that art has no
business criticizing capitalism. Worst of all, his concept of social change is devoid of human
sympathy, restricted solely to urban-industrial development. Immigrants and minorities have no
place in his worldview, nor do intellectuals who might sympathize with their plight. Women,
even white women, fare little better under his gaze, for his “ideal of American manhood and
culture” is obviously entrenched in a masculine “He-man” perspective (656).
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Men like Babbitt push labor-friendly and socialist ideologies to the far, unreasonable left
of popular opinion by insisting that their own political opinions are the products of “sane”
compromise in the center. By seizing hold of nationalist rhetoric, they use patriotic booster-ism
to endorse their pro-capital, racialist, and misogynistic ideologies, successfully redefining normal
as right of center. But in the homogenized world they advocate, distinct regional identifications
suggest possible modes of resistance. The pastoral and agrarian traditions of the Midwest and
the South, respectively, were notably anti-capitalist and anti-industrial, even if the reality of
those associations changed in the twentieth century, when industrialization was in many places
simply inevitable. One salesman Babbitt meets on a train offers a trite summary of the South‟s
regional economy: “Business conditions not very good down there.” Another chimes in about a
different region: “Well, business conditions ain‟t what they ought to be in the West, neither, not
by a long shot” (613). These places frustrate Babbitt and company because they are accidental
pockets of resistance within their hyper-capitalist utopia of technological and financial progress.
Babbitt is a novel that acknowledges the value of difference—be it regional, ideological,
religious, or artistic in nature—in resisting the questionable allure of a blandly homogenized
American culture. Where, then, is the regional voice in the novel‟s Midwest? Where are the
traces of Middle Western culture as celebrated by regionalist writers in the nineteenth century?
Where is the folksy conventional wisdom Lewis had aptly parodied in Main Street? Zenith‟s
chief literary talent, Chum Frink, produces only limply nationalistic verses wholly devoid of
regional character.3 But the city‟s advertisements—ubiquitous in newspapers and junk mail—
are infused with flimsy Midwestern pastoralism. Babbitt, an author of such ads, considers
himself a member of “the new school of Poets of Business.” Dictating a list of available
properties to his secretary, he takes a stab at local color advertising, making sure to capitalize on
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the rural spelling and pronunciation of certain words: “I just want to know can I do you a
whaleuva favor? Honest! No kidding! I know you‟re interested in getting a house, not merely a
place where you hang up the old bonnet but a love-nest for the wife and kiddies—and maybe for
the flivver out beyant (be sure and spell that b-e-y-a-n-t, Miss McGoun) the spud garden” (520).
The regional dialect of Midwestern literature is here repurposed to sell real estate. As a realtor,
Babbitt‟s specialty is the commodification of place, and we find him using a new exploitative
form of “regional writing” to advance his practice.
Grace Flandrau‟s novel Being Respectable (1923) is similarly concerned with the
changing role of Midwestern place in the face of industrial progress. Published one year after
Babbitt, many contemporary reviewers rightly viewed Flandrau‟s book as a follow-up to
Lewis‟s. Reviewing the novel, Fitzgerald compared the two but was careful to make an
important distinction: “[Being Respectable] is a satirical arraignment of the upper class of a
Middle Western city—in this case, St. Paul, Minnesota, as Babbitt, generally speaking, was
concerned with the upper-middle class of Minneapolis” (“Minnesota‟s Capital” 35). Despite
these slight variations in setting and focus, Flandrau shares Lewis‟s concern for the
homogenization of American place and the rise of a bland national culture facilitated by popular
media and technology. Columbia—the fictional city in which the novel‟s plot transpires—is,
like Babbitt’s Zenith, a city that functions as a synecdoche for the larger nation. Its name evokes
the legacy of Christopher Columbus as well as the utopian vision of the Chicago Columbian
Exposition at the 1893 World‟s Fair. The novel captures Columbia‟s loss of local and regional
identity as its citizens become associated with reactionary, conservative nationalism and
infatuated by products of American popular culture. Flandrau‟s more thoughtful characters
express a Babbitt-esque disgust at the spreading sameness of people and places in the US of the
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early twentieth century, as is evident in this exchange between young capitalist Charles
Carpenter and his liberal sister Deborah:
“What‟s the matter with Columbia? It‟s no different from Kansas City or St. Paul
or Minneapolis or—”
“Or Indianapolis or Cleveland or all the rest of them. I guess that‟s true. That‟s
the trouble. They‟re like something made by machinery—all exactly the same.
And they‟re so—uninspired. Columbia‟s so uninspired.” (Being Respectable 101)
Later, a visiting (and visibly bored) novelist echoes this sentiment, remarking at a party, “The
average of American society is everywhere pretty much like this” (193). Flandrau‟s narrator
insists that the Midwestern Columbia is indeed a typical, middle-of-the-road American city—but
it is only through the voluntary sacrifice of regional character and local interests that such places
have allowed themselves to be reduced to type.
Like Lewis, Flandrau places the blame for this infectious homogenization on forces of
modernity the Lynds would later refer to as “space-binding agencies” (Middletown in Transition
380), elements of technological progress and syndicated media that work to make the nation a
functionally smaller place. Automobiles, which reduced the significance of spatial distance
while simultaneously contributing new demands to the national market (for metals, fuels, and for
cars themselves), comprise one such force. Though the autos of the age were somewhat
unreliable for travelling long distances, efficient railroad systems made cross-country, interregional travel a matter of simply having the money to afford the ticket.4 Wireless telegraphy, an
invention of the previous century, continued to permit communication across vast physical
distances long into the twentieth century. Syndicated newspaper columns, widely read “slick”
magazines, and the ubiquitous presence of commercial advertisements were homogenizing
forces in their own right. Products of the era, from Campbell‟s Soup to Continental Motors,
were proudly promoted as parts of an abstract American culture; ads invited consumers to
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practice patriotism though purchasing. These technological, media, and commercial
interventions are on display in the novel. Though Flandrau is no Luddite, she and her characters
plainly recognize that such novelties have fused Columbia and the Midwest to the larger nation,
thereby compromising the discrete individuality of city and region. The 1920s America of Being
Respectable is, thanks to free-market capitalism, the amazing shrinking country—a land in which
distance is no object because money is the only object. In one scene, Deborah Carpenter drives
her thoroughly modern car through Columbia‟s urbanized cityscape and thinks to herself,
“Bungalettes, culturette, religionettes, everything in the diminutive. More people having things,
so everything was smaller. Was that democracy?” (275) Flandrau‟s overarching project,
however, is less an indictment of democracy in general than of “our ten-cent store civilization” in
in a particularly conservative, materialistic, insular, and anti-intellectual era (71). Her goal of
critiquing the facile, reactionary conservatism of Middle America—and, by connection, that of
mainstream American culture—is one shared by a pair of sociologists who captured in their two
major studies portraits of an insular, conservative Midwest and thus corroborated the prose
evidence of their literary counterparts.

Middletown: A Midwestern City “Shifting its Centers”
In 1929, after writers like Tarkington and Lewis had been using fiction to contradict
flawed conceits of the American “middle” for roughly a decade, sociologists Robert Staughton
Lynd and his wife Helen Merrell Lynd published their survey of Muncie, Indiana as Middletown:
A Study in Modern American Culture. They selected Muncie as the focus of their study because
of its utter averageness: geographically, it was part of Middle America and boasted a “temperate
climate” (7); in terms of population, it was a mid-sized American city dominated by middle-class
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whites; economically, it was a booming industrial town like many others in the country. As they
explained in their introduction, “A typical city, strictly speaking, does not exist, but the city
studied was selected as having many features common to a wide group of communities” (3).
They chose not to study cities with large “negro” populations because they felt these reflected
neither national census numbers nor America‟s lily-white self-image. From 1924 to 1927, the
Lynds performed field work in Muncie (called “Middletown” to mask its actual identity),
conducting interviews and collecting data on how a “typical” American city was being affected
by forces of modernity in the age of industrial capitalism. As is suggested by their frequent
insistence upon the “middle-of-the-road quality about Middletown,” their writings on Muncie
often turn into generalized reflections on the larger nation (9). Through the process of analyzing
Muncie, the researchers envisioned themselves taking the average of American life and
providing readers across the country with insight into modern US standards of living. Thus, it is
not inaccurate to read Middletown as more generally about 1920s America than specifically
about 1920s Muncie (after all, the book is subtitled A Study in American Culture), but in doing
so it is important to realize that the Lynds participate in the tendency, common in the era, to treat
the Midwest as synecdoche of the United States. They do not regard Muncie, the state of
Indiana, or the Midwest as places deeply invested in local or regional identity; rather, they find in
Middletown evidence arguing for the emergence of a homogenous national character. In large
part, Middletown chronicles the correlation between widening income disparity between classes
and shrinking cultural differences between people and places.
In Middletown and other cities like it, the Lynds observe a dedicated striving for
normalcy. Advertising and popular media have contributed to this survival instinct of blending
in, but the sociologists attribute its rise primarily to the modern credit economy, which they
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describe as “a repressive agent to standardize widening sectors of the habits of the business
class—to vote the Republican ticket, to adopt golf as their recreation, and to refrain from „queer,‟
i.e., atypical, behavior” (47). Getting money from lenders or simply buying expensive items on
installment plans requires trust between debtors and debt-holders; the interrelationships formed
in these exchanges also require complex interaction between institutions and individuals of
different backgrounds. The Lynds argue that cultural homogeny among members of the business
class serves to artificially synthesize a semblance of trust by reducing difference. “Never,” they
write, “was there more pressure in the business world for solidarity, conformity, and wide
personal acquaintance than exists today under the current credit economy” (278). They contend
that boosterism and nationalism contribute to this conformity as part of a “blanket pattern
solution” tied to abstract symbols of place and nation that convey little meaningful information
but reinforce a constructed in-group identity (486-87, 492). Writing about political sensibilities
as well as spending habits and cultural groupthink, the Lynds reach the following conclusion:
“An explanation of the tendency already noted for Middletown to link its emotional loyalties
together, to vote the good-fellow ticket straight, may probably lie in its increasing sense of strain
and perplexity in its rapidly changing world that can be made to hang together and make sense in
no other way” (500).
The Lynds‟ overarching argument implies that Middletown‟s citizens and the larger
American population have tended to mistake simplicity for “middle-ness” and even-handed
objectivity, when in truth they have simply chosen the political right as the path of least
resistance. Towards this end, they comment on the “obliteration of difference” between major
American political parties, all of which are essentially conservative (414). Middletown shows
that in the 1924 presidential election the city‟s inhabitants voted overwhelmingly for pro-
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business incumbent Coolidge, regardless of socioeconomic background (316). The Lynds
attribute the working class‟s voting against its own economic interests to the general political
apathy pervading the nation. After the Harding administration‟s Teapot Dome scandal,
corruption and public office became essentially synonymous to the average American. Voter
turnout, the Lynds note, declined sharply in Middletown during the 1920s, reversing an increase
in civic participation that began early in the Progressive Era. Even though the modern
Republican Party had more or less squandered the goodwill it had earlier generated with reform
candidates like Teddy Roosevelt, it survived on voter apathy and the association of both
Democrats and Republicans with rampant corruption. Fin-de-siècle Republicans had been more
effective representatives of the American middle class than their Jazz Age successors, a shift
evident in the third-party defections of Progressive Republican stalwarts like Roosevelt and La
Follette. Nevertheless, as the Lynds observe in Middletown and its sequel, Americans continued
to optimistically link these men and even Lincoln to the modern Republican Party, fantasizing
about a middle-of-the-road aspect of the party that had, like the pastoral Midwest, ceased to
exist.
In their 1937 follow-up, Middletown in Transition: A Study in Cultural Conflicts, the
Lynds trace the decline of Midwestern regional identity to broader access to national media, a
change that led consumers to prefer syndicated newspaper columns and radio programs over
their local counterparts.5 In the twenties and thirties, radio especially served as a vehicle of
nationalism and American identity, for it “carrie[d] people away from localism and [gave] them
direct access to the more popular stereotypes in the national life” (264). Middletown in
Transition mourns the city‟s loss of regional identity and its new awareness of itself not as a
synecdoche but as a homogenized node in a homogenous network.6 The Lynds write,
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What one appears to be witnessing... is a struggle between the old pride in
localism, in being Middletown, and the opposed pride in being en rapport with
the „newest,‟ the „smartest,‟ the „most approved by the right people in the big
outside world‟.... Living as Middletown does today with an unprecedented
number of space-binding agencies that bring to it contact with the habits and
possessions of authoritative people who „belong‟ in the wider national culture,
Middletown is shifting its centers of „belonging‟ at a number of specific points to
conform to these more distant centers of prestige. (379-80)
Per the Lynds observations, this decline in regional difference, part of a “universal toning down
of contrasting colors” (381n), was matched by a homogenization of the work force. Due to
industrial progress, semi-skilled machine labor rapidly replaced highly trained hand labor—a
devolution of aptitude evident in the transition of Muncie‟s glass industry from a manual
blowing process to a machine-enabled one. The relative simplicity of handling such devices
eradicated the phenomenon of apprenticeship and switched out trained workers for “quickly
interchangeable semiskilled human machine parts” (65). Production increased, profits rose, but
unskilled and semi-skilled workers had far less to bargain with in disputes with management and
owners, because they were essentially replaceable flesh-and-blood automata. Thus, the
impression of Muncie—and, by connection, mainstream America—that the Lynds leave is one of
a widespread, infectious cultural homogeneity that pretends at being middle-class, fair-minded,
and ambiguously patriotic but is, behind the façade, fanatically pro-business, staunchly
conservative, and more on the side of capital than the actual middle class.
There are striking similarities of theme and style shared between the Lynds sociological
discourse on the Middle Western region and the earlier efforts in fiction of post-WWI
Midwestern authors. Though the Lynds privilege their data-oriented approach over the more
abstract critiques of fiction writers, their conclusions on the homogenization of American place
are virtually indistinguishable from those of Lewis in Babbitt and, to a slightly lesser extent,
Fitzgerald in Gatsby.7 In their 1937 volume on Middletown, the Lynds‟ closing remarks for their
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section on the city‟s working class read like an apt paraphrase of Gatsby‟s ending, matching the
prose cadence and themes nearly note for note: “The Middletown worker may be licked by the
economic order now—and now—and now—in the endless series of each day‟s immediate issues;
but the only generalizations about his life that culture has taught him concern tomorrow, and
„tomorrow‟ according to the American formula always means „progress,‟ getting closer to
whatever it is that one craves” (454, emphasis in original).8 The Lynds‟ fusion of anticapitalistic sentiment and literary style is, though probably accidental, nevertheless appropriate,
for the economic hardships of the Depression had a remarkable impact on American literary
genres. Regional genres like the Western experienced a revival, and cowboy tales were
frequently adapted as films. Middle Western regionalist prose surged in popularity, and the
“Midwestern farm novel” rose from its nineteenth-century grave. Some writers, such as Herbert
Krause and Frederick Manfield, used the form to celebrate the Midwest‟s complex multiracial
history. Others, most famously John Steinbeck in The Grapes of Wrath (1939), looked to the
dried-out South Central region of the American West to explore how its economic troubles
reflected failures of infrastructure on the national level. As the Depression undermined some
Americans‟ faith in capitalism, nationalism, and especially consumerism, creators and audiences
seemed to grow more interested in works on local and regional character. Steinbeck‟s
Oklahoman Joad family became the face of the Great Depression, and 20th Century Fox assigned
conservative creators (Darryl Zanuck and John Ford) to the 1940 film adaptation project to
temper the author‟s leftist sympathies so as not to offend audiences. Thus, the filmic Joads
emerge as a calculated effort to manufacture an artificially moderate West in the 1930s, a
synthetic environment similar to the artificially moderate Midwest that modernists had railed
against in the 1920s.
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From Middletown to Lake Woebegon and back to Fitzgerald
Whenever Garrison Keillor broadcasts homey Midwestern parables live from the
Fitzgerald Theater in St. Paul, he reminds us that the notion of a semi-pastoral, politicallycentered, middle-class-friendly Midwest endures to this day, even as the governments of
Midwestern states like Wisconsin and Ohio work to strip laborers of privileges that have for
decades been sacrosanct. Though politics on the national level barrel headlong into irresolvable
divisiveness between liberals and conservatives, pundits persist in categorizing American
political sympathies as predicated by region: the liberal Northeast, the somehow more liberal
West Coast, the conservative South, and, of course, the moderate Midwest. Television shows
and feature films promote these reductive identities in popular culture, frequently exaggerating
them for comedic value but reinforcing them nevertheless. Is the Midwest really more moderate
than other parts of America? If we define “moderate politics” as bipartisan cooperation to ensure
a healthy relationship between the interests of labor and capital, then the winner-takes-all game
of modern American politics suggests an answer in the negative. As uncompromisingly
conservative, business-friendly Republican governors take Midwestern states, the region deviates
from its historically Progressive roots. Electoral results from presidential elections since 2000
also show a political rift between Midwestern states in the east and west of the region; those
closer to the Northeast tend to go blue, while those further away tend towards red.
Still, as recently as November 2, 2011, trustworthy news stalwart Tom Brokaw could be
heard promulgating the “moderate Midwesterner” stereotype on The Daily Show with Jon
Stewart, assuring the host, “What I find when I go out in the country is they feel that Washington
is walled off from them. So, if you go to a mid-sized city in mid-America, for example, you find
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the Republican banker working with the Democrat who is a backhoe operator or a contractor of
some kind, because they have to get on with their lives.” Brokaw‟s imaginary Midwest is oddly
reminiscent of the pastoral Middle West of the nineteenth century, a place closer in spirit to Lake
Woebegon than to Lake Michigan. It is circumscribed securely within the fantastical zone of
wishful political thinking that writers and sociologists sought earnestly to debunk in the twenties
and thirties.
America‟s Electoral College and two-party political system, both of which reduce
presidential elections to matters of cartographic division and state population, have played
profound roles in sustaining essentially Victorian regional stereotypes well into the twenty-first
century. Their reductive machinations permit news consumers to gaze at a two-toned national
map and see what states in which regions choose “red” or “blue” candidates, providing the
illusion of “big tent” political affiliations and widespread agreement among party-line voters.
But these are deceptive simplicities, for the advent of the internet has facilitated the
dissemination of factional movements that defy normative “red” and “blue” labels—like the Tea
Party, which blends libertarian economic policies with seemingly contradictory moral
conservatism, and Occupy Wall Street, which advocates Progressive-style corporate reform
using a populist-anarchic protest framework. Tip O‟Neill‟s assertion that “all politics is local”
seems necessarily dated in an era when social networking sites and gleefully non-objective news
media sources invite users to cocoon themselves within their preferred agendas, interacting only
with likeminded individuals who may live several states away.
What, then, could literary and sociological discourses on region from the 1920s and 30s
possibly tell us about the political significance of American place in our own times? The answer
is: quite a bit. Tarkington, Fitzgerald, Lewis, Flandrau, and the Lynds inhabited a context little
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different from ours in its overvaluation of regional stereotypes even then being rendered
irrelevant by the “space-binding agencies” of technology and commerce. These writers did not
invent a means of thinking beyond persistent nineteenth-century definitions of regional identity,
but they worked hard to expose how such tropes mask the presence of social unrest, economic
ills, and reactionary conservatism. On the surface, their concern for the homogenization of
American culture appears unconnected or oppositional to what political commentators fear the
most in our time: the irreconcilable bi-polarization of Americans into non-valent liberal and
conservative camps. However, efforts by these modernist-era writers to reveal the political
agendas undergirding “centrist” positions retain their potency today, as nearly all fringe groups
bandy about populist rhetoric and claim to represent the disappearing middle class. The Tea
Party, for example, revives the Nixonian conceit of the “silent majority,” while Occupy Wall
Street seeks to mobilize the “ninety-nine percent” of non-wealthy Americans against the unfair
practices of the rich, elite “one percent.” Their views disseminated over the internet, their
proponents courted by nationally syndicated news media, these movements are not rooted in any
particular place and are incapable of being categorized in traditional regional-political
frameworks. Despite their seeming incorporeality, the Tea Party and Occupy Wall Street alike
organize traditional protest events in targeted locations to promote their visions of social change
on the national level. Thus, their modes of critique in some ways resemble the post-regionalist
discourses of Midwestern writers of the modernist era, who invoked bygone notions of place to
effect political resistance in a time when the actual significance of place was waning. But their
centrist claims also ring familiar, sounding reminiscent of groups as disparate as the People‟s
Party, the Progressives, and Coolidge-style pro-captial Republicans. It is important to remember
that elements from modern fringe groups are steadily being incorporated (much as the Populist
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movement was at the turn of the century) by the two major political parties, both of whom are
eager to appeal to undecided, middle-of-the-road voters.
There is a final reason why fictions on region by Fitzgerald and his early twentiethcentury peers remain relevant: they wrote on the value of place when the nation and the world
stood on the verge of economic collapse, as it so often seems today. Region and place in general
declined in importance while the Boom economy accelerated the speed at which money moved
products and ideas from zone to zone, but these writers accurately predicted that the pace was
unsustainable. Access to technology, fuel, and capital dwindled in the Depression, and, for a
time, geographic distances seemed less surmountable and more significant. These concerns have
resurged somewhat in the current global recession, leading scholars to turn to sustainability
studies and many consumers to become distance-conscious (or pro-local) in their purchases. In
this light, the nostalgic fictions of Tarkington and Fitzgerald especially emerge as thoughtful
considerations of how in the environment of late capitalism definitions of region and valuations
of place are functions of the national, as well as the global, economy.

Notes
1

Fitzgerald knew Flandrau, who lived in St. Paul, personally. Through her, he met Harold Ober,

who was to remain his literary agent until near the end of his life (Taylor 63).
2

A comparable train scene appears in Chapter 3 of Main Street, but Lewis‟s depiction of the

rural-agrarian Midwest is completely purged of the nostalgia that plagues Fitzgerald‟s writing.
Lewis‟s passengers share space with grimy immigrants who form a new “American peasantry”
(26), and out of the train windows they look on rustic chaos, “[t]owns as planless as a scattering
of pasteboard boxes on an attic floor” (24).
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3

Lewis appears to have modeled Frink on actual newspaper poets like Edgar Guest, who

promulgated cardboard Hallmark-ian patriotism in their inspirational poems.
4

In The Global Remapping of American Literature (2011), Paul Giles treats the emergence of

commercial aviation as a major theme in Fitzgerald‟s late works (131-33).
5

Experimental portions of John Dos Passos‟s USA Trilogy (1930-36) emulate the form, style,

and content of syndicated media to show how these forces have reduced regional and local
differences to what Miles Orvell calls “a ticker-tape sameness” (Real Thing 264). Elsewhere,
Giles has described Dos Passos‟s “great theme” as “the new contiguity of near and far, the way
in which distant events shape local contingencies” (Global Remapping 130). It is worth noting,
too, that Dos Passos was himself a Midwesterner, born in Chicago.
6

Middletown in Transition contains a dig at Fitzgerald that shows how sharply the author‟s

cultural stock had plummeted in the Depression. Discussing morally conservative trends among
American youths, the Lynds write, “There is little evidence in Middletown of the conservative
reaction among the young to the „Scott Fitzgerald wave‟ of the early 1920‟s that some people
believe set in in the United States late in the 1920‟s” (164). Here, Fitzgerald is reduced to a
symbol of excess. To put this reduction in context, it is worthwhile to remember that in 1936,
one year before the publication of Middletown in Transition, Ernest Hemingway had mocked his
old friend in “The Snows of Kilimanjaro,” quipping that he worshipped the rich as a “special
glamorous race.” Fitzgerald had somehow become associated with the dispassionate rich he
mocked in his fiction.
7

Discursive overlaps between social-scientific prose and early twentieth-century creative fiction

suggest that many Midwestern modernists were inventing a kind of “urban planning novel.”
Deviating slightly from traditional realism, novelists like Tarkington, Lewis, and Flandrau
147

showed an unprecedented interest in city layouts, population demographics, and citizens‟
spending habits. On network television today, the NBC series Parks & Recreation has revived
these old themes by mining the topic of Midwestern urban planning for humor.
8

Compare to:
Gatsby believed in the green light, the orgastic future that year by year recedes
before us. It eluded us then, but that‟s no matter—to-morrow we will run faster, stretch
out our arms farther.... And then one fine morning—
So we beat on, boats against the current, borne back ceaselessly into the past.
(Gatsby 180)
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WESTWARD EXPANSION, ECONOMIC CONTRACTION: THE “SEMI-COWBOY”
POLITICS OF FITZGERALD‟S THE LAST TYCOON1
At the end of his short life, after travelling the country and the globe, F. Scott Fitzgerald
settled in Los Angeles to eke out a respectable income as a script doctor so that he could pay for
his wife‟s hospital bills and his daughter‟s college tuition. He continued to write and sell stories,
including tales of regional flavor, like his Civil War romance “The End of Hate” (1940) and his
Hollywood comedy shorts featuring Pat Hobby. But Fitzgerald‟s time in LA is most memorable
for what he did not write—or, at least, what he could not write to conclusion. His unfinished
Hollywood novel, The Last Tycoon, has come to be regarded as one of literature‟s great
fragments. Bolstered by the high regard of critics and its hearty afterlife in popular culture
(including two movie adaptations), it has proven to be as enticingly incomplete as Dickens‟s The
Mystery of Edwin Drood, Nabokov‟s The Original of Laura, and Hemingway‟s The Garden of
Eden.2 From the moment Edmund Wilson published the edited manuscript in 1941, Tycoon
seemed destined to be viewed as evidence of Fitzgerald‟s miraculously untarnished promise.
Indeed, Wilson said as much in his preface, applying an aspirational gloss to the fragmented
work. But in 1993, Matthew J. Bruccoli offered his own “restored” Tycoon, arguing that
Wilson‟s editing had given readers a false sense of coherence and that the manuscript was in fact
far more fractured than the 1941 version implied. Bruccoli broke apart episodes that had been
artificially welded together, undid Wilson‟s odd emendations, and included portions of
Fitzgerald‟s working notes to hint at what might have been. He also expanded the novel‟s title to
The Love of the Last Tycoon: A Western, basing his decision on a surviving title page (reprinted
in the new edition‟s introduction). Readers and reviewers responded positively to Bruccoli‟s
editorial detective work. In a review for the Chicago Tribune, Scott Donaldson lauded his
efforts to “deWilsonize” the text as a “service to the author and to American literature.”
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Publisher’s Weekly praised in particular the restoration of the “ostensible working title, one that
implies that Hollywood is the last American frontier.”
But even if the restored title better reflects Fitzgerald‟s conceptualization of his
unfinished project, it is inarguably unwieldy, its components sagging with potential meaning.
Thus, I devote this chapter to what a single essential part of it—the subtitle, A Western—
signifies about problems of region, genre, and economy in the novel. Besides situating this
“Western” text in dialogue with Fitzgerald‟s extant fictional treatment of regional difference, I
wish to address how the allusion to the Western film genre allies Tycoon with a body of
cinematic work as ideologically conflicted as Fitzgerald‟s own corpus. Because the problematic
subtitle applies a calculated inflection to interpretations of the larger work, it is best regarded as
what French theorist Gerard Genette has termed a “paratext,” a liminal textual space between
work and world (located in dedications, covers, indexes, and the like) that functions as a
“privileged space of pragmatics and strategy, of an influence on the public” (Paratexts 2). These
seemingly extra-textual components irrevocably color the reception of a given work, thereby
forming an interpretive crossroads where the disparate politics of reader and writer meet with the
material and economic existence of the text. Genette reminds us that a seemingly innocuous
subtitle can do additional political work to complement that performed by the text proper.
Bruccoli observed in a note on the title that “Fitzgerald was in fact writing a Western—a
novel about the last American frontier, where immigrants and sons of immigrants pursued and
defined the American dream. It is appropriate that these tycoons made movie Westerns: they too
were pioneers” (Last Tycoon xvii). An early title page refers to the work-in-progress as STAHR:
A Romance, so we recognize the shift in genres as a calculated gesture on Fitzgerald‟s part; it is
the gesture‟s significance that remains contested (xv). Bearing this in mind, I propose to

150

evaluate the “Western” qualities and paratextual elements of Fitzgerald‟s unfinished novel. My
goal is to examine how Tycoon is a Western of sorts, for here genre is not an arbitrary
classification but a producer of socioeconomic meaning. My general argument is that Fitzgerald
invoked the Western film genre—the popularity of which had waxed, waned, and waxed once
more in its forty years of existence—in part to represent the cyclical, Spengler-inspired model of
history discussed in the text and philosophized in his private correspondence. Moreover,
Tycoon‟s ambivalent depiction of the production aspect of American cinema, a division evident
in the book‟s pro-union concern for blue collar laborers involved in the making of films contra
its counterintuitive worship of the moguls and stars who receive primary credit for the finished
products, reflects the complex and contradictory views on labor Fitzgerald held at different
milestones in his life. As such, the generic collision of labor-conscious Western film and
creator-centric great American novel that occurs in Tycoon affords us an excellent opportunity to
examine historical problems of labor and production as they appear in Fitzgerald‟s work.
Towards this end, I will explicate the subtitle‟s invocation of the Western region, the Western
genre, and Western civilization writ large.

Western as Region
The most fundamental act performed by the subtitle A Western is its integration of the
novel within the network of Fitzgerald‟s other observations on region. In a strictly geographical
sense, all of his Hollywood stories and a handful of other tales—Tycoon, the Pat Hobby series,
and “The Diamond as Big as the Ritz” (1922) spring to mind—are literally Westerns by
necessity of their setting, and Fitzgerald was more sensitive to regional differences than many of
his peers, probably because he lived in so many diverse US locales throughout his life.3
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Throughout his writing career, he made a habit of identifying the definitive traits he felt to be
unique to certain regions of the US. A thorough consideration of Fitzgerald‟s work reveals that
he often was more regionalist in his biases than he was racist or sexist, a trait perhaps best
evidenced by one telling remark in “The Crack-Up” (1936) essays: “Like most Middle
Westerners, I have never had any but the vaguest racial prejudices” (The Crack-Up 73). This
odd comment reveals an author more prone to generalize about regions and their inhabitants than
about race, gender, or class. In previous chapters, I have analyzed Fitzgerald‟s philosophical
debts to Adams and Mencken in his conceptualization of climatic determinism in the South and
his citation of nineteenth-century Midwestern regionalism in his celebration of the Midwest as
the geographic embodiment of the American middle class.
In the writings from the end of his life, however, Fitzgerald bent his critical gaze further
west still, to the American West Coast. Fitzgerald‟s California, much like his Georgia, is a place
where temperature adversely affects its inhabitants. But, unlike the melted-in-place people of his
fictional South, these Westerners are nearly all regional transplants. The motion picture industry
draws in people from across the nation and even the world. It sweats their labor out and leaves
them dried in the heat. Fitzgerald describes the process thusly in Tycoon:
There was lassitude in plenty—California was filling up with weary desperadoes.
And these were tense young men and women who lived back East in spirit while
they carried on a losing battle against the climate. But it was everyone‟s secret
that sustained effort was difficult here—a secret that Stahr scarcely admitted to
himself. But he knew that people from other places spurted a pure rill of new
energy for a while. (80)
Like much of Fitzgerald‟s earlier work, then, Tycoon courts the theme of regional difference and
the conflation of temperature and temperament, with special attention paid as usual to the
relationship between labor and climate. Aside from their value in understanding how Fitzgerald
interpreted regional difference and economy, these features must also, in whatever works they
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appear, be regarded as pertaining at least in part to his concern with his own creative output.
Throughout his writing career, Fitzgerald envisioned himself as a laborer as much as an artist,
keenly aware that sales of his potboiler stories allowed him to provide for his family. Nor did his
participation in the Hollywood script assembly line alter his perception of art as a fungible
commodity. His brief career in the film business, despite being profitable, appears to have been
a prolonged experience of professional failure, comprised mostly of rejected scripts and dropped
contracts. He noted his dislike of California‟s “monotonous climate” and the “flat, scentless
tone” of its weather, suggesting that boredom and discontent contributed to his writer‟s block
(Letters 118). Elsewhere, he returns to the relationship of temperament and temperature,
positing that the monotony of the weather creates a bland society in LA. It is, he writes, “a slack
soft place... [where] the sin is to upset anyone else.... Everywhere there is, after a moment, either
corruption or indifference” (429, emphasis in original). In Fitzgerald‟s mind, the climate and
culture of the American West impaired his ability to write, and his comments in Tycoon and in
letters find him resorting to his old theories of regional difference to explain his slowed
production without placing too much emphasis on his alcoholism. His personal reflections on
the intersections of region and labor are significant in two respects: they point to a set of regional
distinctions in Fitzgerald‟s work that help situate Tycoon as a Western novel and they also
remind us in a roundabout fashion that the author viewed his writings as salable products of labor
as much as works of art.
Fitzgerald‟s negative portrayal of the West as an arid region of malaise and discontent
differs considerably from the optimistic treatments churned out by turn-of-the-century
fictionalizers of the open frontier and the cowboys who tamed it. As Michael Kimmel observes
in Manhood in America: A Cultural History, the American West as fictionalized by Owen Wister
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and illustrated by Frederic Remington functioned as a site of masculine renewal, a playground in
which emasculated men might rediscover their animal instincts far away from feminine
influence. A frontiersman in such a region was “free in a free country, embodying republican
virtue and autonomy” (101). But the West of Fitzgerald‟s Hollywood “Western” is no such
place, and only his dashing protagonist Monroe Stahr qualifies as such a man. Besides merely
reflecting Fitzgerald‟s growing dissatisfaction with his work for the studios, this shift in the
depiction of regional qualities may be traced in part to Hollywood‟s growing reputation as a
bastion of anti-capitalistic sentiment (which would in the subsequent decade lead to
investigations by the House Un-American Activities Committee and the blacklisting of
“uncooperative witnesses”). Robert Westbrook, Sheilah Graham‟s son, observes that “the
frankly left-wing politics of Hollywood in the late thirties” must not be omitted from any account
of Fitzgerald‟s last days, for “sex and left-wing ideology was a great deal of what Hollywood in
the thirties was all about” (Intimate Lies 5). The West Coast, the literal end of the American
frontier, came to be regarded by the public and by legislators less as a primordially republican
open space and more as a crowded, left-leaning metropolitan center. In Fitzgerald‟s Western
environment, the cowboys were long gone, the gold rushes over, and the capitalist tycoons
increasingly maligned in an era of stark economic hardship.4 The novel addresses these reevaluations of the West by toying with expected tropes of the Western formula, deploying them
with a sharp critical purpose. By labeling Tycoon a “Western” and contrasting present day
Hollywood with the West‟s mythic frontier past, Fitzgerald analyzes cultural differences between
two significant eras in the history of an American region. But an appreciation of the several
genres colliding in the text is prerequisite for processing the political import of their collision.

154

Western as Genre
The manner in which the novel‟s subtitle invokes the Western genre impels the reader to
approach the text under the influence of the generic sensibilities attending cowboy narratives.
As John Frow reminds us, “Genre guides interpretation because it is a constraint on semiosis,”
and it also “defines a set of expectations which guide our engagement with texts” (Genre 101,
104). Nevertheless, one of the most puzzling aspects of The Last Tycoon‟s subtitle is that little
strictly related to the Western genre of film and literature takes place within the novel. If we
seek in Tycoon the obvious tropes of frontier masculinity and violent justice that tend to shape
classic Westerns, we will be sorely disappointed. Only one cowboy, the out-of-work character
actor Johnny Swanson, appears in the surviving text, standing “on the corner in his semi-cowboy
clothes staring gloomily past the moon” at the beginning of Episode 4 (21). As such, the
Western qualities of Fitzgerald‟s final work can best be appreciated through analyses of
understated or “semi-cowboy” elements. This entails, first, a brief examination of the gender
trouble sketched in outline by taunting omissions that refer to the Western cowboy even as they
perpetually defer his representation and, second, a longer consideration of how Fitzgerald
appropriates the subtexts of politics and economy that have historically permeated Western
narratives.
If a fascination with the hyper-masculine cowboy figure recurs in Fitzgerald‟s late work,
it may be traced in part to his long-standing friendship with fellow Princetonian Sap Donahoe,
whom Fitzgerald refers to in The Crack-Up as his moral conscience (Crack-Up 79). In the
summer of 1915, the aspiring writer spent some time with Donahoe‟s family on their Montana
ranch. A photo from the vacation shows a dust-flecked Fitzgerald improbably decked out in
rancher clothes (Meyers 24). Fitzgerald‟s experience working alongside ranch-hands and joining
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in their poker games appears in retrospect an absurd outlier in his biography, as far removed
from the nervous revelry of his Jazz Age existence as his eventual exile in Hollywood. From this
biographical perspective, the elision of cowboys from Fitzgerald‟s self-described “Western”
novel can be regarded as a comment on masculinity in the modern era; that the idealized
cowboy‟s rugged individualism is ephemeral and outmoded in the face of late capitalism is
represented by his absence in thought and action. In this updated Western, what we find instead
of frontiersmen engaged in manly, honest work are emasculated city dwellers skittering from
paycheck to paycheck, cowering in the shadow of an encroaching war. Tycoon measures the
male-dominated frontier fantasy of the Hollywood Western against the genuinely emasculated
America of the Great Depression, which Kimmel describes as a country of men in search of
news ways to express and validate their masculinity.
But one must bear in mind that the Depression-era Western revival had barely begun
when Fitzgerald began working on Tycoon. And Irving Thalberg, the actual producer in whose
image Monroe Stahr was modeled, made movies at a time when Westerns were in many respects
unpopular, so he did little work within the genre.5 He died in 1936, three years before films like
John Ford‟s Stagecoach revived studio and public interest in the big-budget Western. Richard
Slotkin observes in Gunfighter Nation, his lengthy study on the Western genre‟s impact on
American culture, that the state of the filmic Western during the mid-1930s was rather
unenviable. Though the form had enjoyed wild popularity during the silent and early talkie eras,
shifts in taste and public perception led to halt of studio interest in A-grade Westerns. The
cowboy films of the thirties were typically B-movies, cheap distractions that took up space on a
double feature, or musical Westerns, designed to take advantage of developments in cinematic
technology. Noting that in the US the Great Depression coincided with a drought in prestige

156

Western films, Slotkin posits that the bitter realities of economic hardship led politicians as well
as movie audiences to reevaluate the significance of the frontier and even to see in its closure a
metaphor for the decline of expansionist capitalism. The Westerns of the Progressive Era had
dealt with continental imperialism and resource acquisition in a celebration of American
ingenuity and industry, reflecting a hope that the closed frontiers of Frederick Jackson Turner‟s
thesis might be figuratively reopened in the sense of capitalist economic growth. This mood,
however, did not accord with the dire straits of the Depression. Slotkin quotes from one of
FDR‟s radio addresses to illustrate how the significance of the frontier had changed. In 1932,
FDR lamented that “our last frontier has long since been reached,” and he dissuaded the public
from taking hope in imperialist conquest or “exploitation of natural resources” by encouraging a
new interest in “distributing wealth and products equitably” (256-57). The coincidence of these
political reassessments of the American frontier coupled with the resurgence of Western films
near the end of the thirties suggests the genre‟s decade-long slump was accompanied by serious
soul-searching on behalf of filmmakers and audiences to determine the present value of the
frontier in fiction and on screen. Beset from without by the ideological challenges of
communism and fascism, disempowered from within by the economic entropy of the Depression,
American capitalism came to be seen in some intellectual circles as an analogue for the
exhausted frontier: in decline, reaching its logical conclusion, indicative of an era‟s end. The
Western films that followed this recognition in the subsequent revival possessed a keener
political awareness than their predecessors.
Fitzgerald himself lived long enough to bear witness to the birth of the Western film (in
1902) and its eventual rebirth (in 1939). It is therefore suggestive that Fitzgerald began working
on Tycoon, his own “Western,” the very year the genre began to stage its intellectual comeback.
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Frances Kroll, Fitzgerald‟s personal secretary, recalls in her memoir that Fitzgerald gave her his
preview passes for Destry Rides Again (1939), a Jimmy Stewart film that helped spearhead the
Western revival (Against the Current 74).6 Cowboys were in vogue once more in the Hollywood
that Fitzgerald sought to capture in a novel. The resurgence of the genre seems to have provided
the author with some degree of inspiration, in spite of the fact that his personal interest in
cowboy movies was minimal. In a 1939 letter to an MGM story editor, Fitzgerald even alludes
to characters from Stagecoach as he outlines his own script ideas (Letters 597). Moreover, the
scandalous Hollywood subject matter, the provocative Western allusions, and the subversive
political subtexts gave his novel a new way to appeal to the public, with whom Fitzgerald had
largely fallen out of favor in the 1930s. Cash-strapped consumers had little desire to read about
the Jazz Age exploits of flappers and philosophers, but they might deign to read about labor
conflicts, displaced cowboys, and the Hollywood elite. Despite its temporary lull in box office
popularity, the Western film and the American frontier it projected retained a certain
sociopolitical cache. In a subsequent portion of this chapter section, I will address the genre‟s
long-running engagement with the conflict between labor and capital, but there are some
superficial matters that bear mentioning even if they are difficult to miss. The foremost of these
is the visual corollary between the arid wastelands used as settings in countless Western films
and the barren prairies of the Depression-era dustbowl. It is no coincidence that the publication
of Steinbeck‟s The Grapes of Wrath (1939) occurred in tandem with the Western revival, for the
book‟s direct treatment of the subject matter is loosely reflected in the aesthetic impact of John
Ford‟s desolate landscapes. Ford would later direct the film adaptation of Steinbeck‟s novel. In
general, the desperation of frontier life as captured on screen shares discomfiting similarities
with hand-to-mouth subsistence in the Depression.
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Fitzgerald almost certainly recognized these surface connections as he endeavored to
complete his novel about Hollywood in a time of political and economic crisis. And he was in
fine company, for Nathanael West likewise made provocative connections between Western
films and the Depression in The Day of the Locust (1939).7 The novel primarily concerns the
sordid experiences of Tod Hackett, a Hollywood set designer who wishes to paint a Breughelesque landscape of LA ablaze as its denizens go about their seedy business. Like The Last
Tycoon, then, Locust portrays Hollywood as cultural apocalypse: the city at the end of Western
civilization. Also like Tycoon, West‟s Locust embraces both the frontier history of California
and the present state of the Western film genre as tools for expressing its vision of political
apocalypse. Despair and disappointment abound in the California of Locust, which West
portrays as the final frontier of American hedonism, a place pleasure-seekers retreat to after
realizing that their vulgar lives in the East and the North are nothing like the movies. But, West
writes, these transplants soon realize that the cultivated West is nothing like the movies; they feel
“cheated and betrayed,” having “slaved and saved for nothing” (178). This is a new manner of
Manifest Destiny, a philosophy of boundless entitlement to pleasure as payment for participating
in the grimy humiliations of American capitalism. It is instructive to consider that one of the
mock films West places in the text is a Western which bears the loaded title of that imperialist
imperative. Tod reflects in the novel that there is a real possibility of riot in response to such
profound disillusion—not in California alone but across the “whole country” (118).
Fitzgerald and West‟s citation of the Western film draws on its historical engagement of
domestic economic matters, for the Western movie genre has dealt with issues of labor and
production ever since its inception. The Selig Company‟s 1904 Western feature A Lynching at
Cripple Creek was a financial success primarily because it happened to be filmed near the site of
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two violent labor disputes between miners and mine bosses; Selig linked the film to the violence
as a publicity stunt (Smith 22-24). Moreover, the book that inspired the entire Western genre,
Owen Wister‟s The Virginian, ruminates seriously upon frontier justice as doled out by powerful
ranchers upon those who trespass against them. Wister‟s text takes the side of the ranchers, even
though they lynch cattle thieves against the laws of the land. But even Wister himself came to
acknowledge the inherently ambivalent politics of the genre he fathered. In his “Rededication
and Preface” to the 1911 edition of The Virginian, he describes the book as an attack on the
“many enemies” of American democracy, setting his sights on two threats from different ends of
the economic spectrum: the politicized proletariat of the labor unions and the smug bourgeoisie
of Wall Street (5). Patrick McGee argues that this novel, as the foundation of the entire Western
genre, has defined the political divide of cowboy cinema, with some capitalist-friendly films
siding with political authority or big business and other left-leaning movies sympathizing with
outlaws and laborers. For McGee, the Hollywood cowboy thus comes to represent “the subject
under capital, whether it identifies with or against that social force” (243). The figure is
inherently embedded within the structures of capitalism, but in various works he may resist or
comply with his situation.
We see in Fitzgerald‟s take on the American film industry both a labor-oriented
appreciation of production and a consumerist‟s reification of the end product. Tycoon evinces a
genuine respect for the blue collar crew that builds a movie from the ground up—the workers
Fitzgerald‟s friend Bud Schulberg would later lionize as “Hollywood‟s exclusive proletariat...
whose hands literally make pictures (The Disenchanted 5, emphasis in original). But
Fitzgerald‟s novel occasionally indulges in the fantasy that a given film springs to life
spontaneously by the glamorous interaction of actors, directors, and producers. The latter of
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these two incompatible visions reflects the movie-going public‟s obsession with the celebrity
component of cinema; an individual film often comes to be associated with its “tycoon” or great
man, while the nameless multitudes who contributed significantly to its production are relegated
to the credit reel, appreciated by few. When one considers the recurring theme of labor in
Tycoon, one sees that its connections to the Western genre have less to do with the stereotypical
trappings of the form and more with its economic significations. In his notes for Tycoon,
Fitzgerald wrote that he wanted Stahr‟s studio to be marked by an “optimism only equalled [sic]
by that of the River Rouge plant in its great days” (Tycoon 156). He alludes here to the Ford
Motor Company plant in Dearborn, Michigan, which produced vehicles for the US in World War
I but was in 1937 the site of a violent union-busting. Stahr, like Henry Ford, is distrustful of
unions and Marxists; he rants against the Directors‟ Guild and then attempts to fistfight a
Communist agitator named Brimmer (the name suggests political anxiety “brimming” over) in
Episode 17 (127-29). But even Brimmer finds Stahr somewhat appealing, giving him mixed
praise as a “paternalistic employer” in light of Stahr‟s admission that he sometimes views his
workers as his own property (126). In Fitzgerald‟s surviving plans for the novel (made available
in Bruccoli‟s 1993 edition of Tycoon), we see that it is Stahr‟s partner Brady who would actually
have been the union buster. An outlined episode describes him firing many studio employees
and cutting the pay of others as a threat to Hollywood‟s various guilds and unions (181-82).
In his economic desires, Stahr is as divided an individual character as the Hollywood
cowboy is in abstract. Born into poverty in New York, Stahr has since become a rich, powerful
man; now, his blue collar roots struggle against his present wealth. Kroll, Fitzgerald‟s Tycoonera confidant, remarks that by authorial design Stahr‟s central problem with leftist economics is
that he falsely believes any hardworking American should be able to replicate his own Alger-
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esque climb to success (140). He takes Marxist criticism of capitalist economics personally
because it suggests that his meteoric rise was precipitated as much by blind chance as skilled
determination. Though Stahr is by necessity a “subject under capital” and by birth child of
poverty, pride in his particular talents prevents him from rejecting capitalism as a flawed
economic system.
This particular ambivalence is no less problematic than Fitzgerald‟s own relationship
with American capitalism as evidenced by his life and works. Indeed, one of the most
provocative aspects of his final novel‟s connection to the Western genre is that it continues to
illustrate, via a filmic metaphor, the dialectic between capitalism and socialism that had dogged
Fitzgerald‟s work since the composition of his first novel, This Side of Paradise (1920). In
Paradise, Fitzgerald‟s fictional stand-in Amory Blaine spends the last pages of the novel
debating economics and politics with a wealthy capitalist named Ferrenby. The scene is best
read as a prototype of Tycoon‟s conflict between Stahr and the Marxist. Here, Blaine spars with
the businessman over corporate influence on the media and the exploitation of workers.
Paraphrasing Marx on surplus value, Blaine complains, “The root of all the business I saw
around me consisted in overworking and underpaying a bunch of dubs who submitted to it”
(294). He then advances his theory of a socialist government which would invite tycoons like
Clarence Mackay and J.P. Morgan to actively participate in government while simultaneously
capping the incomes of the wealthy. Per Blaine‟s utopian vision, powerful men would jockey for
honor and fame instead of hoarding wealth and impoverishing their laborers. But near the end of
his diatribe he acknowledges his personal stake in social change: “A social revolution might land
me on top. Of course I‟m selfish” (302). Blaine identifies himself with the capitalist, whose
companionship and cigars he has been enjoying all along. Fitzgerald was drawn to the
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accoutrements of capitalism as much as he was repelled by them. His fictions are celebrations of
moneyed leisure as much as they are criticisms of it. And though his early works give lip service
to socialism, they more commonly praise the capitalistic industriousness of the self-interested
egotist plying his trade with eventual success on the open market. Alternately rich and poor
throughout his life, Fitzgerald occupied several different positions as a “subject under capital”—
from student socialist sympathizer to largely apolitical nouveau riche to radicalized Hollywood
left-winger who considered sending his daughter on an “economically organized tour” of Russia
in 1939 (Letters 56)—so he plainly found it difficult to let his sympathies reside wholly with one
party in the dialectic. Tycoon, then, is valuable as a testament to Fitzgerald‟s socioeconomic
sensibilities at the close of his life. It serves as endgame for the dialectical deadlock of
alternating radicalism and conservatism that in some ways defined his work.
The Western genre to which the novel pays subtle homage provides a resilient framework
for supporting such divided sympathies, since the works within its canon have historically
evinced a similar political ambivalence, siding alternatively with the capitalist and communist
sides of the dialectic—or, as Slotkin has defined the ideological conflict, flirting with both
“progressive” industrial and “populist” agrarian sentiments (23). In Tycoon, the cutthroat
capitalist Brady is a thematic descendant of Wister‟s lawless cattle baron, a representation of the
moneyed impunity facilitated by progressive capitalism. Fitzgerald‟s novel stops short of
sympathizing with Brady in the way that The Virginian sides with its lynch mob ranchers;
instead, the narrator Cecilia shows equal concern for Stahr, the “good” capitalist, and Brimmer,
the radical Communist. I find that the novel strives to achieve an ideological synthesis by
circumnavigating the extremes of the dialectic. Slotkin points out that a Western narrative may
fluctuate between progressive and populist sympathies without contradiction, and the same may
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be said of Fitzgerald‟s “Western” as it searches for a compromise between bourgeois ingenuity
and the demands of labor. Forecasting the end of Western capitalism—a cataclysm that was
averted, despite the author‟s worst fears—the book begins to imagine a new hybridized political
structure that marries socialist government with entrepreneurial innovation. The operative
metaphor here is Stahr‟s film studio (sans the influence of Brady) as social collective: an order in
which group administrative oversight reigns supreme but individual talent seldom escapes notice
or reward. In the next section, I will turn my attention to the grand political upheaval Fitzgerald
predicted would prefigure such a political reconciliation.

Western as Civilization
Late in the novel, as Stahr‟s romantic interest Kathleen reveals some details about her
former lover, she mentions that he educated her in history and the arts so that she would be able
to understand the works of historian Oswald Spengler. At the anecdote‟s conclusion, she
abandons him before he begins her informal course on Spengler. The narrative ceases all
discussion of Spengler at this point with the allusion dangling in midair, rife with unrealized
potential, its meaning suspended and deferred like the book‟s strange subtitle. A link plainly
exists between Spengler and the “Western” subtitle, since the historian authored his own text on
the global West: the controversial two-volume analysis of civilizations in flux entitled The
Decline of the West (originally published in 1918, translated and revised throughout the 1920s).
Kathleen‟s brief mention of Spengler points to Fitzgerald‟s personal fascination with the
theorist‟s cyclical model of civilization, and it offers us yet another reading of Tycoon as a
Western.8 Spengler‟s Decline argues that all civilizations must die, and the death process begins
when a productive culture crystallizes into a stagnant civilization. Spengler carefully
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distinguishes between these two terms, using “culture” to signify a living, thriving body of
people and “civilization” to connote the decadent “fulfillment [and] finale of a culture” (1.31).
As a culture careens downs its moribund spiral towards full-blown civilization, the symbols and
ideas that had previously given it definition become so rigid that they can no longer
accommodate the creation of new meaning. Skepticism erodes long-held values. Wars increase
in frequency and cities grow overpopulated. Eventually, visionaries within the declining
civilization begin to imagine and promulgate a new cultural paradigm, which will become the
defining image of the emergent culture.
In the case of Western civilization, Spengler writes that the once-dominant, nowdeclining cultural metaphor is that of infinite space. In contradiction to the various economic,
religious, geographic, and social ideas of infinity which govern Western civilization (such as the
capitalist doctrine of infinite market expansion, the American pursuit of the Western frontier, or
Christian faith in the unending afterlife), Spengler redefines the dying culture in terms of its
finite limitations:
The future of the West is not a limitless tending upwards and onwards for all time
towards our present ideals, but a single phenomenon of history, strictly limited
and defined as to form and duration, which covers a few centuries and can be
viewed and, in essentials, calculated from available precedents. (1.39)
One sees the death of this concept crop up in Fitzgerald‟s writings from The Great Gatsby (1925)
on, for it is in that phase of his career that the author likely began to fall under Spengler‟s sway.
Gatsby ends with a seemingly Spenglerian gesture, contrasting the limitless potential of unsettled
New York‟s “fresh, green breast” with the cluttered modern settlement the region would become.
The dream of infinite space and new frontiers dies as culture civilizes itself, so when the narrator
concludes what has been a “story of the West,” the novel‟s historical turn assures us that Western
civilization is in mind as much as the Midwestern region of the US (Gatbsy 180, 176). After
165

Gatsby, Fitzgerald identified himself as a Spenglerian in interviews—one of which was tellingly
titled “Fitzgerald, Spenglerian” (Conversations 86)—and much of his subsequent work shows
the influence of Spengler. Kermit Moyer has singled out Tycoon in particular as a novel about
“the decline of the West” (“Two Unfinished Novels” 242).
It is worth noting as well that the Western genre comes with its own tacitly Spenglerian
associations. Western films routinely address the end of the frontier and the limits of westward
expansion, thereby assessing the decline of infinite space as a viable cultural metaphor. Wheeler
Winston Dixon refers to this tone as “elegiac” in its yearning for a “time now irrecoverably lost,”
citing it as a stylistic link between the novels of Scott Fitzgerald and the films of John Ford
(Cinematic Vision 83). The Western genre‟s treatment of cultural change also situates it in
dialogue with Spengler‟s philosophy. It is possibly in light of this linkage that Fitzgerald chose
to ally his novel with the Hollywood Western. The ending of Gatsby demonstrates the author‟s
tendency to pun on the myriad significance of the “west,” and in the filmic Western he struck
upon a form receptive both to Spenglerian thought and his own brand of wordplay. Moreover,
the transition of the novel‟s title from STAHR: A Romance to The Love of the Last Tycoon: A
Western indicates that the project is less “romantic” (either in the medieval sense of chivalric
heroism or in the Hawthornian sense of expanded possibilities) than “Western” in its treatment of
frontiers, borders, anti-heroes, and end times. Because Fitzgerald had previously applied the
subtitle A Romance to the largely unromantic Tender is the Night (1934), we know also that he
was perfectly willing to plant his subtitles ironically when the project at hand called for it. In
opting to mark Tycoon a “Western” instead of a “Romance,” he distanced his new manuscript
from his recent semi-flop while still going in for a half-ironic title: a Western in which there are
no cowboys. Yet, surface ironies aside, there were real connections between the Western

166

format‟s dire apocalyptic overtones and the present political context—connections that evaded
neither Fitzgerald nor his literary peers.
For another example of a Hollywood novel in which Western civilization and Western
films are provocatively conflated, we may turn once more to Nathanael West‟s The Day of the
Locust. Much as Fitzgerald plays with Western tropes to contribute to his portrayal of imminent
political crisis, West uses a cowboy character in his own work to function as a troubling sign of
the times. His animalistic Earle Shoop is an authentic cowboy, a genuine article from Arizona,
but in Hollywood he merits only bit roles in B-grade “horse operas” (108). Semi-homeless,
Shoop camps outdoors with his fellow cowboy transients; he is so poor that he must hunt for his
food. Underemployed, uncultured, violent, and unchecked in his sexual impulses, Shoop plainly
illustrates how the economic debasement of a person can result in his dehumanization. If this is
the future of masculinity as enabled by the deprivations of the Depression, it is not a pretty sight.
Shoop‟s plight bears some resemblance to that of the unemployed Western actor Johnny
Swanson in The Last Tycoon, whose way of life as an actor in silent features has come under
attack by changes in the means of cinematic production. Both cowboys are victims of what their
creators depict as economic catastrophe. The presence of these down-and-out Westerners in
their respective texts suggests a great deal about the role of the Western in the midcentury
Hollywood novel, namely that the comparatively shabby Westerns of the Depression had fallen
from grace much as the American economy had and, prior to their revival as prestige features,
embodied the hackneyed dead end of a once-popular cinematic form. I think it is ultimately
these economic and cultural aspects of the genre that both Fitzgerald and West have in mind
when invoking Western film tropes in their novels of Depression-era Hollywood. Their readers,
many of whom had witnessed the genre devolve from the novelty of the early silent Westerns to

167

the pulpy singing cowboy films of the 1930s, would have recognized that the form being alluded
to had experienced its own manner of decline.
Other echoes of Spengler‟s Decline resound throughout the unfinished text of Tycoon,
encouraging readers to see in Fitzgerald‟s depiction of the Depression-era West Coast shades of
Western civilization writ large. Spengler‟s analysis of rural-to-urban migration prefigures
Fitzgerald‟s critique of the Hollywood labor system in Tycoon. The writer‟s portrayal of Los
Angeles as a consumptive colony comprised of “weary desperadoes... who lived back East in
spirit while they carried on a losing battle against the climate” (Tycoon 80) calls to mind the
historian‟s description of the paradigmatic urban center as a “giant city [that] sucks the country
dry, insatiably and incessantly devouring fresh streams of men, till it wearies and dies in the
midst of an almost uninhabited waste of country” (2.102). Through the Spenglerian lens, Los
Angeles serves as the setting of Fitzgerald‟s Tycoon not only because it is inextricable from the
modern film industry but also because it represents the end of American history and economy.
Here, workers in the movie business have become utterly commodified, used up, and burned
out— exploited embodiments of the labor anxieties attending the Great Depression.
The economic turbulence of the novel‟s historical setting, coupled with the encroaching
war against the Nazis, lends its apocalyptic Spenglerian undertones some degree of credence.
Westbrook shares in Intimate Lies Sheilah Graham‟s recollection of Fitzgerald‟s vision: “Scott
wanted to portray Monroe Stahr as the best and (as it looked in 1940) probably the last example
of capitalism—the last tycoon, in fact, an individual who swims against the stream of the new
collective” (434). Outside the novel, Fitzgerald‟s letters from the last two years of his life reveal
that he did indeed believe the world was headed towards a political apocalypse resulting from the
collision of three wholly incompatible sociopolitical forces: American-style capitalism, German
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National Socialism, and Soviet communism. And though the author greatly admired Marx and
agreed with the philosophical precepts of communism, he abhorred the idea held by some party
members that they might “milk Marxism out of Hitler‟s sterile teats” (Letters 77)—that Fascist
victory in the war might eventually lead to real socialist revolution in the United States. Tycoon
bears the stress of all these anxieties, condensing them into a historical narrative inflected by
Spengler‟s philosophy. Thus what the novel captures in its plot and characters is no less than the
discourse on the end of Western civilization as the author presumes to know it. The titular
assertion that Stahr is the “last tycoon” casts him as the final issue of a capitalist system hell-bent
on making celebrities of its captains of industry, its barons, its moguls, its great men. Stahr‟s
death signals the definite decline of the Alger myth and the possible ascent of something
drastically new.
As indicated by the notes collected in Bruccoli‟s 1993 edition of the text, the epilogue
planned for the novel would have turned Stahr‟s death into a homily of sorts for the purpose of
addressing political and economic futures. Three children would scavenge the wreck of Stahr‟s
plane, each salvaging an item from the deceased Hollywood elite inside. Fitzgerald‟s 1939
summary provided to Kenneth Littauer mentions that a young girl would seize the possessions of
an actress, a boy would take items from a disreputable producer, and another boy would happen
upon Stahr‟s suitcase. In a later synopsis, Fitzgerald expands upon their personalities and names
the children Frances, Dan, and Jim. Dan, he writes, would be a child corollary of the ruthless
Brady, while Jim would inherit the balanced eagerness and scruples of Stahr. As in the biblical
parable of the talents, Dan would squander his inheritance, though Jim would make good on his
and at least have the sense to go to the police (lxiii-lxv).
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Obviously no mere cautionary tale for children, the episode functions as a comment on
the potential legacy of American capitalism following its presumed post-Depression dissolution.
The working notes and anecdotal evidence suggest that Fitzgerald sought to pose a provocative
question: What will future generations make of the moral inheritance left by men like Stahr, who
embody the tireless work ethic and artisanal pride of idealized capitalism? True to the novel‟s
larger project, this inquiry is Spenglerian in nature, for it seeks to understand the consequences
of a dissolved cultural paradigm. Tycoon ponders, with a fatalistic post-dated nostalgia, the role
of capitalism in the West after the economic crash, communism, and Hitler. Its argument
follows what FDR‟s financial advisor James P. Warburg would soon posit in his WWII-era
propagandistic treatise on diplomacy, Foreign Policy Begins at Home (1944): that “ [r]unaway
capitalism is the half-way house to fascist slavery” (viii). Yet Fitzgerald‟s novel also shares
Warburg‟s ambivalent response to socialism, which the propagandist regarded as “an escape
from, rather than a solution to, the basic problem of modern society,” for it assigns the means of
production to an abstract state apparatus and not to gifted entrepreneurs (like Stahr) who,
according to national myth, once made America great.9
Though the novel proper functions in large part as an obituary for capitalism‟s “last
tycoon,” its projected epilogue performs the odd gesture of resituating capitalism at the center of
the narrative, offering a parable not about what will replace the dying economic system but
instead about how it will evolve into something drastically different—a subtle but important
inflection that has its roots in Spengler‟s concern for the death and rebirth of culture. Spengler
aside, however, Fitzgerald‟s heroic treatment of Stahr and attention to his legacy suggests a
preference for capitalism, despite the author‟s socialist sympathies (decried as dilettantism by
some of his contemporaries). As Moyer and other critics have noted, one does not typically find
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in Fitzgerald‟s work radical desire for drastic socioeconomic change but instead nostalgia for the
bygone era of the self-made man, the mythologized Ben Franklin type faintly echoed in Monroe
Stahr. Thus in a novel that chastises American capitalism for producing monsters like Brady,
one hears, in lieu of a call for revolution, a lament sent up for the disappearance of beneficent
capitalists like Stahr, men who spur progress on and are producers in every sense of the word.
Evincing admiration for great capitalists who, in the manner of Gatsby, owe their greatest
debt to a platonic conception of self-creation, Fitzgerald turns to the cyclical popularity of the
Hollywood Western to express the desire that tycoons, like cowboys, might make a comeback.
The “Western” subtitle that frames the novel as paratext hints at nostalgia for an idealized
capitalist order and hope that its sociopolitical legacy might help Western civilization to endure
in recognizable form following the upcoming turmoil of the inevitable war. The uniquely
American form of the Western film had proven in Fitzgerald‟s time to be resilient, surviving a
shift in public taste that left the Western unmarketable and therefore virtually unproduced for
two decades. When the Hollywood Western flourished once more in the late 1930s, its
representative films were considerably different from the silent cowboy features from earlier in
the century, but the trappings of the genre remained intact. Tycoon‟s subtitle, linking as it does
the Western film with Western civilization, counters the latter‟s decline with the former‟s
resurgence, offering hope that the global West might rebound in the manner of its filmic
corollary. In Fitzgerald‟s notes for the novel, we see that he planned to have the cowboy actor
Johnny Swanson find work at the end of Tycoon after the character is mistakenly asked to be a
pallbearer at Stahr‟s funeral (Tycoon lxiv). Like the book‟s projected epilogue, Swanson‟s reemployment draws attention to the producer‟s legacy and, by connection, the legacy of American
capitalism. Here the explicit connection to the contemporary Western film revival colludes with

171

Fitzgerald‟s use of symbolic names (Swanson‟s last cowboy feature proves to have not been his
“swansong”) to suggest themes of rebirth and renewal even in the face of apparent death and
decay. In the larger sense of the novel‟s political vision, these themes are directed towards the
besieged American capitalism embodied by Monroe Stahr. The fallen Stahr looms large as the
specter of capitalism, a beacon of liberty and endurance in an era of great social upheaval for the
West. In pitting Stahr‟s benevolent mastery of capital against the threat of fascism, Fitzgerald
sketches an economic thesis that Warburg would later flesh out in detail: that fascism is “the
ultimate perversion of capitalism,” because it “carries out to the nth power capitalism‟s most
outstanding weaknesses as a social system, namely, its tendency to over-concentrate power,
privilege, and prerogative in the hands of the few at the expense of the many” (Foreign Policy
19-20).
Fitzgerald was onto something in linking the resurgent Western genre to the future of
capitalism after WWII, for the revival led by filmmakers like John Ford and Howard Hawks
made possible a reinvigorated conservative take on the American West, even if Ford‟s own films
were skeptical about the ethics of westward expansion in history. The subsequent Western boom
advanced the careers of conservative icons Ronald Reagan and John Wayne, figures whose right
wing stances on American exceptionalism and capitalist supremacy would stand in sharp contrast
to the semi-socialist politics of Fitzgerald and his fellow Hollywood chronicler Nathaniel West.
Their own left-leaning re-toolings of the Western genre refer to an obscure moment in the history
of Western cinema—a shabby time between the popular silent Westerns and those of the
revival—and therefore rightly seem at odds with the popular understanding of pre-revisionist
Westerns. For a long time after, the cowboy politics of men like Reagan and Wayne would place
limitations on what the West and the Western film could signify in political discourse, but these
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Depression-era Hollywood novels speak from a time when dramatic shifts in economic stability
and public taste permitted a radically different reading of the on-screen frontier. Fitzgerald
regarded the survival of modern American capitalism as unlikely, but the Cold War
conservatives who outlived him regarded its subsequent endurance as a mandate. The ten gallon
hat aesthetic that thereafter permeated American politics suggested a new kind of manifest
destiny, one that would entail a foreign policy evangelism of freedom and capitalism—which the
following chapter will argue was partially prefigured by interwar American “colonies” abroad.

Notes
1

This chapter is adapted from an essay that appeared previously in The F. Scott Fitzgerald

Review. It appears here with the permission of Wiley Periodicals, Inc., publisher of The F. Scott
Fitzgerald Review. See appendix for notice of permission.
2

Dickens published installments of the unfinished novel serially throughout 1870. Nabokov

worked on The Original of Laura in 1977. Knopf published an elaborate reproduction of the
manuscript in 2009. Hemingway wrote The Garden of Eden from 1946 through 1958; a heavily
edited version of the still-incomplete text was published by Scribner‟s in 1986.
3

In “„The Diamond‟ and the Declining West,” Ronald Berman makes a compelling case for

connections between the Western setting of “The Diamond as Big as The Ritz” and the
apocalyptic political philosophy of Oswald Spengler. I devote a later section of this chapter to
similar connections between Tycoon‟s Western traits and Fitzgerald‟s well-documented devotion
to Spengler‟s theories.
4

This was due in large part to the influence of men like Walter Wanger, the socially conscious

movie producer who encouraged leftist intellectuals to use the film medium to “reach the people
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whom the liberal needs to convert” (“Hollywood and the Intellectuals” 40). Wanger‟s hand is
apparent in the tentatively anti-capitalist politics of Stagecoach, which he produced.
5

Biographer Mark Vieira relates a story in which Thalberg commissioned a writer to script “an

old-fashioned Western” for actor Wallace Beery, but she instead followed her own muse and
wrote The Champ, which premiered in 1931 (Boy Wonder 142-43). The anecdote suggests that
filmmakers of the era were less eager than before to embrace the pulpy connotations of the
genre.
6

Jimmy Stewart was around this time having an affair with Norma Shearer, Thalberg‟s widow.

Stewart biographer Lawrence Quirk writes that Shearer fell for the actor after seeing him in
cowboy attire at a 1938 costume party (Behind the Scenes 94). It‟s unclear whether Fitzgerald,
who was planning his own “Western” loosely based on Thalberg‟s legacy, knew about this
romance between the star of Universal‟s new cowboy feature and the widow of Hollywood‟s
“boy wonder” producer.
7

Predating works by West and Fitzgerald, Horace McCoy‟s 1935 They Shoot Horses, Don’t

They? makes an implicit connection between the new Hollywood novel genre and
Western/frontier tropes. Several characters in the novel have farm or ranch backgrounds, and the
title itself alludes to the practice of putting crippled horses out of their misery. As the story
opens, McCoy‟s protagonist is on trial for shooting a failed actress at her request.
8

There is considerable critical disagreement about when Fitzgerald began to consume Spengler

firsthand instead of receiving his theories secondhand via the intellectual ether of his cultural
context. James H. Meredith observes that though Fitzgerald claimed to have read Spengler in
1924, the text was not readily available in English until 1926 (“Fitzgerald and War” 201). André
Le Vot‟s biography of Fitzgerald suggests that Spengler‟s theories, as advocated in volume one
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of Decline, became influential at Princeton a year or two after the author left the school; thus
through interaction with alumni and current students, Fitzgerald may have encountered
Spenglerian philosophy almost a decade before the publication of the first major English
translation (37). And in “„The Diamond‟ and the Declining West,” Ronald Berman notes the
apparent influence of Spengler on the Fitzgerald‟s mid-1920s writing without fretting too much
over how it got there. In a spate of 1927 interviews, Fitzgerald says he finished reading the work
in full that year, but doubtless he would have already been exposed to the ideas (In His Own
Time 271-77).
9

Like Fitzgerald, Warburg was interested in the “unresolved conflict between two contradictory

elements” of Western civilization. He wrote in Foreign Policy Begins at Home, “[F]rom an
ethical and religious point of view, Western civilization believes in justice and equality. On the
other hand, in our practical life—that is, our economic system—we believe in „free enterprise,‟
which is the doctrine of survival of the fittest” (22).
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THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION OF THE PARIS CAFÉ: EXPATRIATE AUTHORS,
COCKTAIL CULTURE, AND TRANSNATIONAL NATIONALISM
“He disliked bars and bodegas. A clean, well-lighted café was a very different thing.”
-Ernest Hemingway, “A Clean, Well-Lighted Place” (1926)
“The whole difference between the pre-war spirit and the post-war spirit is somehow summed up
in the difference between the pre-war café and the post-war bar.”
-Sisley Huddleston, Paris Salons, Cafes, Studios: Being Social, Artistic and Literary Memories
(1928)
In my four previous chapters, I argued that interwar American literature produced a
complex regional imaginary onto which were projected deterministic genetic fantasies, anxieties
about Oriental others, concern for the middle class‟s drift to the political right, and reassessments
of free-market capitalism. What I have sought to demonstrate, using F. Scott Fitzgerald‟s life as
a touchstone and his works as a cultural index, is that during the twenties and thirties when
isolationist political philosophies dominated the US scene, the literary discourse on region
expanded to address not only American place but also America‟s place in the modernizing global
community. I have employed Fitzgerald as a focusing lens for this project for a variety of
reasons: he lived all around the country and endeavored to write both national and regional
fictions; his parabolic career neatly followed the nation‟s own Boom and Bust; his camaraderie
with other modernist authors embedded him within a literary network that spanned the country;
and his considerable time in Europe broadened his perspective on domestic matters.
Yet I have, with a few exceptions, elided mention of overlap between expatriate and
regional fictions in Fitzgerald‟s oeuvre as well as in the modernist canon. Here, I seek to remedy
that elision by analyzing impositions of American place in Paris between the World Wars. In
some ways, this approach detours drastically from what has come before. I have transferred the
discussion of American place away from American soil, and the previous chapters‟ emphasis on
regions and regionalisms is herein reduced. But this final chapter is ultimately essential to the
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volume, for it addresses the interwar commercialization and exportation of US cultural products
that evoke American place. In doing so, it provides a glimpse at the meaning and mutation of
American geography in a foreign context. Specifically, the space of the American bar and the
concept of the American cocktail accrued nationalistic significance in France, and Paris‟s
“American colony” proved to be an imagined geography as much as an imagined community.
Fitzgerald and his expatriate peers chronicled the transnational interplay of these cultural-spatial
tensions, and native Parisians “wrote back” to their American occupiers through multiform
means of protest. An odd coalition of radical leftist and upper-class French opposed, with
violence and with snobbery, the spread of a “cocktail culture” that altered Parisian drinking and
spending habits. Some even sponsored Prohibition-inspired temperance movements that
frowned upon consumption of hard liquor but expressed support for light French domestic
beverages like wine, cider, and beer. Thus, the period‟s literature and history show that
transatlantic geographies, communities, and drinks became interrelated categories fraught with
socioeconomic significance.
These conflicts rarely merit mention in popular representations of the post-WWI
Montparnasse arts scene, whose proponents typically depict as a vibrant community in which
class barriers collapsed and artists from around the world talked shop over coffee and fines.
When screenwriters stage the scene, as Woody Allen recently did in Midnight in Paris (2011),
they tend to characterize Americans visiting the French cosmopolis as naïfs, awestruck by and
drawing inspiration from the bustling, modern City of Light. The problem with this imagined
geography of Paris is that it is a fantasy, albeit a popular and enduring one. Many of the
expatriate writers who came to Paris from booming American metropolises did not find the city
inordinately modern. Some dared to describe it—with respect to its staid noise ordinances, its
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gypsy pickpockets, its spotty access to hot water, and its floundering economy—as provincial.
Djuna Barnes called Paris‟s theatres “very bad” and its music halls “usually worse” (Collected
Poems 261). Moreover, the directionality of the cultural exchange taking place between Paris
and the loose coterie that formed its American colony was hardly one-way; rather, these visiting
Americans, traipsing through France as the US government alternately antagonized and aided its
beleaguered ally, left a significant imprint on Paris much as the city made its impression them.
Trying to explain what drew expatriates to Paris, Gertrude Stein described the city as “the natural
background for the twentieth century” (Paris 24), but those hundred years have since become
immortalized for better or worse as “the American century.” With these conflicting histories in
mind, this chapter examines the transplanted American spaces that US expatriates like Fitzgerald
brought to Paris and how cultural exports like the “American bar” teem with a transnational
significance that hints at the nation‟s future power in defining the parameters of globalization.
The phenomenon of looking back with nostalgia at the material and intellectual excesses
of expatriate-occupied France is hardly unique to our time. By the 1930s, the Paris of the
twenties had, following the American Bust, already ascended to mythic status. It was nearly
instantaneously promoted to Golden Age by the lucky few who had lived there and the wistful
others who wished they had. A spate of reminiscences of Paris‟s American colony appeared
during the Depression, inviting readers to salivate at the remembrance of a time when one US
dollar could with relative ease cover the cost of a good French dinner with wine service.
Fitzgerald reflected on the heyday of expatriate excess in his best known short story “Babylon
Revisited” (1931), Hemingway lamented the end of the decade in his 1933 “A Paris Letter”
article for Esquire, and both literary critic Malcolm Cowley and Dingo bartender Jimmie
Charters published expatriate memoirs in 1934. Hemingway, who also contributed a
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meandering introduction for Charters‟s book, was working on his own Paris memoirs a few years
before he died in 1961; the unfinished text was published in 1964 as the alternately sentimental
and sardonic A Moveable Feast.
Works such as these helped concretize in the twentieth century the “Americans abroad”
literary genre that Henry James and Mark Twain had popularized in the nineteenth, but they also
sometimes became complicit in the romanticizing of the American expatriate experience in
France—a perspective that too often neglects the cultural colonization of Paris by American
visitors as well as the US government‟s meddling in European politics during a period of
nominal isolationism. The most enduring popular myth is that the American expatriate
experience consisted primarily of Americans being transformed by their bohemian experiences
abroad. Emblematic of the imagined Paris to which I allude, Hemingway‟s A Moveable Feast
reduces the relationship between the city and the expatriate to that of actor and acted upon—“the
town best organized for a writer to write in that there is” (156). Literary critics and historians
have problematized the one-way directionality of this exchange, noting especially the obvious
economic exploitation of a dollar-franc conversion that afforded Americans unprecedented
spending power abroad. Caren Kaplan has critiqued middle-class white “exile” in the 1920s as a
calculated performance, remarking, “The modernist trope of exile utilizes the modes of
displacement more characteristic of tourism but masks and submerges all references to
commerce or popular culture by promoting artistic concerns” (Questions of Travel 45-46). More
recently, Brooke L. Blower has provocatively interpreted Jazz Age American attempts to
commercialize the French capital as efforts “to command Paris—the capital of revolution,
birthplace of bourgeois society and republican values” and, through doing so, “to control the path
of history” (Becoming Americans 10). What these scholars are presently evaluating is a
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phenomenon similar to but distinct from the period‟s prevalent pro-US jingoism, which H.L.
Mencken lampooned in 1922 as “the faith... that one of Our Boys, taken at random, could
dispose in a fair fight of ten Englishmen, twenty Germans, thirty Frogs, forty wops, fifty Japs, or
a hundred Bolsheviki” (The American Scene 7). In contrast to the deliberately pro-American,
hardline conservative politics of organizations like the American Legion, Paris‟s American
colony consisted of globetrotting American artists and entrepreneurs who imagined themselves
intellectually superior to Coolidge-era isolationists. When the Legion held its 1927 convention
in Paris, it did so explicitly intending to jingoistically flaunt American superiority on the French
soil it had “saved” from Germany in World War I. But the occupying forces of expatriate
literature and US cultural exports worked a subtler nationalistic magic by transposing American
spaces into Paris.
It is within the context of this critical discourse that the transplanted American bar, a
business enterprise that emerged immediately prior to World War I in France and flourished
during the “années folles” of the 1920s, offers evidence of lopsided transnational exchange. The
political, economic, and cultural rifts that separate the classic Parisian café from the competing
American bar in Paris demonstrate, as they appear in literature and popular discourse, that the
American expatriate experience provides an interesting and complex example of transnational
nationalism, a phenomenon that occurs when a foreign community inhabits one country but
persists in touting the values and beliefs of another. The imported space of the American bar on
French soil permitted US nationals to practice a form of expatriate patriotism, a garish manner of
conspicuous consumption that emphasized American economic superiority and worked to more
or less repel the French working class. The bohemian and working-class café was in several
instances literally remodeled into the bourgeois American bar, a place where the price of drinks
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overreached the diminished income of French laborers, students, and artists passing by. More
striking still, some American bars like the Jockey and some hotels that catered to Americans
imposed, against French law, segregationist policies that installed traces of the US South in the
heart of Paris.
Both in literature and at the bar, a conflict emerges between two imagined geographies:
the romanticized freespace of Bohemia and the transported material environ of the America
bourgeois. Bohemia, the gypsy homeland province that now exists as part of modern
Czechoslovakia, was empirically as real a place as America, but in the Parisian context both
were translated imaginatively in response to changing socioeconomic conditions during the midnineteenth and early twentieth centuries. As early as the 1830s (but more commonly after the
popular reception of Henry Murger‟s stories and plays in the 1850s), aspiring French artists who
sought to distance themselves from the bourgeois commercialization of art had been labeled
bohemian due to perceived connections between their transient lifestyle and that of actual
gypsies. This group, members of which either affected or practiced a sort of hedonistic
asceticism, emerged largely in response to the rise of the bourgeois class and the
commodification of artistic production. The grimy glamor of this emergent movement attracted,
in the twentieth century, a deluge of expatriate artists who wished to benefit from the perceived
vitality of its artistic environment. However, their arrival in the tumultuous economic conditions
of interwar France sponsored a remarkably bourgeois market for “the good life,” the deliberate
commercialism of which ran counter to the idealistic precepts of “la vie de bohème.” In his 1924
travel guide, Karl Baedeker informed his Anglophone readers that Paris was “a city of pleasure,
always en fête” (xxxii), and, for middle- to upper-class Americans seeking a vacation from
Prohibition, this description throbbed with hedonistic promise. The American bar, with its
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overpriced cocktails and attractiveness to tourists, embodied the threat of a counter-Bohemia,
though it is worth noting that members of the French working class were essentially displaced
from both geographies.
Some American authors, most notably Fitzgerald and Hemingway, shared a keen
awareness of the crass materialism that expatriates smuggled into Paris during the 1920s.
Having fled the dry United States, they appreciated the ubiquity of alcohol on French soil, but
their fictions, letters, and essays show that they intuited an exploitative intent in the spending
patterns of their expatriate cohort. By frequenting American-style bars and voting with their
dollars at establishments that pandered to their interests, expatriates and tourists exerted a
powerful economic influence on Paris that altered the city‟s cultural identity. Remarkably,
nineteenth-century fears of European decadence had by the Jazz Age reversed into the
recognition that young American capitalism posed its own threat to old Europe. Many examples
of modernist prose display genuine ambivalence about the imposition of American culture onto
France, and the literary setting of the American bar in Paris proves to function as a rich node of
transnational cultural exchange. In the commercial space of the American bar, the United States
entered France as an imagined geography, a consumerist-capitalist bourgeois ideology evoked in
name and celebrated in the conspicuous consumption of imported American goods and services.
By exploring the individualistic politics of the American cocktail and by subsequently
evaluating the transnational significance of the Parisian-American bar in literature, we may tease
out these nationalistic and capitalistic complexities. Such investigations gain new potency in
light of Donald Pease‟s call for “a field of American studies... that is grounded in a comparativist
model of imperial state exceptionalisms” (“Re-thinking „American Studies‟” 25), for the means
through which the American expatriates of the Roaring Twenties imported consumerist values
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into a frequently unreceptive French context provide us an opportunity to study a subtle cultural
conflict between two colonizing nations. Nonviolent skirmishes between these Western imperial
powers, occasions on which US citizens slyly “colonized” French territory, played out in
American literature and at the American bar.

“Paris is [illegible]”: Expatriate Authors and the American Taint in Interwar France
Many American authors sought out Paris on the basis of recommendation. Their mentors
pointed them towards the city as if it were a homework assignment, and they crossed the Atlantic
for further instruction in the production of modern literature. Hemingway went in 1921 at the
recommendation of Sherwood Anderson, who sent him packing with letters of introduction to
Stein, Ezra Pound, and Sylvia Beach. When Fitzgerald made his second trip to France in 1924,
he was following the advice of his intellectual conscience, Edmund Wilson, who had implored
him to give Paris another chance after a disappointing first trip. In 1925, William Faulkner came
seeking in James Joyce a mentor superior to Anderson; he ended up seeing the Irish novelist only
from a distance, too shy to make his approach. If most expatriates came for the art and the
modernity that Paris had cultivated, the ones who stayed did so for the wildly favorable exchange
rate and the quality of life it purchased on the cheap.
Fitzgerald—who is often regarded by his biographers as the typical ethnocentric
American abroad, so goofily out of place that he once bathed his daughter in a bidet (Le Vot
171)—was enthusiastic about how far the dollar stretched in postwar France. The healthy
(though often squandered) income he drew in America from the sales of novels and stories
translated to a modest fortune in Europe. In 1924, he wrote to Thomas Boyd, “We found a
wonderful English nurse in Paris for $26.00 a month (My God! We paid $90.00 in New York)”
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(Correspondence 141). Childcare was only one of the expenses made minimal through the
miracle of the dollar-franc exchange; travel, meals, lodging, and above all drinks were incredibly
cheaper in France than in America, where the price of alcohol was being driven up on the black
market by insatiable post-Volstead demand. In 1922, Hemingway had conservatively estimated
a twelve-for-one conversion (Dateline 115), but during the economic tumult of 1926 a dollar
could net as much as fifty francs (Blower 70). Hemingway, who generally made a show of being
above petty financial concerns, could not resist writing exuberantly to a friend about getting his
money‟s worth out of Paris in 1921: “Living is very cheap. Hotel room is 12 francs and there are
12.61 to the paper one. A meal for two hits a male about 12-14 francs—about 50 cents apiece.
Wine is 60 centimes. Good Pinard. I get rum for 14 francs a bottle. Vive La France” (Selected
Letters 60). Like the French bohemians before them, American and English writers flocked to
the Left Bank of Paris to ply their trade honestly and escape the material concerns of bourgeois
living; but, also like the French bohemians, these authors found that the Parisian artistic
counterculture was tethered to consumerism and capitalism. They were not able to live outside
materialistic convention so much as they succeeded at outbidding it through a beneficial
exchange rate. In addition, Americans imported their own capital-oriented cultural tropes and
spree-style spending habits into the French context, leading a handful of writers to express guilt
over taking advantage of war-ravaged Europe. Cowley writes in his 1951 revisions to Exile’s
Return, “The exiles of art were also trade missionaries: involuntarily they increased the foreign
demand for fountain pens, silk stockings, grapefruit and portable typewriters. They drew after
them an invading army of tourists, thus swelling the profits of steamship lines and travel
agencies. Everything fitted into the business picture” (62-63). With these comments, Cowley
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participates in a modern reversal of the classic nationalist fantasy that decadent Europeans
endeavor to corrupt innocent, earnest Americans.
Since the Revolution, American letters have expressed an enduring fear of “the European
taint”—the idea that ineffectual, effeminate, and feudally aristocratic Old World values threaten
the exceptional, manly, and democratic project of the New World. Literary expressions of this
fear peaked in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, surfacing in the writings of men like
Benjamin Franklin, Royall Tyler, Nathaniel Hawthorne, and Henry James. In the modernist era
of literary production, however, the directionality of these fears reversed and many left-leaning
American writers expressed their concern that US-style free-market capitalism might unduly
influence Europe in the form of an American taint. Hemingway‟s The Sun Also Rises (1926)
offers a full and early expression of this fear as it shows American protagonist Jake Barnes and
his expatriate friends cut a swathe of debauchery from France to Spain, culminating in the sexual
corruption and physical debasement of a young Spanish matador. Hemingway‟s ironical tone in
this novel, especially as applied to the expansion of cocktail culture in France, harkens back to
one of his 1922 Toronto Star articles in which he sarcastically declares that the present “golden
age of European culture” has arisen because “the French bartender has at last learned to mix a
good martini and a palate-soothing bronx” (Dateline 124). Other writers expatriated in different
ways in reaction to America‟s Jazz Age and its possible influences on Europe. Believing that
Americans lacked tradition and discipline, T.S. Eliot adopted British citizenship and converted to
Anglicanism in 1927; Ezra Pound began railing against capitalism and the US on Italian radio in
1935; and Stein, despite the risks she faced due to her Jewish ethnic heritage, remained in France
throughout World War II and privately supported the Nazi-collaborationist Vichy government.1
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Yet it is Fitzgerald‟s conflicted, dynamic perspective on interwar interactions between
Americans and Europeans that provides the richest index of popular stances on the topic.
As revealed by his volatile comments in stories, novels, letters, and nonfiction essays,
Fitzgerald‟s perspective on France—and in particular on the place of expatriates in Paris—
changed drastically from the beginning of his professional career to his post-Gatsby slump. In
May 1921, not long after his first trip abroad, Fitzgerald fired off an uncharacteristically
nationalistic letter to Edmund Wilson. In it, he rants, “God damn the entire continent of
Europe.... France made me sick. Its silly pose as the thing the world has to save. I think it‟s a
shame that England and America didn‟t let Germany conquer Europe. It‟s the only thing that
would have saved the fleet of tottering old wrecks.” Fitzgerald, who even early in his career had
typically been antagonistic to American capitalism and nationalistic sentiment, here indulges
fully in the rhetoric of both. He resorts to the pseudoscience of eugenics to convey the
unrestrained disgust he held for France: “I believe at last in the white man‟s burden. We are as
far above the modern Frenchman as he is above the Negro. Even in art.” Near the end of his
screed, he invokes materialistic consumerism to denounce Paris‟s role the cosmopolitan capital
of culture and to praise its possible successor, New York City: “You may have spoken in jest
about New York as the capital of culture but in 25 years it will be just as London is now. Culture
follows money and all the refinements of aestheticism can‟t stave off its change of seat.” His
rage almost spent, he concludes the letter by leaving “2 francs” to Wilson to “find a French slave
to make me a typed copy of your letter from Mencken” (Letters 326). Fitzgerald‟s language in
this letter is, while patently offensive, characteristic of the post-WWI American attitude towards
France. As evidenced by the landslide victory of the isolationist, pro-capital Warren G. Harding
over the internationalist, progressive James M. Cox in the 1920 presidential election, a disturbing
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number of Americans regretted the nation‟s participation in WWI and viewed France as an
unwanted burden.
Fitzgerald‟s subsequent experiences of living abroad for extended periods led him to
reevaluate his vitriol towards France. Two articles he placed in The Saturday Evening Post in
1924 help pinpoint the moment this change began. The first, “How to Live on $36,000 a Year,”
was published in April of that year, and it finds Fitzgerald using wit to lampoon the American
grocery store owners and thieving servants who have driven up his cost of living on Long Island
and stymied his efforts to enjoy a newly rich lifestyle. “How to Live on Practically Nothing a
Year,” published later that year in September, is the sequel to the former article, this one written
as an account of the Fitzgeralds‟ summer in France. Its introduction explains that they
expatriated to escape from soaring American prices. What they discover abroad, however, is that
France‟s weak national economy compels some French to fleece comparatively wealthy tourists
just to survive. At the essay‟s conclusion, Fitzgerald sympathizes with the French instead of
antagonizing them, and he sees his own American experiences reflected in those of a young girl
on the Riviera who tells him, “The English and Americans drive the prices up until we can‟t buy
and we don‟t know what to do. My sister had to go to Marseilles and find work, and she‟s only
fourteen. Next winter I‟ll go too” (Afternoon 115). Like the Fitzgeralds, this child and her
family are victims of Anglo-American profiteering, forced to pull up roots and “economize” via
geographic displacement.
In the spring of 1925, Fitzgerald wrote Wilson from Paris a letter that wholly reversed the
sentiments he had expressed in 1921. He no longer sided with isolationist, xenophobic
Americans in their crude mockery of France and their preference for New York; now, he sided
with the French against the bourgeois American tourists who were presently clogging Parisian
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streets. Fitzgerald wrote, “This city is full of Americans.... they seem to be incapable of any
conversation not composed of semi-malicious gossip about New York courtesy celebrities. I‟ve
gotten to like France.... I‟m filled with disgust for Americans in general after two weeks‟ sight
of the ones in Paris” (Letters 342). He would soon lose his patience with his fellow countrymen
at home. He wrote Hemingway in December 1927 that America “is a wowsy country but France
is [illegible] and I hope to spend March and April, or April and May, there and elsewhere on the
continent” (Letters 303). Editor Andrew Turnbull makes no guesses at what adjective Fitzgerald
applied to France, but we can easily infer that it is the opposite of “wowsy,” or baby-talk for
“lousy.” Despite his self-admitted difficulties in speaking the French language, Fitzgerald-theexpatriate had come to prefer life abroad. Like many Americans, he had initially resented the
way poor Frenchmen (doormen, taxi drivers, etc.) tried to part touring Americans from their
inflated wealth through price-fixing and grift; by the mid-1920s, however, he seemed to intuit
that such ills occurred in tandem with and primarily because of American cultural imperialism.
In France, he was especially fascinated by the prospect of a slower-paced country not prone to
boosterism and abject materialism, two darker aspects of American capitalism in the 1920s.
Fitzgerald spoofed the French disdain for grubby commercialism in a short creative
nonfiction essay entitled “Salesmanship in the Champs-Elysées” that he wrote for The New
Yorker in 1930. The piece, narrated in tortured English from the perspective of a Parisian car
salesman dealing with an American customer, is a half-admiring, half-mocking tribute to the
stereotype of the irate French business proprietor. The plot is simple: an American enters the
dealership looking to buy a car, and the unhelpful French salesman could care less about selling
him one. The salesman is eager to philosophize and converse, but he is humorously unmotivated
by the potential for profit, leading the customer to remark, “I don‟t think you want to sell me a
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car” (In His Own Time 235). Yet the conclusion reveals that the salesman, who wishes to
“[make] a proper study of his sincerity and his character and the extent of his desire for the car,”
operates on a timetable incompatible with the hasty commerce preferred by the American (236).
This comedic short tells us a good deal about Fitzgerald‟s emergent respect for the French and
his growing impatience with expatriate and vacationing Americans, many of whom earnestly
wished to Americanize—colonize—their French environment.
Prior to the mid-twenties, when his experiences abroad led him to reevaluate his sneering
attitude towards the French, Fitzgerald had shared his sense of anti-Europeanism with the
conservative popular magazine The Saturday Evening Post, a common venue for his short
stories. Editorials in the Post of the 1920s regularly criticized the internationalist excesses of the
Wilson administration and touted instead the pragmatic isolationism of “business government”
(Lowden 5). In illustrations of European characters, the magazine‟s cartoonists festooned their
targets with monocles and furs to mock their foppish impracticality. The recurring implication,
indebted to nationalist sentiments that sprang up after WWI, was that Americans should avoid
European entanglements and decadent Continental culture. Fitzgerald‟s global consciousness
and cultural tolerance expanded as he began living abroad for extended periods in 1924, but he
would not write maturely in fiction about Euro-American relations until 1930. As late as
October 19, 1929 (a mere ten days before Black Monday), Fitzgerald was placing stories in the
Post that pandered somewhat to Jazz Age American notions of exception. In that particular
issue, his “The Swimmers” concluded with a star-spangled stream of patriotic prose:
The best of America was the best of the world....
France was a land, England was a people, but America, having about it still that
quality of the idea, was harder to utter—it was the graves at Shiloh and the tired,
drawn, nervous faces of its great men, and the country boys dying in the Argonne
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for a phrase that was empty before their bodies withered. It was a willingness of
the heart. (Short Stories 512)
Perhaps the most interesting part of this passage is its emphasis on American participation in the
Allied offensive at the Battle of the Argonne Forest, which took place in late 1918. Though this
battle ended a terrible number of American lives (estimated at 117,000), the Allied victory was a
joint US-French effort on French soil, a fact downplayed in Fitzgerald‟s representation of France
as “a land” (a mere backdrop or stage) where American heroism once displayed its merit.
Similar to how the Crash and the Depression gave rise to a new era of national soulsearching in America, the dawn of the 1930s inaugurated for Fitzgerald a new decade of selfreflection and self-castigation in fiction; the economically crippled country was pondering its
new place on the world stage just as the emotionally bankrupt author was wondering how his bad
behavior abroad contributed to the onset of his wife‟s schizophrenia. As André Le Vot and
others have noted, Fitzgerald was keenly aware of how his meteoric ascent to celebrity and his
subsequent ruin “mimed his epoch, preceded and followed it” (xii). Zelda had the first of her
major breakdowns in Paris in April 1930, leading to two more on American soil in 1932 and
1934. Earlier in his career, Fitzgerald might have blamed Europe for contributing to his and
Zelda‟s loss of innocence, a popular American notion that Hemingway had parodied in The Sun
Also Rises through Bill Gorton‟s mockery of Jake‟s expatriate status: “You‟ve lost touch with the
soil.... Fake European standards have ruined you” (120). But by the publication of “One Trip
Abroad” (1930) and Tender is the Night (1934), Fitzgerald had begun to worry like Hemingway
about the American problems expatriates brought to Europe—and brought on themselves.
“One Trip Abroad,” published in the Post on October 11, 1930 (roughly a year after the
Crash) finds Fitzgerald placing the blame for American corruption less on decadent Europeans
than on Americans behaving badly. The story concerns the globetrotting young Kellys, Nelson
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and Nicole, who grow dissipated and morally lax as they tour Northern Africa and Europe. At
frequent intervals in the narrative, the Kellys encounter another couple who always seem slightly
more debauched than they; by the end, they realize that the couple is a supernatural reflection of
themselves. As Matthew J. Bruccoli observes in his preface to the story, “One Trip Abroad”
uses the German literary device of the doppelganger (Short Stories 577), a hint that the story
privileges neither American forms nor politics. The doppelganger device allows Fitzgerald to
express the problem of American isolationism abroad—the tendency to form expatriate cliques
and colonies instead of becoming immersed in foreign culture. Though they have put an ocean
between themselves and their home nation, the Kellys run into themselves (literally) over and
over again, much as the expatriates found adaptations of American spaces awaiting them in
Paris. The story explains the logic behind this phenomenon in order to critique it. When the
Kellys befriend an older, more seasoned expatriate couple after “a cocktail in the bar of the Hotel
Transatlantique,” these travel veterans assure them, “Every place is the same.... The only thing
that matters is who‟s there. New scenery is fine for half an hour, but after that you want your
own kind to see.... The place itself never really matters” (579-80). What the Kellys themselves
later discover in Paris is that Americans abroad have a knack for causing trouble and making
their presence known but unwanted. They find expatriates partying incessantly, distracting one
another from work, and disseminating American customs amongst the French. At one party they
attend, their Austrian-French host declares, “Everyone who arrives must drink two cocktails in
the American style,” even though, as Nelson notes, the “very fashionable” native Parisians
nationalistically prefer French wines and beer (591). Nelson, a professional musician, fails to
make any progress in his career, and the doppelganger revelation at the tale‟s conclusion strongly
suggests that the most corrupting force Americans encounter abroad is other Americans.
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The themes of self-recrimination, diminished patriotism, and sympathy for Europe
prefigured by “One Trip Abroad” receive extended treatment in Tender is the Night, Fitzgerald‟s
novel about the dissipated Divers, Dick and Nicole. Set in the 1920s, the plot chronicles Dr.
Diver‟s inability to complete his treatise on psychiatry amidst the physical temptations and
libational pleasures of interwar Europe. Yet the insurmountable hurdles he faces are in nearly
every case American in origin: his interest in a visiting Hollywood starlet (Rosemary Hoyt)
strains his relationship with his wife; his alcohol-drenched friendship with American musician
Abe North—who once back in the States is “beaten to death in a speakeasy” (Tender 208)—
impedes his writing; and his American sense of being excepted from international law results in
a brutal beating administered by Italian carabinieri. Reflecting on his own European
misadventures, Fitzgerald depicts Diver and North as slumming Americans who believe their
money and national identity afford them the right to colonize Europe as a drunken playground.
In one of the novel‟s most troubling scenes, Dick and Abe are tangentially involved in the
murder of a Scandinavian-African expatriate, Jules Peterson. When Peterson‟s body turns up in
Rosemary‟s Paris hotel room, the two men participate in a cover-up to protect her lily-white
reputation. We learn that, through a roundabout sequence of events, Abe is partially responsible
for the man‟s death; after being robbed in a Montparnasse bistro, North had called the gendarmes
on the establishment‟s proprietor and clientele, leading to mass confusion—which Jules, as a
helpful witness, had tried to sort out, much to the displeasure of the criminal, who murdered him
in retaliation. Fitzgerald‟s narrator expresses the conundrum of nationalities and legalities in a
darkly droll passage: “Abe had succeeded in the space of an hour in entangling himself with the
personal lives, consciences, and emotions of one Afro-European and three Afro-Americans
inhabiting the French Latin Quarter” (111). The predicament, caused by Americans behaving
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badly, leaves the comparatively innocent Rosemary with a strong distaste for the expatriate
scene. Exasperated, she asks, “Do all the Americans in Paris just shoot at each other all the
time?” (116)
Fitzgerald is merciless in his treatment of the flawed, “spoiled” Dr. Diver and, in contrast,
highly respectful of the French environs the character mucks up. In one episode, Diver and his
debauched companions visit Beaumont-Hamel, site of the Battle of the Somme, causing the
doctor to tear up with a sentimentality he seldom displays for American topics. Of the trenches,
he remarks, “This kind of battle was invented by Lewis Carroll and Jules Verne and whoever
wrote „Undine,‟ and country deacons bowling and marraines in Marseilles and girls seduced in
the back lanes of Württemberg and Westphalia. Why, this was a love battle—there was a
century of middle-class love spent here. This was the last love battle” (62). Fitzgerald had
previously reserved purple prose like this for “the best of America,” as he did in his
appropriation of the Argonne for “The Swimmers.” Its deployment here as an elegy for prewar
Europe suggests a new development in his style and ideology. This, when considered alongside
his depiction of Tender‟s American characters as not merely dissipated but dangerous (leaving
madness, violence, and even murder in their travelling wake), suggests that Fitzgerald had, like
many modernist authors, come to recognize the threat American materialism posed to European
cultures in the dawning age of globalization.

Transnational Concoctions: Between the Café and the Bar
Symptoms of this cultural-economic transnational conflict were notably present in the
history of and the literature surrounding the American bar, especially with regard to the
importing of the American bar and the American cocktail into the twentieth-century French
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context. Interestingly, the cocktail had by the mid-nineteenth century spawned its own genre of
popular literature in the form of the mixing guide, and American celebrity bartenders were
emerging as patriotic American types. Well-dressed, financially secure, frequently partners in
the establishments where they held court, the country more prominent barmen were equal parts
artisan and businessman, embodiments of the tense masculine balancing act Michael S. Kimmel
has described as definitive in the American age of the “self-made man.”
Although celebrity bartenders had existed as far back as the early nineteenth century,
“Professor” Jerry Thomas‟s mixing guide, The Bon-Vivant’s Companion; or, How to Mix Drinks
(1862), was the first text of its kind in America, and a distinctly nationalist-exceptionalist strain
courses through it. In the text, Thomas and his publishers repeatedly tout the wealth and general
superiority of the United States, where “drinks exist in greater variety... than in any other country
in the world” (xlvii). Their stated goal is to situate young America within the old transnational
history of fancy alcoholic drinks. The publishers write in their preface that “a list of all the
social drinks... of America would really be one of the curiosities of jovial literature; and that if it
was combined with a catalogue of the mixtures common to other nations... it would be a
„blessing to mankind‟” (xlviii). However, the implicit end of this combinatorial effort is the
celebration of America, home of the cocktail, as the new drinking capital of the world. The
gaudy American creations on parade in Thomas‟s collection make the refined but simple
alcoholic palates of the French and English seem downright bland by comparison. As one might
expect of a book published during the Civil War and republished frequently during
Reconstruction, American place plays an essential role in Thomas‟s indexing of these recipes,
which are more often than not labeled in relation to where they were invented or became
popular. Allusions to diverse regional identities appear in such drinks as the “Louisiana Sugar
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House Punch” (20), the “Philadelphia Fish-House Punch” (26), and the “Baltimore Egg Nogg”
(97). Thomas collects these diverse beverages under one cover, compiling in recipe-book form a
document of American exception. Claret and port drinks, tainted by connection to Europe, are
marked as outsiders and given alienating Catholic names, like the “Bishop,” the “Arch-Bishop,”
the “Cardinal,” and the “Pope” (74-76).
Cocktail historian David Wondrich reads Thomas‟s book as a nationalist document that
cites the cocktail as a symbol of American ingenuity and individuality. As a single-serving,
made-to-order beverage, the cocktail signifies a different consumerist ideology than do
traditional European drinks, like French wines and English punches, served to crowds.
Wondrich writes of this difference, “Ideas of democracy and individualism extended to men‟s
behavior in the barroom, where they were less likely to all settle for the same thing or let
someone else choose what they were to drink” (Imbibe! 68). Thus, in its origin, the cocktail was
an indisputably American creation—though, as The Bon-Vivant’s Companion demonstrates in its
numerous citations of place, the cocktail‟s invention was spread across the nation‟s regions, from
the urbanizing North to the Deep South and the frontier towns in the West. Thomas himself
picked up recipes from and plied his trade across a number of US states, including Connecticut,
New York, California, Nevada, Missouri, Illinois, Iowa, South Carolina, and Louisiana.
Thomas‟s book and the imitations that followed hinged on the notion of young America
contributing significantly, even boastfully, to a well-established European tradition. The author
himself told an interviewer in the 1880s that he planned to “revolutionize the bar” in England by
opening an American-style saloon in a major city (qtd. in Wondrich 34). Yet despite the
patriotic fervor of their proponents, the cocktail and the American bar in which it was served
were ineluctably tethered to a number of transnational connections. The very title of Thomas‟s
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book cites the French term “bon-vivant,” invoking European definitions of the good life as one in
which high-quality food and drink feature prominently. Most early editions of the volume
include nearly as many markedly European recipes as American ones, and often requisite
ingredients like sherry and brandy are products of typically European origin. Even recipes that
call for American whiskey are indebted to a moment of transatlantic crisis in alcoholic beverage
history, the Great French Wine Blight of the 1850s, which generated in America greater demand
for domestic liquors. Coincidentally, the blight itself was caused by American grapevines
imported to France. These carried with them a species of aphid that decimated French crops.
For French vineyards to survive, they were forced to more fully integrate their plants with the
roots of durable American breeds.
Much like those American vines, aphids, and roots, the cocktail culture popularized by
Jerry Thomas spread to Europe in a curiously transnational fashion and profoundly affected
French life as well as American letters. Between the turn of the century and the 1920s,
entrepreneurs successfully managed to “revolutionize” the bar in Paris, accomplishing in France
what Thomas had hoped to accomplish in England. “American” bars, so dubbed because they
specialized in cocktails and catered primarily to an expatriate clientele, sprang up in the City of
Light, often replacing Parisian working-class cafés. To leech from the comparatively abundant
wealth of American and English visitors, foreign profiteers transformed a number of pre-existing
French cafés into upscale, if often lurid, venues; such was the case for the café Le Dingo, which
mutated into the Dingo American Bar and Restaurant after its new American owner Louis
Wilson remodeled the building and added a wooden bar (Glassco 223). Even cafés that were
unwilling to fully convert to American bar status sometimes added wooden bars and cocktail
options to appease customers. Thus, the term “American bar” could apply categorically to the
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establishment itself or it could refer simply to the presence of a bar setup in the larger café: either
the state of being an American bar or the circumstance of having one and offering cocktails. The
saloon-style serving bar—at which patrons could belly up, order mixed drinks, and sit to their
content—was itself an American cultural product distinct from the traditional zinc countertops of
Paris cafés. American bars in Paris needed to import or construct this feature to attract the
expatriate customers whose plentiful francs they coveted.
Despite sharing virtually the same space, the transplanted American bar differed rather
profoundly from the traditional French café. In Paris, from the mid-nineteenth century Second
Republic to the 1940 end of the Third Republic, the Left Bank café thrived as a working-class,
student, and bohemian institution, a semi-domestic commercial space that helped citizens
negotiate a middle ground between their homes, their jobs, and their representation in
government. Social historian W. Scott Haine has observed that, in the age of industrialization,
the French café space “served not only as a living room for the working class but also as an
annex to the workshop and factory” and that it “suited the needs of a proletariat negotiating the
transition from life in small cities, towns, and villages to the experience of a large modern city”
(The World of the Paris Café 59, ix). The crowded café helped rural workers come to terms with
the crush of the city in a relatively safe environment, and it allowed all workers—urban natives
and rural transplants alike—a public space for interacting with their economic peers. Moreover,
in a time when factory owners and foremen strove to mechanize workers by instilling within
them an indefatigable sense of efficiency, the working-class café afforded them the passive
resistance of inebriation; in Haine‟s words, the café “[prolonged] the traditions of the artisanal
world, and it thus ran directly counter to the most powerful economic forces of the era:
rationalization and mechanization” (86). Because in nineteenth- and early twentieth-century
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France workers were permitted semi-frequent food and beverage breaks, wine purchased in the
café space could mischievously interfere with the working day‟s schedule.
Besides enabling what Haine refers to as “indiscipline,” the café also facilitated more
direct political activity and labor organization. The history-making first meeting between Karl
Marx and Friedrich Engels took place in a French café, and the institution has long played a role
in radical politics and anti-capital agitation. Since before the nineteenth century, many café
owners had run unofficial employment bureaus out of their businesses, helping local workers
find jobs through informal connections. In the nineteenth century and well into the twentieth, the
café remained a space for dealing informally with problems at work. According to Haine,
laborers received permission from sympathetic café owners to use backrooms as bases for
organizing strikes, walkouts, and other forms of resistance. The threat to Parisian capital was so
great that in the 1840s undercover police monitored café activities, and in the 1850s conservative
politicians endeavored to close cafés that catered to left-leaning clientele (Haine 24, 10-11).
These Left Bank working-class cafés were also frequented by Paris‟s bohemian element
(its starving artists as well as its slumming fakers), who, like the laborers, tended to favor leftist
politics and passive resistance to bourgeois ideology. The literal place of Bohemia, then the
much-mythologized gypsy homeland province in Eastern Europe, had little to do with the
Parisian appellation, which period critics invoked to map a crusty imagined geography over the
perceived griminess of the “art for art‟s sake” crowd. Historian Jerrold Seigel has remarked that
the rise of bohemian subculture occurred in response to two social forces: the spread of
bourgeois values (in the age of industrialization) and the commercialization of artistic production
(as patronage gave way to salable art). He writes that, for nineteenth-century French intellectuals
and artists, “Bohemia was a living reproach to bourgeois life. It was the realm of liberty,
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pleasure, and truth. Its existence showed that idealism and devotion could find no home in
ordinary society; that the modern exaltation of work rested on domination by capital and the
exploitation of real workers” (Bohemian Paris 62-63). As an imagined geography, he explains,
“Bohemia was a realm of liberated fantasy. Life in the remote margins and dark corners of
society allowed the mind a free play that the demands of a regular, orderly life constricted” (76).
The semi-domestic space of the Left Bank café helped enable this “free play,” and it brought
artists into contact with workers who shared their political beliefs—if not their aesthetics.
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the American bar began to intrude
into this café-centered economic, political, and artistic context, and its effects did not go
unnoticed. By 1928, English expatriate socialite Sisley Huddleston observed in the “Epistle
Dedicatory” to his Paris Salons, Cafes, Studios that the City of Light had turned into a
“variegated cosmopolitan Paris... a curious kaleidoscope Paris that has changed its morals and its
manners in this our Cocktail Epoch.” Jazz, American fashion, and cocktails had invaded the
city, leading many native Parisians to view turn-of-the-century French formal dress and café
culture with sarcastic disdain. “Nobody cares to see the flutter of frilly lace and the swirl of
tempestuous linen,” lamented the socially conservative Huddleston. “The nude has replaced the
agitation of petticoats, and negro jazz and tangoes from South American houses of ill-fame have
triumphed over the waltz and polka” (18). Struggling to answer the question of why Parisian
culture had changed so profoundly in three decades, Huddleston cast vague aspersions on the
phenomenon of the American bar: “The whole difference between the pre-war spirit and the
post-war spirit is somehow summed up in the difference between the pre-war café and the postwar bar” (230). The French, he noted, had tried to take ownership of the signature American
drink—the cocktail—via language by “Frenchify[ing]” it as “coquetèle,” but “the meretricious
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mixture” resisted these efforts and remained an alien invader of malicious intent (20-21). To the
caste-minded Huddleston, the American bar and its attendant cocktails symbolized crude, raw
democracy: a jumbled, shaken, and stirred social order, with love of money transcending concern
for class and race. He particularly feared the positive reception African-American jazz
musicians had received abroad. In short, he believed that a particularly corrosive form of the
melting pot had been marketed overseas as the cocktail. For the old guard expatriate Huddleston
and for many residents of Paris, the cocktail was a potent symbol of modern cultural chaos. The
Dutch painter Kees Von Dongen quipped to Huddleston, “Cocktails! They are of all colours.
They contain something of everything. No, I do not merely mean the cocktails that one drinks.
They are symbolic of the rest. The modern society woman is a cocktail. She is a bright mixture.
Society itself is a bright mixture. You can blend people of all tastes and classes” (20).
Cocktails and bars had effected an American invasion of France. Stephen Longstreet
quotes Harry McElhone, owner of the hotspot Harry‟s New York Bar, as saying of the era‟s
Parisian youth and visiting expatriates, “The younger people aren‟t happy with the bistros that
used to satisfy their fathers. They prefer the atmosphere of bars and pubs” (We All Went to Paris
316). Although these American bars sprang up from the husks of renovated French cafés, the
French working class and bohemian artists were not welcomed by the new proprietors; they were
priced out by the increased cost of mixed drinks in such establishments. Jimmie Charters,
barman at the Dingo, describes American bars as places “where the management catered
exclusively to foreigners and the few internationally-minded French. Prices were higher in such
places, but that only served to keep out the riffraff” (This Must Be the Place 19-20). He remarks
in his memoirs that he and his fellow bartenders regarded French laborers, who could be picked
out when they committed the faux-pas of ordering wine as they would in a café, with disdain,
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because they were typically unable to pay the exorbitant tabs. Most customers at American bars
were non-French. Charters breaks down the national make-up of his clientele: “Of my clients in
Montparnasse some 70 per cent were Americans, about 20 per cent English, and the rest a
mixture of French, Italians, South Americans, and Swedes” (32). The French who could afford
to attend were slumming bourgeois businessmen and successful artists.
At the heart of the American colony in Left Bank Paris, a strange transnational
gentrification, coded in nationalistic and colonial terms, had occurred, usurping the French
proletariat politics of the café with the American bourgeois economics of the bar. The
Montparnasse area in particular underwent radical changes from the dawn of the twentieth
century through the French equivalent to the Jazz Age. Blower writes that in 1900, it “remained
surprisingly agrarian,” a zone where a mixed-class neighborhood dead-ended into wheat fields.
When the Boulevard Raspail cut through Montparnasse in 1911, the area began to become more
commercialized. Even then, however, “the Dôme was only an unassuming workmen‟s corner
bistro with no outside seating, the Rotonde only a modest zinc” (81). The market expansion
caused by the post-WWI flood of American nationals changed this and resulted in the addition of
new cafes and the gentrification of preexisting ones. Sometimes the effects of this gentrification
were peculiar; in A Moveable Feast, Hemingway mentions that one unfortunate waiter was
“forced to cut his mustache when they made the American bar at the Closerie” (143), presumably
because his exorbitant whiskers were too European for the imported American setting. Blower
reports that American money could even import Southern-style racial segregation into the French
context; the Paris police archives document accounts of French-African colonial subjects and
African-American visitors being ejected from the Jockey, while period newspapers noted similar
happenings at various Montmartre clubs.
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On August 11, 1923, the African-American newspaper the Chicago Defender reported on
these abuses in an article provocatively entitled “Start War on American Color Line in France:
Americans Take Hate to Paris.”2 The article describes several “instances in which white tourists
from the United States have expressed dissatisfaction at finding themselves placed at tables with
dark subjects,” listing troubling incidents of de facto segregation or unreproved racism at the
Café de la Paix, the Bal Tabarin, and various sightseeing agencies (1). For their part, French
police and politicians vehemently opposed such practices, but some hotel owners persisted in
informally segregating their establishments to appease American clients. Some tour organizers,
too, risked the ire of Parisian officials by racially segregating their busloads of tourists. AfricanAmerican expatriate celebrity Josephine Baker was herself nearly ejected from a French
restaurant when a white American couple complained to the head waiter (Blower 51, 277).
Fitzgerald sought to represent the transnational nature of these expatriate regional and racial
conflicts in an early “Melarky” draft of Tender is the Night. In one scene set in a Paris café, the
sight of a “huge American Negro, with his arms around a French tart” causes the protagonist‟s
“Tennessee instincts” take over; leaving the place in a huff, he assaults a different black musician
on his way out (qtd. in Taylor 162). Likewise, Langston Hughes wrote about black Southern
musicians abroad in France playing for an audience of white “American millionaires” in his
poem “Jazz Band in a Parisian Cabaret” (Collected Works 106). These literary and journalistic
discourses on the significance of region and race in an expatriate context suggest that American
domestic racial anxieties were translated intact abroad.
In spite of obvious barriers of class and race, bar proprietors, bartenders, and the
expatriates who paid for the cocktails generally indulged in the fantasy that they were bringing
an important democratic element to a still-provincial, caste-oriented Paris. Using the rhetoric of
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liberty versus prudery, Charters relates in This Must Be the Place the legend of how the
American colony was born: a scantily-clad American flapper was asked, for decorum‟s sake, not
to smoke outside the Rotonde, so she and her friends fled across the street to the more permissive
Dôme, marking it and nearby bars safe spaces for expatriates (15-16); Jimmie, who though born
in England seems to have acquired through his clientele a preference for American society and
politics, further skewers the Rotonde by confiding to his readership that it later became a
communist bastion. Charters celebrates the American colony in Paris as a zone of individualism
and freedom, giving little thought to the French Bohemia it crowded out. He remembers it as a
place where “artists, writers, nobles, American sailors, and doubtful women mingle[d] on equal
terms without reserve” (24); later, with no concern for the French laborers effectively barred
from participation, he exults, “People did not separate into class or intellectual groups” (28).
And if any of his contemporary readers were to doubt that the inside of the typical American bar
was a specially nationalized space, Jimmie assures them that “these smaller bars really took the
place of the American living room. No one ever entertained at home, first because French
housing laws do not permit any noise after ten o‟clock, and secondly because it was so much
more economical to meet your friends in a bar where each paid for his own drink” (20, emphasis
in original). Charters, in his resistance to French noise ordinances and his praise for the fiscal
accountability in buying one‟s own individually-made cocktail, here provides a succinct
expression of how the American bar formed a bastion of nationalism, exception, and isolation in
a foreign context.
In their fictions, Fitzgerald and Hemingway chronicle the rise and decline of the
American bar in Paris, which, in spite of its bohemian affectations, thrived generally as long as
expatriates could rely on a booming economy back home. Hemingway‟s The Sun Also Rises
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offers an extensive catalogue of the era‟s prominent American bars (such as Harry‟s New York
Bar, the Dingo Bar, the Crillon, and the bar at the Ritz) as well as cafés that had adapted to serve
American-style mixed drinks to their clientele (including the Dôme, the Rotonde, and the Select),
though the author holds many of these businesses at an unfriendly arm‟s length.3 As J. Gerald
Kennedy has noted, they assume an enervating role in the novel‟s recurring theme of labor; “the
seductive ambience of the Quarter” distracts protagonist Barnes from “the workaday world of the
Right Bank” (“Hemingway, Hadley, and Paris” 206). As early as 1922, Hemingway had argued
to his Canadian newspaper readership, “You can find anything you are looking for at the
Rotonde—except serious artists. The trouble is that people who go on a tour of the Latin Quarter
look in at the Rotonde and think they are seeing an assembly of the great artists of Paris. I want
to correct that in a very public manner, for the artists of Paris who are turning out creditable
work resent and loathe the Rotonde crowd” (Dateline 115). This was not entirely true, since
many notable French writers and painters frequented the Rotonde and managed to remain
productive, but it certainly speaks to how Hemingway viewed cocktail culture as a threat to his
work ethic. In the same article, he noted of lazy “American Bohemians in Paris” that “the gang
that congregates at the corner of the Boulevard Montparnasse and the Boulevard Raspail have no
time to work at anything else; they put in a full day at the Rotonde” (Dateline 116). By 1926, he
was convinced that bars and cafés were detracting from his personal creative output. He wrote
Fitzgerald, “I haven‟t been drinking, haven‟t been in a bar, haven‟t been at the Dingo, Dome nor
select. Haven‟t seen anybody. Not going to see anybody. Trying unusual experiment of a writer
writing” (Selected Letters 217). He thus reacted strongly against the popular equivocation of
expatriate bar and artistic cultures.
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Fitzgerald, who aside from a handful of minor 1925 stories had little to write in fiction
about Paris before the Wall Street Crash of 1929, thereafter began to emulate Hemingway by
using the Parisian bar/café scene as a trope for creative impotence and unchecked excess. The
plot of his 1930 Post story “The Bridal Party,” which is set almost exclusively in Parisian bars
and bistros, primarily concerns rich Americans drinking heavily to dull the pain of their financial
losses. Fitzgerald describes the cosmopolitan drinking habits of these men as incongruous with
the dire economic conditions facing them:
for weeks they had drunk cocktails before meals like Americans, wines and
brandies like Frenchmen, beer like Germans, whisky-and-soda like the English,
and as they were no longer in the twenties, this preposterous mélange, that was
like some gigantic cocktail in a nightmare, served only to make them temporarily
less conscious of the mistakes of the night before. (Short Stories 565)
He chastises his characters indulging in the anodyne sweetness of that “gigantic cocktail” while
Americans back home suffer.
Elsewhere, Fitzgerald writes about the disappearing transnational space of the ParisianAmerican bar, which had lost much of its expatriate customer base in the Crash. In a particularly
insightful passage in “Babylon Revisited,” Fitzgerald remarks on the American bar‟s reliance on
the colonizing, globalizing power of the American dollar in a bull economy. The story‟s
protagonist Charlie Wales is “not really disappointed to find Paris was so empty. But the
stillness in the Ritz bar was strange and portentous. It was not an American bar any more—he
felt polite in it, and not as if he owned it. It had gone back into France” (Short Stories 616).
Here, the language of revoked ownership and conceded territory mingle to represent the loss of
capitalist buying power and withering of imperialist intent. With the American colony broken up
by the Bust, the Left Bank has reverted back to its classic “provincialism” and the Right Bank‟s
nightlife scene attracts “a local, colloquial crowd” that leaves the few remaining American
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tourists staring with “frightened eyes” (619-20). Fitzgerald‟s rhetoric suggests that the
transnational space of the American bar has caved in, gone native—a reclamation of French
cultural territory that had been seized in a vulnerable time. Its reversion is, within the story‟s
thematic framework, not to be lamented, for such bars assume a villainous, dangerous aspect in
remembered sequences, contributing to the death of Wales‟s wife, his mental breakdown, and his
initial separation from his daughter. The American bar retains these sinister qualities in Tender
is the Night, as it contributes to the dissipation of antihero Dick Diver and the demise of his
alcoholic friend Abe North. In several key scenes, Fitzgerald emphasizes the artificial
American-ness of the Parisian-American bar of the Cocktail Epoch, but the most puissant and
telling occurs when North impersonates General “Black Jack” Pershing to receive star treatment
at the Hotel Ritz bar. Dick and friends warn the gullible concierge, “He brooks no delay. Every
man, every gun is at his service” (Tender 83). In this scene, set in the Boom year of 1925 but
written with the postdated insight of the Bust, Fitzgerald‟s expatriate characters stage an invasion
that expresses rather frankly the aggressiveness of American commercial and cultural intrusions
in interwar France.
Fitzgerald and Hemingway both noted the irony inherent in expatriate American
affectations of bohemian artistic and economic values. With an equally sharp tongue, Zelda
likened, in the pages of Save Me the Waltz (1932), the fiscal side of the American expatriate
experience to the “sword of Damocles, forged from the high hope of getting something for
nothing and the demoralizing expectation of getting nothing for something” (Collected Writings
98). Authors who had gone abroad to the cosmopolitan capital of Paris for the purpose of fleeing
a decade of Harding, Coolidge, and Prohibition found the era‟s hallmark American capitalism,
exceptionalism, and isolationism by their side at every step. They came sharing Stein‟s
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aspirations for laying the cosmopolitan foundations of twentieth-century art and literature, but
they inadvertently lugged the imperialist burden of the American century along with them. As
artists, they founded an American colony based unintentionally but nevertheless significantly on
exclusion; as celebrities, they accidentally commercialized the Left Bank as a fashionable
vacation spot for visiting intellectuals and pop culture-minded tourists alike; as drinkers, they
revolutionized the Paris proletariat café and bistro scene by creating a new market for bourgeois
American bars.
The French, themselves no strangers to colonization, were not entirely receptive to these
intrusions. They were also growing tired of the US government‟s interference in French and
European economic concerns. During WWI, the United States and Britain had agreed to
maintain stable exchange rates with the French; after the war, these measures expired, leading to
an excess of francs in circulation from the war effort and a subsequent decrease in value for the
currency.4 From 1921 to 1922, as the French sought war reparations from Germany, the
governments of both America and England refused to support France‟s claim. What happened as
a result was an economic crisis during which the value of the franc plummeted, leading to
suffering on the part of the French poor and a favorable exchange rate for the deluge of
expatriates (Parry and Girard 133-34). Desperate to lay hands on any sort of reparations, France
and Belgium sent troops to the Ruhr in Germany to extract natural resources from local mines
and to intimidate the German government. In response to the occupation, American and British
political leaders threatened to recall French loans and refuse to issue new ones; thus the franc
dipped an additional forty-six percent in value in 1924 (Conklin et al. 157). The US-backed
Dawes Plan, the brainchild of American banker Charles Dawes, guaranteed a portion of
reparations to be paid in exchange for the politically humiliating withdrawal of the French-
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Belgian coalition troops. Making an all-too literal investment in European politics, the United
States would loan Germany funds to pay a small percentage of the reparations.
French citizens projected their frustrations with the US government onto American
tourists, and, in the summer of 1926, Parisians threw trash and vegetables at a sightseeing bus
full of Americans outside the Place de l‟Opéra, which was not only a popular tourist area but also
home to many of Paris‟s bourgeois American permanent residents. Massive national tax hikes
(as high as twenty percent in some cases) and purposeful devaluation of the franc (to stabilize the
tanking currency) further soured the atmosphere, leaving the French increasingly less
sympathetic to foreigners keen on benefitting from their tumultuous economy. More riots
occurred in 1927 following the Sacco and Vanzetti executions. French radicals, angry at the US
government‟s handling of these accused anarchists, broke windows at the Select as well as other
businesses that catered to American expatriates (Blower 11-12, 124).
Fitzgerald acknowledged his awareness of simmering anti-American animosity in August
1926 when he wrote a friend, “Unless the Americans are first driven out of France (as at present
seems not unlikely)—I‟ll be home with the finished manuscript of my book about midDecember... Whether the spring will see us back on Long Island or returning to Europe depends
on politics, finances and our personal desires” (Letters 207). Yet it was two forces of primarily
US origin that ultimately crippled the American colony in Paris: its own snowballing popularity
and the encroaching Depression. Jimmie the barman captured both of these in his memoirs,
explaining that by 1925 “too much advertising had turned the spontaneity of „la vie de bohème‟
into a huge commercial success” and that “the cafés continued to flourish mightily until the
depression swept most of the Americans and English—the biggest spenders, of course—back to
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their native lands” (14). Had Huddleston waited one more year to publish his 1928 critique of
the “Cocktail Epoch,” he might have been able to pen its obituary.

Stars and Bars: Cultural Exports and Transnational Nationalism
Though it evaporated at the beginning of the Depression and the end of Prohibition, the
American colony in Paris carried significant transnational resonance because it foreshadowed the
invasive, globalizing power of American cultural exports in the twentieth century. The
American bar itself was one of the US‟s first internationally franchisable entities, something that
might be regarded as a forerunner to the dominating global power of American fast food chains
like McDonalds. The phenomenon of American bars and American authors becoming
fashionable in a foreign metropolis notorious for defining fashion hints at the rise of the
American century, the worldwide appeal that the US culture industry would soon exert—not to
mention the martial might and ideological coerciveness of the nation-state‟s surging militaryindustrial complex. The artist Marcel Duchamp intuited these connections as early as 1934,
when, thinking back on the expatriate scene, he labeled Hollywood an “industrialized,
popularized Montparnasse” (qtd. in Charters 156). In the final section of this chapter, I intend to
use the American colony as chronicled by Fitzgerald and his peers to perform a comparative
study of imperial strategies practiced in the era by the United States and France. My purpose,
drawing from Pease‟s call for such an approach, is to articulate the relation between the cultural
arm of the early twentieth-century American “empire” (its cocktail bars, its literary stars, and its
buoyant dollars) and the post-WWI civilizing mission of French colonizers in West Africa.
These two imperialist-democratic ideologies, so superficially different, both sprang from a
common capitalist drive for wealth and market expansion. Moreover, both modern nations now
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face the threat of transnational nationalism from unassimilated immigrant communities—a
political effect evident earlier in the shared space of Parisian-American bar.
In the late nineteenth-century European rush to occupy Africa, the French colonizing
imperative operated under two presumptions: that it could civilize West Africans and that it
could make this venture profitable. In this era, French statesman Jules Ferry remarked,
“European consumption is saturated; we must create new bodies of consumers in other parts of
the world, or else modern society will go bankrupt” (qtd. in Parry and Girard 87). His rhetoric of
assimilation suggests the French intention that African “bodies” and minds would be made over
in the image of the rational, thrifty Frenchman to ensure the never-ending market expansion
required for economic growth in the classic capitalist model. This was primarily a capitalistsecular mode of empire-building, with little emphasis on religion and much on producing new
consumers and new capital. In actuality, the West African colonies seldom yielded the desired
economic results and cultural assimilation proved incredibly difficult, for behind the humanist
rhetoric of compassion and civilization rested the glaring financial motive, obvious to all parties
involved. Money concerns troubled relations between continental French and colonized West
Africans, who, due to failures in production, were unable to “buy in” to civilization. After WWI,
French politicians planned to use German reparations to pay for colonial improvements (like
better healthcare facilities and new schools) in the region; lacking these, the imperialists fell back
on exploitative forced labor strategies in an attempt to make the colonies profitable (Conklin et
al. 168).
Notwithstanding its comparatively liberal ideology of assimilation, the French occupation
of West Africa from the late-nineteenth to mid-twentieth century adhered to a traditional
European model of colonization that required regular army presence and official government
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sanction. Following roughly the same timeline, businessmen, artists, and celebrities from the
United States were testing a new form of unsanctioned, civilian cultural colonization in Paris. It
is tempting, perhaps, to regard this as an overstatement, an exaggeration of an innocent moment
in transatlantic history, but historians are now beginning to see the American colony in Paris not
as a bohemian freespace (as it was romanticized during the Depression and in later popular
culture) but as a dominated zone prefiguring America‟s hegemonic role in later globalization.
Blower writes, “After World War I, Americans reinvented their national life in Paris,
transforming what had been a modest colony or outpost into a colony in the more grandiose
sense of the term—a foray into foreign space that threatened to dominate and redirect local life”
(24). The decade‟s ballooning population of permanent American residents in Paris attests to the
veracity of her claim: in 1920, 8,000 Americans (many of them de-mobbed soldiers) claimed
residence, but by 1923 that amount increased exponentially to 32,000—and it would later reach
as high as 40,000 (Blower 6). If these numbers seem inconsequential when compared to Paris‟s
estimated 1924 population of 3,500,000 (Baedeker xxvii), it bears noting that they do not at all
account for the inestimable flood of tourists—temporary residents—pouring into Paris on a daily
basis, pockets heavy with inflated francs. By 1927, the Paris American Chamber of Commerce
had thousands of members, many of these representatives of businesses and services that sprang
up to cater to Americans and French citizens who desired American goods: doctors, grocery
stores, and, of course, cocktail bars (Blower 28, 7). The 1924 Baedeker travel guide to Paris
devotes two full pages to British and American health care providers operating in the City of
Light (43-44). Notable too is one fact to which I alluded earlier in the chapter—that French
West African colonial subjects were not always welcome in these establishments, some of which
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practiced informal racial segregation when they could do so without drawing the ire of the Paris
police.
Americans of the 1920s colonized Paris as a playground but also as a commercial zone.
The rapid proliferation of American citizens and businesses in the French cosmopolis
demonstrates this clearly, but it should also be remembered that expatriate authors came to
France to do business as well. The American intelligentsia‟s flight to Paris might be regarded in
economic terms that borrow from and revise European modes of colonialism: they occupied a
resource hub to produce intellectual capital and to expand their markets. Fitzgerald in particular
was obsessed with reinventing himself in France as something more than a wunderkind college
writer. He wanted Gatsby, his least expressly political novel to date, to stand on its own stylistic
and structural merit, and from France he regularly wrote Max Perkins to check its disappointing
sales numbers. Hemingway, too, used France as a base of operations for expanding the
marketability of his talent. Desiring fiercely to be more than the small journal writer whose
name was misspelled in The Best Short Stories of 1923, he struggled to break his contract with
the avant-garde press Boni & Liveright so that he could sign with the conservative, powerful
Scribner firm—a scheme engineered in part by Fitzgerald. As many critics have noted,
Hemingway‟s The Sun Also Rises is littered with commercialist language that suggests finances
occupied his mind during composition and revision. In one section, a drunken Jake summarizes
his existential philosophy of “exchange of values”: “Enjoying living was learning to get your
money‟s worth and knowing when you got it. You could get your money‟s worth. The world
was a good place to buy in” (152). In another, he projects his fiscal-mindedness onto the entire
country of France: “Everything is on such a clear financial basis in France.... If you want people
to like you you have only to spend a little money” (237). Much later in life, Hemingway was
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still imagining Paris in economic terms; he would comment in his A Moveable Feast manuscript
that Paris “was always worth it and we received a return for whatever we brought to it” (236).
Of course, Hemingway refers to more than mere financial investment in each of these passages,
but fiscal rhetoric nevertheless frames his engagement with France.5
If American literature and mixed drinks seem strange weapons for deployment in a
colonial conflict, it bears noting that American imperialism has seldom been as overt as its
European counterpart. The expansionist history of Manifest Destiny is, though fraught with
atrocities, patterned on a narrative logic distinctly different from that of colonial imperialism.
Later, after the closing of the western frontier, US imperial strategies were not about land
acquisition but market expansion. So, in the twentieth century, although the United States was
certainly willing to flex its military might to spread the gospel of free-market capitalism, it more
often disseminated its ideology through popular culture, fast food, and conspicuous consumption.
Today, when fundamentalist provocateurs and terrorists rail against “American imperialism,”
they typically have in mind the globalizing action of American corporate culture as much as they
do injustices carried out abroad by the US government. Thus, working towards political ends,
modern terrorists commonly target civilians and businesses, assuming complicity. The “années
folles” Parisians who threw bricks through the windows of the Select and pelted American tour
buses with garbage made similar assumptions, for with bars and cocktails, with novels and
dollars, Americans had succeeded at annexing French territory, crowding out the proletarian café
scene. On the part of the conquering army, the only shots fired were made of liquor, perhaps
flowing freely into one of Jerry Thomas‟s flaming Blue Blazers.
As early evidence of the American century that would follow, the American colony in
Paris was a space that displayed both transnational and exceptionalist qualities. Taking the
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definition of “transnational” literally, it was very much a place between nations, where boosted
currency bought foreigners the right of perpetual occupation and where expatriates were defined
less by the place they were than the place they had left. But, as phenomena like informal racial
and economic segregation remind us, the shifting terrain of the American colony was also a place
of exclusion and exception. Through the currency exchange and the artistic inspiration Paris
provided, a transatlantic fraud transpired: Paris‟s many American businesses helped keep
American dollars in American hands, and its American salons supported an expatriate counterculture industry devoted to producing new American art. In this manner, it operated like an
evolving cultural form of imperialism, and there was an accidental “civilizing mission” at work
to boot. As Cowley noted in 1951, expatriate culture made the French eager consumers of
imported American products, and American loan-sponsored relief efforts paved the way for an
urban rebuilding that facilitated modern advertising and American-style cinemas (Conklin et al.
172). Nor was Paris the only city where this “American bar” strategy of cultural colonization
took place; during Prohibition, something like an exodus of American bars and American culture
took place, with Volstead exiles dispensing cocktails from Havana, Cuba to Casablanca,
Morocco (Sismondo 219, 278). Transnational transactions that privileged American culture—
the sort chronicled by Fitzgerald, Hemingway, and others—spanned the globe.
Although the classical colonial imperialist model fails to accurately describe the spatial
intrusion of the American colony in Paris (which created an exclusive American commercial
subculture with its own economy and art), it may be possible to regard it instead as a form of
transnational nationalism. Sociologists are presently using this term to define “a new type of
nationalism that is transnational—that is, a nationalism that is expressed and developed beyond
and outside the borders of a single state and its territory” (Kastoryano 160). Often, they apply
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the term to the modern behavior of unassimilated immigrant groups who resist the sociopolitical
ethos of an adopted country by forming insular sub-communities and by touting fundamental
beliefs imported from a distinct country of origin. In first-world environments where
assimilation is advocated either explicitly or implicitly, such behavior “arouses nationalist
sentiments in both home and host countries, and beyond” and “creates new expressions of
belonging and a political engagement that reflects the nationalization of communitarian
sentiments guided by an „imagined geography‟” (Kastoryano 160). Yet this “new type of
nationalism that is transnational” is, as we have seen, hardly new. Modern research on the
phenomenon focuses primarily on nonwhite others belonging to Muslim immigrant communities
in the United States and the European Union, but US nationals practiced this very behavior in
1920s Paris, creating a Little America in the French metropole.
Sociologist Riva Kastoryano encourages us to interpret twenty-first century occurrences
of transnational nationalism as informal political movements that cut across geographical
boundaries by “employing discourses, symbols, images, and objects” (167). This approach is
helpful for mapping the commercial-cultural geography of the early twentieth-century American
colony in Paris, which was thinly networked across the city in a chaotic grid from the Opera
district and Montmartre to Montparnasse and working class areas on the opposite side of the
Seine. For, in a very real sense, the imagined American geography that expatriates cultivated in
Paris was most present in its commercial spaces and objects: bars, stores, and books produced in
France but evoking hints of American nationalism. The prohibitive pricing at American bars
reeked of the pro-capital political environment of the 1920s US, and the exclusionary effect these
prices had on French laborers mirrored the way Prohibition had complicated poor Americans‟
access to liquor while leaving the rich and middle classes largely unaffected. Likewise, the
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success many expatriate novelists experienced in writing American fiction while living on
inflated francs paralleled the US government‟s foreign policy stance on Europe during the
decade: isolationist and exclusionist in theory, while in practice willing to intervene for the sake
of profit and unilateral benefit. This is not to say that authors like Fitzgerald and Hemingway
were intentionally complicit in anti-European nationalistic behavior or that they lacked global
awareness after their time abroad, for certainly many American authors left Paris with strong
internationalist political beliefs that they would hold for the rest of their lives. But they
nevertheless altered the cultural geography of Paris, so that today one can visit the city and
indulge in Hemingway and expatriate tours, retracing their steps in and around American bars,
many of which are still standing.
From the retrospective vantage of literary history, it is common practice to regard the
American expatriate experience as normative, even natural, given how many canonical modern
American works were produced as a direct result of the phenomenon. But it must not be
forgotten that US nationals who doubled as permanent and semi-permanent residents of Paris
formed an inassimilable immigrant community that generated then nearly as much transnational
tension as similar groups composed of ethnic minorities do today in the US and EU.
Transplanted spaces like the American saloon, which carried in its history and its drink recipes
traces of American regional identity, worked to reproduce a US-privileging cultural geography
abroad. The imaginary American spaces summoned into existence by expatriate fiction did
much the same. When expatriate authors endeavored to represent their vision of interwar France
by writing first and foremost about Parisian-American bars, they wove a discrete, self-reflexive
information loop that scribbled American signifiers palimpsestically over an endlessly complex
twentieth-century European experience. The most self-conscious of these authors eventually
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acknowledged, first, their failure to represent non-Anglophone aspects of European culture and,
second, the deleterious influence American commercialism exerted abroad—as Fitzgerald did in
“Babylon Revisited” when he recollected Paris‟s snow as a Hollywood special effect: “the snow
of twenty-nine wasn't real snow. If you didn't want it to be snow, you just paid some money”
(633). These authors‟ fictions and their favorite bars serve to remind us of the ephemerality and
portability of American place, representations of which circulated in the twentieth century, the
American century, as imagined geographies and fungible commodities.
***
On the surface, Fitzgerald‟s America looks like a small, homogenous place: the lily-white
zone of the “great American novelist,” hemmed in by his regrettably short career and his fixation
on settings occupied by upper-middle-class white characters. To read Fitzgerald without delving
into his neglected stories, his transregional American life, and his self-conscious critique of
expatriate behavior is to accept those limits. But digging into Fitzgerald‟s “little lower layer”
means recognizing that his America, in both its material and illusory aspects, frequently exceeds
them. It is the rich collection of sites he imagined in fiction, the history behind and around these
geographic fantasies, and the perforated borders where his imaginings spill over into works of
other authors, contributing to multiple discourses on cultural geography. Simultaneously
placeless and tied to numerous places, Fitzgerald and his works provide an invaluable index for
exploring changing valuations of American regions in modernist literature and popular culture.

Notes
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1

See Barbara Will‟s Unlikely Collaboration: Gertrude Stein, Bernard Fay, and the Vichy

Dilemma (Columbia UP, 2011) for details on unpublished letters in which Stein‟s Jewish identity
and her support for Nazi-occupied France come into conflict.
2

The Chicago Defender newspaper sometimes covered the African-American expatriate scene,

and it later hired author Langston Hughes (who traveled to Paris in 1924, 1937, and again in the
1965) to write weekly columns from 1942 through 1962. In one such article, Hughes wrote
about the odd phenomenon of facing racial prejudice in American establishments run by
immigrants. These proprietors refused him service because they feared it would drive out their
white clientele. He contrasts this domestic problem with his comparatively better experiences
receiving service abroad, including in France (Langston Hughes and the Chicago Defender 58).
The Defender itself boasted an interesting regional history, because founder Robert S. Abbott
used the pages of the paper to publicly encourage American blacks to flee the South and migrate
northward (13).
3

Some of these businesses receive only passing mention in the novel, while others feature more

prominently. Harry‟s appears briefly as the “New York Bar” in which “Harvey had won two
hundred francs… shaking poker dice” (Sun 49). Cohn‟s lover Frances mentions the Ritz as a
spot for a lunch date.
4

The US had also made substantial loans to France during WWI and declined to forgive these

debts after the war. Some internationalist thinkers regarded this as a shortsighted political move
that contributed significantly to European instability. James P. Warburg described the loans as
“our contribution toward winning the war” and “the price we paid in money for the lives which
Britain and France sacrificed during the first years when we were unaware that our own vital
interests were at stake” (Foreign Policy 87).
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5

In “Babylon Revisited,” Fitzgerald employs similar rhetoric but in a more penitent tone.

Recollecting “thousand-franc notes given to an orchestra for playing a single number” and
“hundred-franc notes tossed to a doorman for calling a cab,” Fitzgerald‟s protagonist tells his
sister-in-law that money made the expatriates “a sort of royalty, almost infallible” (619-20). Yet
Wales believes that the money he wasted in the Paris of the twenties had corrupted him—that,
though he “lost a lot in the crash,” he “lost everything [he] wanted in the boom” (633).
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